Page 2 of 2 Missing the nuance in south Thailand
By Jason Johnson
These preconceived notions of a bounded ethnic minority group that universally
harbors bitterness towards the Thai nation-state and are together bent on
ethnic preservation and acquiring some form of political autonomy are also
transmitted and greatly amplified by the role of prominent Malay Muslim
intellectuals - including former National Reconciliation Commission members -
and other Malay Muslim nationalist activists.
As de facto spokespeople for the Patani Malay Muslim nation, they tend to
overstate the nationalist cares and concerns of ordinary Malay Muslims,
frequently speaking about group pride in the ancient Kingdom of Patani, the
Malay Muslims unique way of life, and the need for the Thai government to give
greater
recognition to this identity by, for instance, allowing some form of autonomy.
But by emphasizing to the media, academics, human-rights activists,
policy-makers and others that Malay Muslims have a shared sense of grievances
resulting from the Thai state's strong-fisted security policies and long-term
nation-state building, these cultural preservationists become a critical -
non-violent - resource in the Patani Malay Muslim nationalist struggle.
Unfortunately, most writers and observers of the south share an overly
simplified view of the assumed preoccupations of ordinary Malay Muslims, and
thus fall prey to elite Patani Malay Muslim advocates' claims.
The complete omission of the role of these intellectuals in the extant
literature on southern Thailand that touches on the theme of nationalism
reveals the blindness of journalists and scholars to the social disjuncture
between these cultural elites - who live both for and off ethnicity - and the
scores of Malay Muslims who are unmoved by, or unaware of, their claims.
Loaded agendas
Journalists and scholars have not been the only ones who have slipped into
analyses which exaggerate or romanticize Malay Muslims' dispositions towards
the idea of a Patani Malay Muslim nation-state and anti-Thai state sentiment.
With Thailand's security forces engaging in human-rights abuses against Malay
Muslims, human-rights activists have played an increasingly prominent role in
demonstrating Malay Muslim resentment toward state-supported security forces.
While documenting violence perpetrated by individuals or groups supported by
the Thai state is absolutely necessary, human-rights activists' strong focus on
victims of state violence leads to portrayals that systematically downplay the
lack of antipathy some Malay Muslims have for the Thai state. By claiming that
the Malay Muslim minority group is averse to the presence of troops, however,
these activists have a strong argument to support their unwavering commitment
to change state policy.
As human-rights activists have rightly highlighted, hostility toward the use of
state force is widespread. According to the CSCC, this resentment seems quite
intense for some 30% of the Muslim population. Yet this same research center
has also found attitudes of indifference or even support for troops among some
Malay Muslims - a phenomenon in Malay Muslim society that human-rights
activists routinely deny or overlook.
I once asked a human-rights researcher about Malay Muslims' opinions towards
Malay Muslims working with the largest state-supported defense group, the
village defense volunteers, or chor ror bor. The researcher responded
simply: "They [Malay Muslim villagers] hate them." In stark contrast, I have
been told by some 30 or so Malay Muslims, including several middle-class
nationalists, from various villages in Pattani and Yala provinces, that as long
as Muslim chor ror bor do not overstep their boundaries (that is, engage
in human-rights abuses), they have no qualms with their state security force
affiliation.
Even though many Malay Muslims are widely involved with state-supported
anti-insurgency groups, human-rights activists' impulse to represent Malay
Muslims as opposing state forces en bloc is clearly shown in their tendency to
ignore or sanitize this phenomenon.
The International Crisis Group's report on state-supported paramilitary groups
fails to note that approximately 80% of the chor ror bor - which now has
more than 51,000 members in the region - is Muslim in membership. Meanwhile,
Non-Violence International only mentions near the very end of its recent report
on the proliferation of guns in the region that the chor ror bor are
mainly recruited from Malay Muslim villages.
By systematically excluding or concealing this important information, these
activists add support to their core argument that the Thai state's heavy-handed
policies of arming primarily Thai Buddhists is producing more violence, most
especially against innocent Malay Muslims, and further alienating the Malay
Muslim minority.
The presumptions of foreign journalists and academics about the boundedness of
Malay Muslims may lead to assumptions that Malay Muslim chor ror bor and
others who work for the Thai state deep down resent this work, not only because
of the dangers of being targeted by insurgents, but for selling out to the Thai
state. Romanticized notions of "resistance" may lead many intellectuals to
perceive this work as a regretful, but necessary, strategy of individuals from
an underprivileged minority who are merely trying to survive in an unequal
society.
Such assumptions, however, fly in the face of the more complicated reality
where, at the village level, Muslim leaders and others often oppose the
incursions of insurgents. That's been highlighted in the article "Landscapes of
fear, Horizons of Trust", written by CSCC's Senior Research Fellow Marc Askew
for the Journal of Southeast Asian Studies in February this year.
Moreover, the apparent bifurcation of the socio-political world implied by some
accounts - between Thai Buddhist state versus Muslim Malay communal solidarity
- does not seem particularly relevant to the Muslim chor ror bor I have
encountered. For the chor ror bor I know, Thailand is their homeland,
and insurgents who call for ethnic and religious unity in no way represent
their political or cultural preferences, which are contingent on a number of
factors beyond ethnicity and religion.
The lack of consciousness for Patani Malay Muslim nationalist unity was on
clear display following the unresolved June 8 assault on a mosque that left 11
Malay Muslims dead in Cho Airong district of Narathiwat province. As the media
and Patani Malay Muslim nationalist activists either blamed state forces for
this tragic event or denounced Thai officials' knee-jerk reaction of instantly
blaming insurgents, it was striking that the immediate reaction from one Malay
Muslim chor ror bor member was that it was the work of insurgents and
that "real Muslims" would not do this.
When I told his friend that it was being widely reported by the media that
local Malay Muslims are extremely incensed at the Thai state for this, he
responded "Yes, the people in that area are, but we aren't."
Notes
1. The term "Patani" is used to refer to Malay Muslims who identify themselves
as belonging to a Patani nation. "Malay Muslims" is used in reference to all of
the Malay-speaking Muslims from Thailand's three southernmost provinces of
Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat, as well as four districts in Songkhla province.
The term "Patani Malay Muslim" is not used for all Malay-speaking Muslims
because for some the term refers only to Pattani province, not a Patani nation.
2. Chalk, Peter. 2008. The
Malay-Muslim Insurgency in Southern Thailand: Understanding the Conflict's
Evolving Dynamic. RAND Counterinsurgency Study, Paper 5, published by
RAND National Defense Research Institute.
3. Liow, Joseph Chinyong. 2006.
International Jihad and Muslim Radicalism in Thailand? Toward and Alternative
Interpretation, Asia Policy, Number 2, July 2006, pp89-108.
4. Fuller, Thomas. August 31, 2009.
Muslim Insurgents Confound Military in ThailandNew York Times, August
31, 2009.
Jason Johnson is a researcher and PhD student in the political science
department at Northern Illinois University. He is currently based in Pattani
province, southern Thailand, and may be reached at jrj.johnson@gmail.com
(Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
