SPEAKING FREELY An 'Asia-Pacific' chimera
By Andy Yee
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Since Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd proposed building an Asia-Pacific
community in June last year, there has been considerable debate among
policymakers and academics on reforming the regional architecture of East Asia.
In the recently concluded US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, however,
regional security arrangements received little attention.
If anything can be learned about the recent proliferation of multilateral
institutions, it is that they are very often driven by, not drivers of, the
political and economic realities of each region.
Around China's near abroad in East, Central and South Asia, three regional
communities have taken shape: the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). These three
regions have different degrees of economic integration. Politically, three
respective axes differentiate them: US-China, China-Russia and China-India.
Political relationships in the three axes show sharp contrast. Take a look at
military ties. China and Russia held joint military exercises under the name
"Peace Mission" as recently as last month, and also in 2007 and 2005. In
contrast, the US and China agreed only to resume high-level military exchanges.
A few months ago, their relations were shadowed by a maritime incident in the
South China Sea. In June this year, India was ramping up its military
deployment along its border with China, positioning two army divisions as well
as squadrons of Su-30.
By observing patterns of regional architecture in these regions, we can see
that they are often manifestations of political and economic realities.
East Asia
East Asian regional architectures have developed significantly over the past
two decades, represented by a matrix of organizations including ASEAN, the
ASEAN+1s, ASEAN+3 and the East Asia Summit (EAS).
These arrangements are very different from other regions. Firstly, they
emphasize informal dialogue and trust-building over formal agreements ("the
ASEAN way"). Secondly, they are all ASEAN-driven, but have significant
overlaps, representing different views on the membership of an East Asian
community. Thirdly, they focus mainly on free trade, economic and development
issues. Recently, however, they are moving towards wider regional issues and
non-traditional security threats.
Different interpretations exist as to China's goals of multilateral diplomacy:
whether this is a realpolitik effort to advance national interest and erode US
power in the region, or a genuine commitment as a responsible stakeholder.
While it is difficult to identify empirical evidence, the above-mentioned
regional characteristics suggest that both may be occurring.
East Asian economies have well-developed trade and financial relationships. The
ASEAN-Japan free trade area (known as the Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement) took effect in December 2008. An ASEAN-China Free Trade Area will
take effect in 2010 for certain ASEAN countries, and be fully developed in
2015. The ASEAN+3 countries boost a common regional reserve pool known as the
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization of US$120 billion. Meanwhile, Beijing
often speaks of China's peaceful rise (heping jueqi). It demonstrates
this by active participation in multilateral organizations.
However, China's neighbors do not want to see Sino-US rivalry played out in
their front yard. Shortly after the 2001 EP-3 surveillance plane incident,
Singapore's Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew remarked: "We in Southeast Asia held
our breath. When it was over, we heaved a sigh of relief." They do not want to
be forced to choose between the US and China. An ASEAN-led system is acceptable
to China, the US and other East Asian countries.
Yet, US alliances in Asia are still concerned about China's dominance in
ASEAN+3. In response, they pushed for the creation of EAS, by adding India,
Australia and New Zealand into the existing ASEAN+3. In order not to appear
obstructionist, China has tried to downplay the importance of EAS rather than
refusing to be part of it. Before the first EAS summit in 2005, China
maintained that ASEAN+3, not the EAS, should be in the driver's seat for the
East Asia community-building exercise. In the second EAS summit in 2007,
Premier Wen Jiabao argued that the EAS should more properly serve as a
strategic platform for the exchange of ideas and facilitation of cooperation.
As a hedge, China prefers informal, non-institutionalized dialogues to reduce
the risk of a coordinated effort to constrain its action.
Central Asia
The SCO is the one regional organization that China has founded and that it is
proud of. In contrast to East Asia, it is more institutionalized and has more
rules and formal agreements. In 2004, the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure was
established. In 2007, armed forces of all member states participated in the
joint Peace Mission anti-terrorism exercises.
Evidently, the two regional powers, China and Russia, view themselves as having
aligned interests in the region. After the Xinjiang incident on July 5, the
People's Daily launched commentaries accusing the US and the three evil forces
of terrorism, extremism and separatism as detrimental to Xinjiang and the
region.
Within 48 hours of the violence, Moscow issued a statement strongly supportive
of Beijing. On July 10, the SCO issued a statement to "further deepen practical
cooperation in the field of fighting against terrorism, separatism, extremism
and transnational organized crime for the sake of safeguarding regional
security and stability".
