Obama's clock ticks down on Myanmar By Brian McCartan
CHIANG MAI - Remarks made by United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
about a review of US policy towards Myanmar have stirred new debate about the
effectiveness of Washington's long-held sanctions regime and what course
possible engagement with the hardline military junta should follow. Some
analysts have even interpreted Clinton's comments as a tacit admission that
past policies towards Myanmar have largely failed.
But Clinton may not have had a full-blown policy review in mind after her
comments at a February 17 "town hall" meeting at Tokyo University in response
to a question from a Myanmar student about policy alternatives to economic and
financial sanctions. According to an informed source with high-level US
government
contacts, Clinton's remarks were made largely off the cuff and were not
intended to signal a shift in policy.
Clinton followed up the remarks the following day at a press conference in
Jakarta, Indonesia, where she said, "Clearly the path we have taken in imposing
sanctions hasn't influenced the [Myanmar] junta." She added that the
"constructive engagement" route taken by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) since 1997 has also not had much positive effect. In reply to
questions on Clinton's remarks, the State Department has since said that the
policy review is ongoing.
The 1995 Free Burma Act imposed stiff economic and trade sanctions against
Myanmar for its abysmal human-rights record. An amendment to the 1997 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act allowed the US president to determine if and when
to impose sanctions on Myanmar and gave the executive the diplomatic
flexibility to decide whether the generals had improved the country's human
rights policy. In 1997, then-president Bill Clinton issued Executive Order
13047 which disallowed most new investment in Myanmar.
In 2003, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act was signed by president George W
Bush and banned the importation of any Myanmar product, froze any US-situated
assets of certain Myanmar government officials and imposed a visa ban on
Myanmar officials and their families. That was followed by more financial
sanctions in 2007 against select Myanmar government officials, their family
members and their business associates and related companies.
Last year the Tom Lantos Burma JADE Act came into force, imposing financial
sanctions and travel restrictions as well as sanctions on the import of Myanmar
jade and other stones and jewelry.
Opponents of the sanctions say that ordinary Myanmar citizens suffer more than
the targeted generals and that after 14 years there is little evidence they
have influenced the military regime to reform. At the same time, the sanctions
have pushed the regime further into China's sphere of influence and allowed
companies from South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, China and India to pursue
investment opportunities that American companies must forego.
Mixed signals
Scot Marciel, the new US special envoy to ASEAN, said at a conference held in
late February at the Institute of Security and International Studies at
Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University, "The US's goals and objectives for
[Myanmar] remain the same." He went on to specify those objectives as a
unified, peaceful and stable Myanmar, the release of political prisoners, and
genuine dialogue between the government and the political opposition.
Many Myanmar observers thought they saw more proof in a possible shift in
American policy in late March when Stephen Blake, director of the Office for
Mainland Southeast Asia, made the first visit by a senior US diplomat to
Myanmar in over seven years. The State Department played down the visit and
said it was a part of a five-country tour and did not signal a change in
policy. Following diplomatic protocol, Blake held meetings with Myanmar's
Foreign Minister Nyan Win and other government ministers, as well as senior
members of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD).
According to Jennifer Quigley, advocacy director for the Washington-based US
Campaign for Burma, "It is all part of the game. Everyone knows that to have
real talks they must speak with [Senior General] Than Shwe." In an April 3
article written for the Far Eastern Economic Review, the US Campaign for
Burma's executive director wrote, "Direct engagement should only be with the
regime's sole decision maker, Senior General Than Shwe. Meetings with other
officials, who are not involved in decision making, will not produce results."
The Committee Representing the People's Parliament (CRPP), a group formed to
represent the members of parliament elected in Myanmar's annulled 1990
elections, further muddled the issue when it told The Irrawaddy magazine that
Blake told them in a meeting in Yangon that some existing sanctions would be
removed while others would remain in place. These comments apparently inspired
17 members of the US Congress to write a letter to Clinton on April 3,
expressing their concern about the possible lifting of sanctions.
If there are to be any changes to US policy towards Myanmar, they won't likely
take place until this autumn or later. The US has yet to appoint an assistant
secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs or one for Democracy, Human Rights
and Labor, the two bureaus that have primary responsibility for Myanmar. US
President Barack Obama this week nominated Kurt Campbell for the East Asia
post, but until he is confirmed and the other assistant secretary slot is
filled, a full review of Myanmar policy can not be undertaken.
Whether intentional or not, Clinton's comments have stirred up a hornets' nest
of debate on possible methods of engagement and the efficacy of past sanctions.
At a seminar at the New Delhi-based Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies on
February 5, Andrew Selth, a research fellow at Australia's Griffith University
and noted Myanmar scholar, outlined three possible approaches for dealing with
Myanmar.
The first, favored by previous US governments, entails the use of sanctions to
pressure the regime into political change. The second is the "constructive
engagement" policy followed by ASEAN. The third is a more pragmatic approach
preferred by China, India and Russia, which have engaged the junta
economically. The second and third approaches are focused on developing better
relations to promote business interests with very little, if any, criticism of
Myanmar's human-rights record or poor governance.
Business pressures
As noted by Clinton in Jakarta, none of these approaches have so far been
successful in pressuring the junta towards change. Some big US business
interests, including oil and gas giant Chevron, which has energy interests
pre-dating the imposition of sanctions on Myanmar, as well as the US-ASEAN
Business Council, have said they would like to see sanctions rescinded
entirely.
Others are calling for the removal of the blanket economic sanctions, including
a ban on new investments, while keeping in place the more recently Treasury
Department imposed "smart sanctions" that target the bank accounts and travel
ability of certain junta members, their families and business associates.
