Keys
to nudge Myanmar off nuclear
target By Shanan Farmer, Alex
Roesler and Christina McDonnell
The spread
of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of
states threatens international security. While
North Korea, Iran and Pakistan dominate global
nuclear proliferation concerns, other states
operating on the periphery of the international
system - such as Myanmar - are at risk of becoming
the next proliferation challenge.
Although
there is no verifiable evidence to show Myanmar,
also known as Burma, is actively seeking nuclear
weapons, a systematic review of nuclear
proliferation risk factors finds that the
country's reclusive ruling generals are at high
risk of desiring them. Myanmar's military leaders
have intense security threat perceptions which
stem from fear of a Western-led invasion, and they
likely view nuclear weapons as a means to protect
the country's core interests.
When
suggestions were made recently by Georgetown University
professor David Steinberg to
Myanmar officials that their fears were misguided,
they cited a series of recent United States
invasions of other states, including Grenada,
Lebanon, Haiti, Panama, Somalia, Iraq, and
Afghanistan, to justify their concerns. The recent
surprise US decision to bomb Libya after its
leader Muammar Gaddafi willingly gave up his
nuclear program in 2003 undoubtedly intensified
Myanmar's concerns of a possible US invasion in
the name of promoting democracy.
With
those heightened threat perceptions, Myanmar
likely sees North Korea as a model of a state that
uses nuclear weapons to deter Western aggression.
Myanmar's military leaders also appear to believe
that nuclear weapons would provide them with
international status and enhanced bargaining
power.
History has shown Myanmar is
largely invulnerable to coercive diplomacy tools
such as economic and diplomatic sanctions.
Isolated for over two decades, Myanmar has adapted
to operating on the fringes of the global system.
Meanwhile, current US-led economic sanctions
against the country have been largely ineffective,
primarily because they are not internationally
coordinated and enforced.
The threat of a
near-term nuclear weapons program in Myanmar
ultimately hinges on North Korea. Myanmar's
burgeoning military relationship with North Korea
could provide it with an accelerated nuclear
pathway that compensates for its lack of
indigenous nuclear scientific and engineering
expertise. Myanmar has purchased conventional arms
and missile technology from North Korea in
violation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution's (UNSCR) 1718 and 1874. Reports
suggest these shipments could have contained
nuclear weapons-related materials.
Given
recent international proliferation trends,
successful non-proliferation policy must focus on
keeping countries from wanting nuclear weapons in
the first place. Technological barriers to entry
make it unlikely that Myanmar could develop an
indigenous program within the next decade but
covert assistance from its military partner, North
Korea, could accelerate this timeline.
Past case studies on nuclear
decision-making show that once a country's
leadership commits to acquiring nuclear weapons,
it becomes exceedingly difficult to reverse the
decision. It is far easier to influence states
away from initiating a nuclear weapons program
than it is to convince them to abandon or halt an
existing one. In order to curb a nuclear weapons
progression, new policy is needed now that steers
Myanmar's strategic calculations away from the
nuclear option.
The US should consider
Myanmar through a broader lens with a holistic
consideration of its foreign policy interests in
the region, including nuclear non-proliferation.
Reorienting US policy towards Myanmar does not
mean casting aside human-rights issues, which were
the initial motivation for imposing economic
sanctions. In fact, reducing the threat
perceptions of Myanmar's senior generals could
allow for more direct and meaningful humanitarian
assistance to the county, as was eventually
allowed after the 2008 Cyclone Nargis disaster.
Tradeoffs between human-rights and
non-proliferation objectives may be required, but
they are not mutually exclusive. It is worth
noting that former US secretary of defense Donald
Rumsfeld and other US officials reportedly pushed
for democratization and human rights to be
included as part of any deal with Gaddafi to halt
his nuclear program.
Moving beyond the
issues of terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction to democratization and human rights
would have put that particular deal in jeopardy,
and the final US decision against including these
issues in the negotiations turned out to be
instrumental to their success. Yet Libya did not
get a pass on human-rights issues and today faces
a UN-authorized "no-fly zone" over Libya
authorizing "all necessary measures" to protect
civilians and halt Gaddafi's abuse of his own
citizens.
Our research found that security
concerns are a significantly high risk factor for
Myanmar and steps are needed to ease its military
leadership's fear of a possible US invasion.
Security threat perceptions are a significant
factor in a state's decision to acquire nuclear
weapons. In turn, a more favorable security
outlook is one of the major reasons why a state
could decide to reverse its nuclear course.
Succor over sanctions The US
and its allies should increase
military-to-military engagement with Myanmar to
build trust and reduce threat perceptions.
Indonesia's military had similar US threat
perceptions to Myanmar until the 2004 tsunami,
when the US military provided rapid and large
scale humanitarian and disaster relief assistance
and then left after the mission was accomplished.
