Fight or flight in the South China
Sea By David Brown
Lately China has exhibited symptoms of
bipolar disorder in its approach to the thorny
question of sovereignty over the South China Sea.
Addressing Southeast Asian counterparts
last weekend, Chinese Defense Minister Liang
Guangjie murmured familiar mantras about its
outlook on the South China Sea: China will never
seek hegemony or military expansion ... China is
committed to maintaining peace and stability
through security cooperation ... China
unswervingly adopts the policy of forging friendly
and good-neighborly relations.
In his
bilateral contacts at a regional security dialogue
in Singapore, Liang seemed intent on persuading
members of the
Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to exclude the United States
from discussions aimed at lowering tensions. Yet,
scarcely days earlier, Chinese coast guard vessels
were engaged in unprecedented thuggery against
rival claimants to the 3.5 million square
kilometers of ocean that stretch south from Taiwan
to the Malacca Straits, activities Beijing
describes as "regular maritime law enforcement and
surveillance activities in the waters under the
jurisdiction of China".
Four ASEAN states,
Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam,
claim parts of this maritime area, claims based on
application of the United Nations Charter on Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) rules on dividing up an
enclosed continental shelf. Vietnam additionally
asserts rights derived from its exploitation of
the area's rich fisheries and seasonal occupation
of certain islets rich in guano, abalone and sea
cucumbers stretching back at least to the 1600s.
Though quick to claim its UNCLOS rights
when that suits it, China treats the charter as
irrelevant in respect to its "irrefutable
jurisdiction" over the South China Sea. Up against
a Law of the Sea Convention deadline to declare
all maritime claims, in June 2009, China simply
tabled a crude map and did not bother to address
the geological and geomorphological criteria
established by the convention.
Notwithstanding the broad signal that
China is uninterested in compromise, ASEAN
collectively has clung to the hope that Asia's
emergent superpower can be persuaded to negotiate.
They have but one success to show for that: in
2002, after years of trying, ASEAN nations at last
persuaded China to sign on to a "Declaration on
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" or
DOC. DOC signatories agreed to "exercise self
restraint in the conduct of activities that would
complicate or escalate disputes". Additionally,
China forswore resort to force in the resolution
of territorial claims.
The next step in
the DOC process was to be agreement on modalities
for settling the rival claims. So far, however,
ASEAN hasn't been able to lure Beijing's
negotiators back to the table. The Chinese insist
that they never intended to settle who owns what
in a multilateral forum but are ready to work
things out in bilateral negotiations with other
claimants. Meanwhile, Beijing has systematically
been creating ‘facts on the ground' in support of
its contention that it owns the whole South China
Sea, right up to 12 miles off the coasts of
littoral states.
In the northern part of
the contested waters, China's bully boy tactics
seem to have succeeded. Beijing has declared the
Paracels, a group of reefs and islands that lies
between its Hainan Island and Vietnam's central
coast, now to be open for tourism and economic
development by Chinese entrepreneurs. It ousted a
small South Vietnamese force from the Paracels in
1974, and in recent years has all but driven
Vietnamese fishermen from the surrounding waters.
Hanoi clings doggedly to its claim, but its ASEAN
partners show no signs of rallying in support.
That leaves the sprawling Spratly
archipelago and an expanse of empty sea southwards
of the Paracels - roughly, the southern two-thirds
of the South China Sea - still up for grabs.
Incidents last month directed at
non-Chinese fishermen and oil exploration ships in
the Philippine and Vietnamese economic zones are
new only in that they extend a now familiar
pattern further to the south and closer to the
coasts of rival claimants. Beijing has bluntly
warned international oil companies against
concluding exploration contracts in areas Vietnam
claims as its EEZ. Manila sources report that
Chinese naval forces are planting new outposts in
Philippine territorial waters in defiance of the
standstill required by the DOC.
The
massive disconnect that has emerged between what
China says and what China does gives General
Liang's insistence at last weekend's Singapore
forum that "the involved countries should resolve
their disputes over maritime sovereignty through
friendly negotiations and bilateral talks" a
distinctly hollow ring.
What is driving
China? Some analysts have speculated that policy
incoherence is a temporary manifestation of rival
power centers in Beijing. Others express
confidence that the Chinese will not press their
claims so hard or far that they alienate
Indonesia, frighten businessmen or undo the US
Pentagon's ambitions of military to military
cooperation on a global scale.
