Old and new faces of Indonesian terror
By Clifford McCoy
The arrest last week of radical Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir was the
highlight of a government crackdown on Islamic militants following the
discovery in February of a training camp in Aceh province. Once regarded as the
spiritual leader of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terror group, Bashir's popularity
has wavered in recent years and his position is emblematic of the evolving
nature of militant Islam in Southeast Asia.
The 72-year-old Bashir was arrested together with his wife and five bodyguards
on August 9 while traveling to deliver a sermon in West Java. The arrest came
only a day before the start of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan and a week
before Indonesia's nationally celebrated independence day on August 17. Bashir
has
denied any involvement with the camp, and even claimed that his arrest was
arranged by the United States.
Bashir's arrest is the latest in an ongoing crackdown since the discovery of a
jihadi training camp in northern Aceh run by a new coalition of militant
groups. The training camp was established by seven groups who joined together
to form the lintas tanzim, or cross-organizational project.
The coalition was led by one of Southeast Asia's most wanted terrorists,
Dulmatin, who is also believed to have been one of the leaders of the 2002 Bali
bombings that killed over 200 people. Until February, Dulmatin was believed to
be in hiding in the Philippines.
Analysts and counter-terrorism officials see the group as a new strain of
militant Islam in Indonesia. The grouping was highly critical of JI and
rejected what it perceived as its overly passive and soft approach to jihad.
Members of the new group have also reportedly criticized now deceased Noordin
Top's more violent form of terrorism for its lack of long-term direction.
Noordin Top masterminded the July 2009 bombings of the JW Marriot and Ritz
Carlton hotels in Jakarta, among other bombings, and was killed in a police
raid in September 2009.
Instead, the new group aims to establish Islamic law across all of Indonesia,
and to do so without the collateral killing of fellow Muslims, as happened with
JI attacks. According to an April 2010 report by the International Crisis Group
(ICG), the new group's enemy has become defined as ''not simply the US or
allied countries, but as anyone who obstructed the application of Islamic law -
and that meant that many Indonesian officials were high on the list.''
Indonesian authorities say the group was allegedly planning a Mumbai-style
attack on luxury hotels in Jakarta frequented by foreigners, as well as several
assassinations of high profile public figures, including President Susilo
Bambang Yudhoyono. Although the group referred to itself as "al-Qaeda in Aceh",
there is so far no evidence of any concrete ties to Osama bin Laden's
organization.
Since the raid on the camp in February, some 100 members of the group have been
captured or killed by police, including Dulmatin. Among those arrested, and
only two days before Bashir's arrest, were five suspected terrorists in three
different locations in West Java on charges of plotting a car bombing. An
explosive device and bomb-making materials were reportedly found in one of the
locations. Police claim all five men are members of an organization established
by Bashir in 2008 called the Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).
With Bashir as its alleged chairman, JAT reportedly aims to establish Islamic
sharia law across Indonesia. As an above-ground organization, the group largely
concentrates on religious outreach, albeit with a distinctly jihadi bent.
Combined with Bashir's celebrity status, the group rapidly expanded a
nationwide membership in only two years.
Bashir's involvement in the organization made it suspect to counter-terrorism
officials from the start and this was reinforced by the group's embrace of
individuals with known ties to extremist organizations, especially JI and
Noordin Top's splinter group. According to ICG, many members of JI either
became members of JAT or maintained dual memberships in both organizations.
Police claim that many suspected terrorists, captured or killed in the raid on
the Aceh camp, have links to JAT. One JAT executive committee member, Lutfi
Haedaroh, alias Ubeid, had previously spent time in prison for involvement in
Noordin Top's bombing campaign. Ubeid was captured fleeing the Aceh camp in
February. A May 6 raid on JAT's offices nabbed three officials charged with
providing funds to the training camp.
Counter-terrorism officials say Bashir, through JAT, was involved in setting up
and providing funding for the Aceh camp and received regular reports from the
field. He is also believed to have had a role in appointing operational leaders
to the new group. According to ICG, the establishment of the camp is in line
with what Bashir has been preaching for years.