Engagement with all levels of Myanmar's
military leadership is key. Military-to-military
exchange would be the most productive engagement
track, as Myanmar military members would likely be
most comfortable dealing with their US military
counterparts. Just as Libya expressed an interest
in having its students attend US universities,
military-to-military educational engagement may
pique the interest of Myanmar's military
leadership.
In the years preceding the
Myanmar military's crackdown on pro-democracy
demonstrators in 1988, the majority of its
officers were trained outside of the country,
including in the US via the International Military
Education and Training (IMET) program. Some of
these officers are still in the military today and
could be eager to resume this and other mutually
beneficial programs.
In that direction,
Myanmar military officers could be invited to take
part in military education training sessions -
such as those offered by the Asia Pacific Center
for Security Studies - to better educate them on
international norms for civilian control of the
military. The sessions could also offer
instruction on how to adequately address
comprehensive security threats, such as disaster
management and health and environmental protection
issues.
The Barack Obama administration's
policy of "pragmatic engagement" with Myanmar is
on the right track, but it needs to be
significantly enhanced to succeed. In particular,
Obama's government should pursue a step-by-step
process that encourages reform instead of regime
change. Current US sanctions, which include a ban
on trade and investment as well as
military-to-military engagement, is perceived by
Myanmar's leaders as advancing the ultimate goal
of regime change.
Ultimately, Myanmar's
isolation should be decreased. Greater integration
into the international community may create
opportunity costs for Myanmar's leadership that
impact the economic and political feasibility of
beginning a nuclear weapons program. It may also
boost Myanmar's perceived international standing
and counter its apparent belief that nuclear
weapons provide status and political influence.
United States efforts to engage Myanmar
can serve this purpose, though to date Myanmar has
largely spurned Obama's engagement overtures.
Given the lack of trust between the two nations,
the US needs to consider cooperating more with
Myanmar's key trade partners, including China,
India and Thailand, to effect change.
Since the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) admitted Myanmar into the regional
grouping in 1997, it has attempted to bring
Myanmar back into the fold through policies of
engagement that enhance economic linkages. To
date, the US has opposed ASEAN's engagement; Obama
should consider a policy course shift that
supports these collaborative efforts.
At
the same time, the risk of a near-term nuclear
weapons program in Myanmar is ostensibly
eliminated if North Korean assistance can be
blocked. In Libya's case, exposing and disrupting
Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan's secret
proliferation network changed Gaddafi's
perceptions of the technical and clandestine
feasibility of a nuclear weapons program and
ultimately contributed to his decision to bring it
to a halt. If North Korea and other nuclear
proliferators are taken out of the equation, the
risk of Myanmar's military leadership opting for
nuclear weapons will similarly be substantially
reduced.
During former US ambassador to
the United Nations and New Mexico governor Bill
Richardson's visit to North Korea in December
2010, he asked his North Korean counterparts if
they were exporting nuclear technologies to Syria
and Myanmar. In an interview with the authors,
Richardson summarized Pyongyang's response as
"maybe". He added that his North Korean
counterparts said that they had few ways to obtain
foreign exchange given the extensive international
sanctions they faced.
Historically, North
Korea has categorically denied sponsoring illicit
activities or initiating provocative attacks, so
their candid response to Richardson was
surprising. This highlights a possible
carrot-based approach to dealing with North
Korea's onward proliferation: convincing Pyongyang
to halt its illicit nuclear trade in exchange for
legitimate trade opportunities. In a globalized
world, stopping nuclear technology transfers will
remain difficult as long as North Korea, Pakistan
and Iran continue to furtively operate outside of
international norms.
The policy
recommendations in this article focus on several
areas where the US may be able to improve
cooperation with Myanmar for mutual benefit. Some
of these recommendations require substantial
efforts from China and ASEAN to be more effective
in reshaping Myanmar's stance on human rights,
civil liberties and democratic values. So far all
of Myanmar's allies have prioritized economic over
political and strategic engagement.
With
the political pressure exerted by Myanmar's
exile-run activist groups, policy recommendations
are slow to be implemented and often filled with
controversy.
Yet the risk of Myanmar
launching a nuclear weapons program is high and
actions should be taken urgently to prevent a
dangerous and unpredictable regime from obtaining
such a destabilizing capacity. Leveraging the
international community's collective "soft power"
and a change in outlook in the US is the best way
forward to ensuring a peaceful and nuclear free
Myanmar.
Shanan Farmer, Alex
Roesler and Christina McDonnell are
National Security Fellows at the John F Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University. The
views expressed in this article are those of the
authors and do not reflect the official policy or
position of the United States Department of
Defense or the US government.
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