More and
more, though, these seem to be forlorn hopes. By
all the evidence, China is playing for keeps and
the prize is energy - the very significant oil and
gas deposits believed to be awaiting discovery and
exploitation beneath the seabed of the South China
Sea.
One can argue - and petroleum
geologists do - whether the oil and gas is really
there, but it's beyond dispute that Beijing gives
very high priority to securing energy supplies.
China became a net oil importer in 1993; it now
imports some six million barrels of oil a day, or
some 60% of the oil it uses. By 2025, the Chinese
economy will require oil imports on the order of
15 million barrels daily, according to BP's highly
regarded annual review.
The situation is
similar though less acute with regard to natural
gas, reports BP. Beijing began to import liquefied
natural gas in 2007, and by 2025 is expected to
source 40% of its needs from abroad. For a nation
willing to spend heavily to build a navy capable
of protecting supply lines to the Middle East, the
hydrocarbons presumably beneath the South China
Sea must look irresistibly like low hanging fruit.
According to the International Energy Agency:
The hydrocarbon resources of the
South China Sea are little known. Several
unconfirmed Chinese reports place potential oil
reserves at 213 billion barrels, while the US
Geological Survey (USGS) estimated reserves in
1994 at 28 billion ... Some experts believe that
natural gas comprises the largest component of
the South China Sea's hydrocarbon deposits, but
estimates of this resource vary widely as well
...
The US Energy Information Agency
comments thus:
The fact that surrounding areas are
rich in oil deposits has led to speculation that
the Spratly Islands could be an untapped
oil-bearing province. There is little evidence
outside of Chinese claims to support the view
that the region contains substantial oil
resources ... Due to the lack of exploratory
drilling, there are no proven oil reserve
estimates for the Spratly or Paracel
Islands.
Is a fight inevitable?
The Vietnamese have no illusions about
Beijing's readiness to provoke. Vietnam has been
fending off Chinese attempts to bring them to heel
for over a thousand years. Managing its unequal
relationship with its northern neighbor is the
core concern of Hanoi's foreign policy. To avoid
war with the northern colossus, history suggests,
the Vietnamese will kowtow but finally fight
rather than capitulate.
A year ago, US
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the
South China Sea a region of American "national
interest" - a posture fully consistent with US
objectives of free access in Asia going back to
the 19th century , but in the context uttered, a
slap in the face to the Chinese. Clinton's remarks
were closely coordinated with Hanoi, host of the
2010 Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and garnished by a
lot of bilateral talk about a new US-Vietnam
strategic relationship. She suggested that the US
could play a role as an honest broker in resolving
the South China Sea claims.
Now, the US is
on the spot to play that role. The 2011 ARF
meeting is little more than a month away and will
be chaired by Indonesia. The meeting will provide
the best current opportunity for revitalizing a
process that leads to a peaceful sorting out of
rival maritime interests and claims.
It's
possible to imagine a negotiated outcome that
satisfies no one claimant fully but all
sufficiently. That's an outcome with several
essential elements: that ASEAN is able to hang
together and the ASEAN member claimants can agree
how to parcel out the Spratlys amongst themselves;
that the US engages effectively on the side of
common-sense accommodations including joint
development in some areas; and, hardest of all,
that China backs away from its preposterous claim
to 100% ownership of the South China Sea.
At the defense ministers' forum last
weekend in Singapore, US Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates refused to be drawn out on the recent
Chinese muscle-flexing, other than to say that he
shared others' concerns and that there are
multilateral mechanisms, ie the DOC and UNCLOS,
that can be applied to resolve the issues relating
to the South China Sea. Some reportage called this
a sign that the Americans are pulling back from a
confrontation.
That's probably a wrong
interpretation. The immediate challenge for the
Americans is to work with Indonesia to put the
territorial issues on a track toward solutions
grounded in international law and diplomatic
common sense. They must reassure the Vietnamese
and Filipinos that the US will not back down. They
must persuade Chinese doves that whoever owns the
Spratlys, there will be unimpeded opportunities
for Chinese enterprises to participate in the
exploitation of those hypothetical hydrocarbons.
Equally important, Washington ought to
stand tough vis-a-vis China's hawks, putting
Beijing privately on notice that provocative
actions can only result in uniting other
claimants, drawing the US further into the
conflict and postponing the mutually beneficial
development of the South China Sea's resources.
David Brown is a retired
American diplomat who writes on contemporary
Vietnam. He may be reached at
nworbd@gmail.com.
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