Radical past, evolving future
It is not the first time that Bashir has been linked to a violent and radical
Islamic movement. Intelligence agencies have claimed he was the spiritual head
of JI, although the cleric has consistently denied any involvement with
terrorist activities.
Two prior attempts to convict Bashir on charges related to terrorism, including
his alleged role in the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2000 Christmas bombings that
killed 18 people, were unsuccessful due to lack of evidence. While he was
widely believed to lead JI at the time of the 2002 attack, no conclusive
evidence has ever been produced that he ordered or endorsed the attack. Bashir
was eventually sentenced to 18 months for immigration violations and illegally
sending Indonesians abroad for military training.
Bashir was also charged in October 2004 with inciting the 2003 JW Marriot Hotel
bombing and another charge related to the 2002 Bali bombing. He was sentenced
to two and a half years in prison, but released in June 2006 after his
conviction for conspiracy in the Bali bombing was overturned.
Indonesian security officials must be more confident of their evidence this
time around if they intend to avoid a third strike. That legal confidence is
reflected in the nature of the charges against the cleric. While past attempts
have only linked Bashir to JI and terrorism through his spiritual and moral
leadership as a well-known Islamic cleric, this time he is accused of direct
involvement in funding and organizing the training of militants, appointing key
leaders and receiving reports on the group's activity from extremists in the
field.
One other notable difference amid the new charges is Bashir's flagging
popularity and shifts in Indonesian attitudes towards violent Islamic movements
since 2002, which so far has limited the domestic political fallout from his
arrest. Frequent terror bombings have not been popular among the majority of
Indonesians and Bashir's message of violent jihad and public moral support for
both the Bali bombers and the suicide bombers in last year's hotel bombings has
dented his mass appeal.
According to a July 2010 report by the ICG entitled ''The dark side of Jamaah
Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)'', the cleric has been a problem for successive
Indonesian governments since the 1970s and is recognized as the ''elder
statesman of the radical movement''. However, the report argued, he is no
longer that movement's driving force or even its most influential ideologue.
In recent years, Bashir has come under criticism even within jihadi circles for
his poor strategic judgment and a lack of managerial talent. He is also
believed to be at odds with JI over their current preference for religious
outreach over violent jihad. JI members have allegedly said that it lacks the
resources and that the timing is not right to wage a militant campaign against
Yudhoyono's secular elected government.
Bashir's declining influence may mean that his arrest will have little impact
on extremism in Indonesia. He does, however, remain the most prominent radical
figure in the country and is believed to maintain the respect of many
extremists. His sermons and pronouncements have made him a potent symbol of
defiance towards the US and West, although this message has carried less
resonance with Indonesians in recent years.
Bashir's popularity could grow with his imprisonment if authorities are not
watchful. Given Indonesia's notoriously lax prisons, Bashir may be able to use
the time to preach, recruit and even lead his followers from inside prison
walls. As an unconvicted prisoner, he is by default a symbol of government
repression to his followers, especially if public prosecutors again fail to
prove his direct involvement in terrorism.
More worrying for security officials, however, is the changing nature of
terrorism in the country. Jakarta has received international praise for its
recent counter-terrorism efforts. But while analysts say terrorism is not
necessarily increasing, it also has not been entirely eradicated. As shown by
Noordin Top's splinter group, a small cell can inflict serious damage and loss
of life.
What is taking place instead is a mutation in the nature of militant Islam in
Indonesia. Previously prospective militants gravitated either towards JI, even
with its current passive stance based on simply teaching jihad and religious
outreach, or to Noordin Top's attack-oriented splinter group. With the
discovery of the lintas tanzim, there is now a third option of targeted
assassinations that avoid killing Muslims in order to bring Islamic law to
Indonesia. Its a worry that extends to the nearby Philippines, considering the
cross-border nature of the group.
With Bashir now in lockup and the lintas tanzim at least temporarily
upended, there is still the prospect for further evolution of Islamic extremism
in Indonesia. Indonesia deserves praise for the way it has recently handled its
domestic terrorist threat, but as long as figures like Bashir are able to
arouse extremist sympathies, the government cannot rest on its laurels.
Clifford McCoy is a freelance journalist.
(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact us about
sales, syndication and
republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