The anti-sanction lobby claims the restrictions have slowed Myanmar's economic
development and hindered US business interests. Several American companies
opted to pull out of Myanmar in the 1990s, including Pepsi, Levi-Strauss and
Apple Computers due to consumer and shareholder pressure, leaving Chevron as
the only major US company with significant interests in Myanmar.
Sanctions opponents argue further that economic engagement with Myanmar would
create another locus of power - a growing middle class - that will press for
more rule of law, protection of private property and eventually democracy. They
contend US-led sanctions have allowed more morally ambiguous countries like
China to win diplomatic and economic sway.
Sean Turnell, a professor at Australia's Macquarie University and editor of
Burma Economic Watch, said in testimony on Thursday before the Tom Lantos Human
Rights Commission that "economic and financial sanctions should be retained at
the present time". He said the Bush administration's financial sanctions are
"especially justifiable" and could be used as leverage in response to genuine
reform in Myanmar.
"Lifting sanctions now would not only embolden [Myanmar's] present reform-shy
regime, but also greatly de-leverage the ability of the United States to
influence future events," he cautioned.
Turnell also argued that the creation of a middle class in Myanmar was not
possible any time soon precisely because the regime controlled virtually all
capital goods such as oil, gas, gems, and agriculture. Most economic activity
is centered within the state sector, with private businesses forced to deal
with the state for contracts, permits or licenses.
Turnell also explained how poverty in Myanmar was caused by decades of chronic
economic mismanagement that predated US and Western sanctions and has continued
into the present. He also argued that investment from non-American companies
made economic sense, noting that there is little demand in the US for Myanmar
goods but that there is in neighboring countries.
Others agree with that economic reasoning. The US Campaign for Burma's Quigley
said, "Now is the wrong time to go soft. If sanctions are ended, the regime
looks victorious." She continued, "Many people talk of sanctions versus
engagement, but it is really sanctions and engagement. The more the regime
engages with the NLD and the ethnic minorities then sanctions can be reduced."
Fragmented community
Still, many observers recognize that while isolation has not worked, neither
has unilateral engagement nor attempts by United Nations' envoys to open
genuine discussions with the regime's leadership. The ruling generals are
clearly aware that the international community is fragmented in its approach
and are able to leverage the different views and approaches to their advantage.
Selth argued it is crucial to gauge the generals' mentality and play on their
perceived threats to national security. Instead, if the US shifts tack, it is
expected to take a multilateral approach in which Washington engages more with
Myanmar's ASEAN neighbors in an attempt to form a united policy front vis-a-vis
China's and India's commercial first approach towards the junta.
Given ASEAN's policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member
states, this will not be an easy task. One idea put forward by some analysts is
to follow the six-party talks format now used in discussions with North Korea.
But this approach is less likely to work with Myanmar's generals because of
their known strong aversion to any foreign intervention. Nor is Myanmar
dependent on the international community for food aid, as is the case with
North Korea.
The potential for a US policy shift comes while humanitarian organizations
debate over how much change can be leveraged from the junta's openness to their
activities in the Irrawaddy Delta following the Cyclone Nargis disaster last
May. One side believes that the access they gained may be expanded to the rest
of the country as long as the international community goes softer on its push
for political change. Others argue that the regime's openness in the Delta is
likely only temporary and that the generals have used the aid for political
gains.
Koos Richelle, director general of the European Commission's Europe Aid
Cooperation, said after a late April meeting in Manila that the EU was willing
to provide increased development aid to Myanmar, but that the country's leaders
were "not opening up for what we consider to be normal contact". Expressing
frustration at the generals' refusal to discuss development programs needed by
the country, he said, "We are not a money making machine throwing envelopes
over the fence."
A separate process, apparently unrelated to Clinton's remarks in Indonesia, is
the Myanmar policy review announced by the US Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which will begin next month and take three to four months to
complete. The aim of the review, congressional staffers say, is to make US
policy towards Myanmar more effective and to increase international cooperation
on Myanmar.
The two movers behind the Senate policy review, however, approach Myanmar from
two very different directions. Democrat Senator John Kerry, the new chairman of
the committee, has been a long-time supporter of the Myanmar's squashed
democracy movement. Rather than soften policy, Kerry is reportedly more
interested in finding ways to increase humanitarian aid to the country without
softening pressure for political change.
Democratic Senator James Webb, on the other hand, comes from a more
business-minded perspective and would like to see sanctions partially or
entirely removed. He said on April 3 that the US should have a more
constructive policy on Myanmar that works toward removing sanctions through a
more "aggressive diplomatic posture" and through confidence-building measures.
Still, many activists and Myanmar analysts think there is likely to be little,
if any, substantive change in US policy on Myanmar any time soon. They note
that the Tom Lantos JADE Act, which bars US imports of Myanmar gems from third
countries, was passed less than a year ago by a wide margin in Congress. New
Vice President Joseph Biden, they note, was a key player in the JADE Act's
passage.
The first real indication of the Obama administration's intentions towards
Myanmar will come when he decides whether to extend the New Investment Ban,
which was first put in place by then President Bill Clinton in 1997 and is set
to expire on May 15.
The ban has been a key part of the US's sanctions regime and its renewal would
signal Obama intends to remain tough with Myanmar. Should he allow it to lapse,
it could signal a more conciliatory policy approach to a regime the outgoing
Bush administration once referred to as an "outpost of tyranny".
Brian McCartan is a Chiang Mai-based freelance journalist. He may be
reached at brianpm@comcast.net.
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