Page 1 of 2 War brings profits to south Thailand
By Brian McCartan
NARATHIWAT and BANGKOK - Malaysian Prime Minister's Najib Tun Razak's recently
concluded visit to Thailand, including a trip with Thai Premier Abhisit
Vejjajiva to the country's troubled southern border regions, was meant as a
show of support for Thai counter-insurgency policies against Muslim rebels
frequently accused of taking sanctuary and planning attacks in bordering areas
in northern Malaysia.
The diplomatic gesture is unlikely to have any immediate impact on the
separatist militants or on the overall lawlessness in the region that has
allowed the insurgency to thrive. The majority of the population in the three
southernmost Thai provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat and four districts
of neighboring Songkhla
province are ethnic Malay Muslims, who make up the majority of the population
in Malaysia.
The historically restive region was once part of the sultanate of Pattani that
also included parts of modern-day northern Malaysia. It was incorporated into
Siam, now Thailand, in 1909 and has shown on-and-off resistance to Bangkok's
Buddhist majority rule since the 1940s. The result has been that many
Malay-Muslims in the region have relatives on both sides of the border and
often look more towards Malaysia for social, economic and religious
inspiration.
Young people in search of work look more frequently to comparatively prosperous
Kelantan in Malaysia's north or to cities further inland such as the capital,
Kuala Lumpur, where they speak the local language and are at home with the
customs and religion. Thai officials have claimed in the past that anywhere
between 50,000 and 100,000 Malay Muslims in the area possess both Thai and
Malay identity cards.
There are widespread sentiments among Malay Muslims that Bangkok has long
neglected their economic and educational needs and refused to accept their
different culture and history. This has engendered among some a deep-seated
mistrust of the Thai state, exacerbated by recent heavy handed measures used by
security forces to restore law and order.
According to Deep South Watch, a monitoring group at Pattani's Prince of
Songkhla University, more than 3,900 people have been killed in the region
between January 2004 and the end of October 2009.
The fact that several older and likely current insurgent group leaders reside
or sometimes take sanctuary across the border in Malaysia will ultimately
require Kuala Lumpur's input in any final solution to the conflict. However,
dialogue between the two governments on the insurgency has not always gone
smoothly.
Many Malaysians were outraged by the mass killings of Muslims by Thai security
forces at Krue Se mosque in April 2004 and the suffocation deaths in army
custody of 78 Malay-Muslims apprehended at Tak Bai town later that year. A
suggestion made by then-Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad that Thailand
should grant autonomy to its three southernmost provinces was received coolly
in Bangkok.
Bilateral relations deteriorated in 2005 when a group of 131 Malay-Muslims,
including women and children, fled across the Thai border into northern
Malaysia claiming fears of government persecution. Malaysia refused to hand
them back without monitoring by the United Nations. Smarting from the loss of
face and fears of internationalizing the conflict, Bangkok was quick to label
the refugees as insurgents and accused Kuala Lumpur of meddling in its domestic
affairs. Follow-up accusations were made by Thai officials that insurgents had
been trained in Malaysia's remote northern jungle areas.
Surayud Chulanont, a former army commander and at the time premier, attempted
to repair relations in 2006 by holding talks with Mahathir's successor,
Abdullah Badawi. That effort hit a snag when Surayud claimed that the
insurgency was being funded partially through a network of tom yam kung (spicy
Thai soup) restaurants in Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur discounted those claims, with
then-deputy security minister Fu Ah Kiow calling the charge "absolutely
baseless" and "very imaginative".
Relations have since improved, with both sides putting aside accusations and
working to find solutions, say analysts. Malaysia's view that the problem stems
in part from a lack of social and economic development in the region prompted
the creation of a joint development program, dubbed the "Three E's" for
education, employment and entrepreneurship, aimed at bridging the income gap
between southern Thailand and northern Malaysia. An agreement on the program
was signed in 2007 at a joint commission meeting in Bangkok.
Instability contagion
Kuala Lumpur is clearly concerned that the violence could spread into Malaysia
or that it could lead international militant networks to take root in the
region.
From behind the scenes, Malaysia has been a partner in attempts to negotiate
with separatists, according to people familiar with the talks. The Malaysian
government is also believed to have lines of communications with leaders of
Thai separatist movements, including with the more mainstream Patani United
Liberation Organization (PULO) and the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate
(BRN-C).
Attempts at negotiation have apparently been encumbered by the inability of
Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur to determine which group at any given time actually
controls fighters on the ground. The juwae, or "fighters", as they call
themselves, are known to operate in small cells with a fractious leadership
that has made it difficult to determine both their aims and numbers.
The Thai army commander, General Anupong Paochinda, has made it clear on
several recent occasions that no negotiations will be held with the
separatists. Meanwhile, the military's lack of progress in apprehending the
perpetrators of a June massacre of 11 Muslim worshippers at the al-Furqan
mosque in Narathiwat province is believed to have inflamed insurgent passions.
While the insurgency has contributed to the region's instability, some Thai
officials claim that disputes between local politicians and criminal gangs are
the main cause of the violence. The Thai Fourth Army commander, Lieutenant
General Pichet Wisaijorn, the top military official responsible for the
southern region, told Asia Times Online in November that statistics collected
beginning last year showed that only 26% of violent incidents were
insurgency-related. If true, that means the majority of the nearly 4,000
murders committed over the past six years can be attributed to political
disputes and criminal activity.
While the insurgency may be the focal point of discussions between Malaysia and
Thailand, the real discussion, if the military's claims are to be believed,
should be on how to eliminate criminal activity along their mutual border.
Although violence has been limited to the Thai side, the links between
insurgent violence and criminal gangs cannot be ignored. Nor can the potential
of criminal-related violence spilling over into Malaysia, especially if the
potential for profits is high enough.
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