The day before last week's bombings of two luxury hotels in Jakarta, the
Australian Strategic Policy Research Institute (ASPRI) released a report
warning of possible new attacks by Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Southeast Asia's
largest terrorist network.
The report "Jemaah Islamiyah: A renewed struggle?" indicated a possible
resurgence of attacks because of competition among extremist factions inside JI
seeking to establish dominance. The day before the report's release, two newly
recruited suicide bombers checked into the JW Marriott hotel in Jakarta.
They later smuggled explosives into the hotel, which was highly secured by
armed guards and metal detectors, and used room 1808 as a makeshift command
center to assemble the bombs
and make final preparations for Indonesia's first terrorist attack in nearly
four years.
Closed-circuit television footage from the JW Marriott on the morning of
Friday, July 17, shows one of the suicide bombers, wearing a baseball cap,
carrying a backpack on his chest and wheeling a suitcase, as he walked
purposefully toward a hotel cafe where 18 business executives and an Australian
trade commissioner were having a breakfast meeting.
About two minutes later, his partner in terror detonated himself at the
restaurant of the nearby Ritz Carlton. The attacks killed nine people,
including the two bombers, and injured over 50 others. They came nine days
after presidential elections in which incumbent president Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono was re-elected in a landslide.
The elections have been hailed as the most peaceful in Indonesia's history, and
while pre-election violence was always a possibility considering the country's
turbulent past, few expected such deadly attacks would occur well after the
vote. Earlier speculation that Yudhoyono's political enemies may have played a
role in the bombings has been widely discounted due to the nature of the
explosives and method of attack.
"The attacks come at an unexpected time and are intended to rattle the country
after the most trouble-free election Indonesia has ever seen," wrote STRATFOR,
a US-based private intelligence firm in an analysis of the bombings. "By
attacking five-star hotels in the capital, the perpetrators have reminded the
international business community of Indonesia's inherent security concerns.”
One of Yudhoyono's bigger achievements in his first term was the curbing of
Islamic extremism. Dozens of JI members were arrested or killed and several
deadly plots were thwarted, including a planned bombing of a cafe frequented by
Western tourists in West Sumatra in 2008. According to several assessments, the
international linkages that gave JI members access to funds and training have
been decimated.
Yudhoyono notched those successes by addressing terrorist threats more through
police work than military means, establishing village-level intelligence
networks, rehabilitating and reintegrating former militants into society, and
allowing opportunities for Islamists to participate in above-ground politics
and organizations.
Those policies have been coupled with substantial outside assistance from the
United States and Australia, including the establishment, funding, equipping
and training of the country's elite Detachment 88 counter-terrorism taskforce.
"[Yudhoyono] has done exceptionally well in terms of arresting JI members and
making them talk," said Noor Huda Ismail, executive director of Indonesia's
International Institute for Peacebuilding and co-author of the recent ASPRI
paper.
Those policies, however, have not come without criticism. Human rights groups
say the country's anti-terror legislation and decrees curb basic human rights,
while Yudhoyono has been repeatedly criticized for over-accommodating Islamic
hardliners and allowing them to influence government policy.
Extreme splinters
At the same time, Yudhoyono's counter-terrorism successes have apparently
caused a reactive transformation of the group. "I'm not sure JI or any other
label has any relevance any more," said long-time Indonesia observer and
veteran journalist John McBeth. "There are obviously networks, but they are
pretty fragmented and disparate."
According to the ASPRI report, JI has fractured into three categories: those
who are cooperative with the authorities, those whose position is unclear, and
those who continue to resist the authorities. Violence-prone splinter groups,
consisting of members of the latter category, are now seeking to reassert
themselves, according to the ASPRI research.
"JI is no longer a cohesive organization with a clear, unified leadership
structure," the same report argues. "The continued leadership split in the JI
organization and the release from prison of unreformed members of the group ...
raises the possibility that splinter factions might now seek to re-energize the
movement through violent attacks."