In return, China is satisfied with Russia's effort to counter against US
influence in Central Asia through the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). It also has a stake in supporting Russia's effort to build an
anti-terrorism center in Kyrgyzstan and develop the CSTO Rapid Reaction Force
in Central Asia.
The China-Russia leaders' meeting in June following the BRIC summit indicated a
high degree of political and foreign policy coordination in future in Central
Asia. Importantly, China expressed its support of Russia over the situation in
Caucasus.
For the moment, Sino-Russian convergence over regional security in Central Asia
results in their stepping up of political efforts in regional cooperation. This
enables the creation of a simple and authoritative regional architecture,
namely the SCO.
South Asia
SAARC, the equivalent of ASEAN in Southeast Asia, is a dysfunctional
organization that attracts little enthusiasm among its members. It is crippled
by the strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan. In addition, a less
dynamic trade regime means that SAARC is not a priority to South Asian
countries as ASEAN is to Southeast Asian countries. According to the
International Monetary Fund, India's trade with SAARC amounted to 2.8% of its
total trade in 2006, while its trade with East Asia amounted to 24.9%.
China became an observer of SAARC in 2005, and Chinese foreign ministers
attended the SAARC leaders' summit in 2007 and 2008. China has a vital interest
in cross-border integration schemes with South Asia so as to develop eastern
Tibet and Yunnan province.
In 1999, the Yunnan provincial government hosted the Conference on Regional
Cooperation and Development with India, Myanmar and Bangladesh in Kunming. They
approved the Kunming Initiative, which aimed to improve communications between
southwestern China and northeastern India by developing transportation links.
The initiative currently remains a non-governmental one.
At present, China-SAARC cooperation is limited to diplomatic exchanges,
official seminars and trade fairs. While China has sought a greater role in
SAARC, Chinese assistant Foreign Minister He Yafei said in 2007 that it was
still too early for China to apply for SAARC membership.
India is highly skeptical about China's South Asia policy, including its
strategic relationship with Pakistan, unresolved border disputes, Chinese naval
ambitions in the Indian Ocean and China's influence over Bangladesh, Nepal and
Sri Lanka to balance India.
New Delhi and Beijing seem to be focusing their naval strategies on each other.
China is constructing naval stations and refueling ports in Myanmar, Sri Lanka
and India's rival Pakistan. India has transformed a bay in the southern state
of Karnataka into an advanced naval installation.
During the SCO and BRIC summits on June 16 and 17, Beijing avoided bringing
their long-standing land border disputes to the forum. Merely over a week
before, on June 8, New Delhi announced it would deploy two additional army
divisions and two air force squadrons near its border with China.
Policy implications for an 'Asia-Pacific community'
We can briefly summarize China's relative experience of multilateral diplomacy
in the three regions. With East Asia, it is strong economically but weak
politically. With Central Asia, it is weak economically but strong politically.
With South Asia, it is weak both economically and politically.
Now let's return to the fundamentals of East Asia as a region. Firstly, it is a
stable and dynamic economic regime. Secondly, it is crowded with competing
regional leaders: the US, China, Japan and ASEAN. These fundamentals have a
complex, non-binding and economic-focused regional arrangement. It will neither
move towards the direction of greater institutionalization and stronger
political unity, like the SCO, nor will it deteriorate, like the arguably
dysfunctional SAARC.
With this background, we can understand the constraints facing East Asia and
foresee what a future regional framework will look like. It will respect all
countries in the region, big and small, as equal partners. It will be open and
inclusive to countries both within and outside the region. It will have no
clear regional leader and there will be no willingness to cause too much
disruption to the status quo. It will also be a mix of formal and informal
arrangements. Therefore, it will be a flexible framework.
ASEAN, the current driver of the regional agenda acceptable to all major
powers, would act as the core platform, out of which trans-regional and
sub-regional channels and dialogues could be established.
Given the dynamics of East Asia and the emergence of global challenges like
climate change, financial crisis and non-traditional security threats, the
scope for multilateral cooperation is great. However, realizing the complex
political realities, it is impossible to create a brand new regional
institution. The most probable way would be adjustments and supplements over
the existing architecture. Ultimately a harmonious and effective framework
would be a product of the balance of various powers.
Andy Yee is a postgraduate student in Pacific Asian Studies at the School
of Oriental and African Studies in London.
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Speaking Freely is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest writers to have
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click hereif you are interested in contributing.
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