COMMENT
To beat terrorists, use judo, not boxing
By Frank J Cilluffo and Sharon L Cardash
It's been a tough week to be a terrorist leader. First, Baitullah Mehsud,
leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, is reported to have been killed in a United
States Predator drone missile strike. Then, Noordin Top, likely mastermind of
multiple bombings in Indonesia - including the most recent attack on the
Ritz-Carlton and J W Marriott hotels in Jakarta, was apparently nearly killed
in a government raid on his hideout in a remote area of central Java.
Although Top has been on the run for years, he has been sustained by a network
of supporters. Some argue that his recent brush with death will surely fuel his
legend. But there's also a counter-perspective worth considering: the Jakarta
hotel bombings appear to have been a step too far. Condemnation was
widespread, with voices weighing in even from the fringes.
Always one to embrace violent means and methods, Top's willingness to target
and escalate attacks on civilians may have led to his "Amman moment", akin to
the shift in momentum away from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the leader of al-Qaeda in
Iraq, when his November 2005 attacks on three hotels in Jordan killed 30
members of a Jordanian-Palestinian wedding party, and outraged even militants.
Erosion of public support affects maneuverability (the ability to hide,
camouflaged among the people, and plot logistics unfettered), which is crucial
to continued operational and strategic viability. The adversary that overplays
his hand, incurring a backlash even from former sympathizers, ultimately does
damage to himself and his cause.
Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was already on the ropes, having
splintered when Top pulled away and formed a more extreme faction called
al-Qaeda for the Malay archipelago. Still, his death or capture would prove to
be a genuine game-changer in the campaign against violent extremism.
How events unfold in Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, will
affect the entire world. If the grievances that nourish Top's well of support
are further acknowledged and effectively addressed moving forward in a
meaningful and comprehensive way, then the country could move solidly down the
path of reconciliation.
Directing insufficient attention, thought, action and supporting resources
towards these ends could result in a reversal of course, in which advantage and
momentum are ceded to the forces of terror. The exercise requires careful
calibration, with response being commensurate to threat and broadly perceived
as "just". To overreact would be to play directly into the hands of the
adversary, providing oxygen that keeps their narrative alive, by re-animating
the very grievances that JI was able to manipulate initially for its own
purposes.
Killing and capturing will only get us part of the way to where we need to be.
From here in, more judo and less boxing will help keep the adversary off
balance by turning the adversary's strength against itself, causing it to
collapse under its own weight. Softer moves and methods, rather than the direct
application of force, can also be deadly for a target. Think of the power of
hope, widespread economic opportunity and education, and pride in self, country
and culture, to extinguish the appeal of Top's message. In fact, JI stands
"against" everything and "for" nothing that will actually better people's lives
and positively impact their fate.
It is up to Indonesians to identify their best interests, determine how to
advance them, and implement those plans. Homegrown and regional resistance to
homegrown and regional terrorism is naturally most effective. Rejection of
violent extremism, underlain by a deep reservoir of patience and tolerance
anchored in local history and culture, must ultimately derive from within. From
afar there is only so much the international community can do.
The importance of a multifaceted approach has been recognized and reaffirmed at
the highest levels in the United States, however. Just last week, assistant to
the president for homeland security and counter-terrorism, John Brennan, set
out both short- and long-term goals and comprehensive means for reaching them.
With the right mix of instruments, leadership, persistence and sometimes
restraint, there could be many more bad weeks for the bad guys.
Let's hope this is just the first of many more to come.
Frank J Cilluffo is director of The George Washington University Homeland
Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the former special assistant to the
president for homeland security at the White House. Sharon L Cardash is
HSPI's associate director and previously served as security policy advisor to
Canada's minister of foreign affairs.
(Copyright 2009 Frank J Cilluffo and Sharon L Cardash.)
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