One of these splinter factions is said to be led by Noordin Mohamed Top, a
Malaysian-born former accountant who became an Islamic extremist now known in
intelligence circles for his bomb-making capabilities. Noordin is known to have
fled to Indonesia after the Malaysian government's crackdown on Islamic
extremists, following the September 11, 2001, terror attacks against the United
States.
Noordin is also believed to be responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in
Indonesia, including the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed 202 people and
injured more than 200, the bombing of the JW Marriott in Jakarta in 2003, the
bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004, and the follow-up Bali
bombings of 2005. In April 2006, he narrowly escaped arrest when Indonesian
police raided his safehouse.
"Noordin Top is a very intelligent person, not because of his being an
accountant, but from his experiences as well as his knowledge of the Islamic
faith and the expertise that he has derived over the years working closely with
JI members," said Andrin Raj, a counter-terrorism expert and director of
Malaysia's Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Center.
"From my research and understanding of Noordin Top, he is likely to continue
his endeavors for jihad and will die as a jihadist," he added.
Terrorism analysts contend that Noordin drifted away from the mainstream JI
group due to a disagreement over hitting "soft targets", such as hotels and
nightclubs, which directly target civilians. In 2006, Noordin is believed to
have founded the group Tanzim Qaedat al-Jihad, which translates as the
Organization for the Base of Jihad - also referred to as al-Qaeda for the Malay
Archipelago.
Analysts say it is the most radical and violent of the JI splinter groups and
advocates the killing of Westerners. Other factional groups identified in the
Australian Strategic Policy Research Institute's report are Jamaah Anshorut
Tauhid (JAT) and Jamaah Tauhid wal Jihad. The former was allegedly set up last
year by JI's reputed spiritual leader, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, while the latter is
said to be a study group led by Aman Abdurrahman, a young Muslim teacher,
according to the ASPRI report.
Most fingers have pointed to Noordin's group as the likely culprit behind the
July 17 attacks in Jakarta. Police say the bombs used were similar to the
explosive devices discovered at an Islamic boarding school in Central Java that
were uncovered during a raid just days before the Jakarta bombings. The police
had apparently received information Noordin was seen earlier at the school.
The explosives used at the hotel bombings, they said, were also the same type
used in the 2002 Bali bombings that Noordin and JI stand accused of
orchestrating. Analysts say that the more mainstream JI faction now rejects the
extreme tactics of Noordin and other hard-line group elements, believing that
the disadvantages of launching indiscriminate attacks that harm innocent
civilians - such as generating public outrage and resulting in inevitable
crackdowns on their organization - far outweigh the benefits.
This supposed faction, known by analysts as the "traditionalists", is allegedly
led by Abu Rusdan, an Indonesian religious teacher who was sentenced to
three-and-a-half years in prison in 2004 for giving sanctuary to one of the
2002 Bali bombers, who have since been convicted and executed under Yudhoyono's
watch.
Rejecting such tactics, however, does not make the traditionalists any less
radical; rather, analysts say, it is a strategic decision that could shift with
changed circumstances. And while these traditionalists may reject the tactics
of the hardliners, they remain ideological allies, say analysts.
"Although internal friction is apparent among JI members, this does not mean
they will call the police and report the whereabouts of Top," said Noor Huda
Ismail in e-mail correspondence. "Such individuals would be happy to provide
sanctuary for Top and have even arranged for his nuptials with women who
believe that marrying Top will increase their social status because he is
considered a mujahid, a warrior of Islam."
JI's fracture into splinter groups has apparently left the group without a
formal chain of command. But as last week's attacks in Jakarta demonstrate,
factions and cells have the capability and will to act on their own with
devastating effect. "The Jakarta bombing is a means to show that JI is indeed
active and capable of carrying out strategic attacks within the region," said
Andrin of Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Center.
Nelson Rand is a journalist based in Bangkok, Thailand. He has a Master's
Degree in Asia Pacific Policy Studies and is the author of the newly released
bookConflict: Journeys through war and terror in Southeast Asia.
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