ASIA HAND Thaksin tests Thailand's deal
By Shawn W Crispin
BANGKOK - How long will Thailand's political peace last? By certain estimations
the pre-election accommodation that paved the way for Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra's rise to power and self-exiled former premier Thaksin Shinawatra's
return to influence is already showing signs of strain. How the royalist
establishment might respond to perceived threats, however, is a wildcard. (See
The deal behind Thailand's polls Asia Times Online, June 30, 2011)
Yingluck, Thaksin's political novice sister, struck a notably conciliatory pose
on the campaign trail, emphasizing national reconciliation as one of her top
policy priorities. In a symbolic bow to royal power, her maiden speech as
premier underscored the need for Thais to rally around King Bhumibol Adulyadej
and his
84th birthday celebrations scheduled for this December.
Analysts interpreted her apparent decision against appointing top United Front
for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) protest leaders, some of whom have
been critical of the monarchy, and known anti-royal elements in her Puea Thai
party to prominent government posts as yet another nod to royal power. So, too,
were public comments by two of her top ministers that they planned to uphold
draconian lese majeste laws more firmly than the outgoing Abhisit
Vejjajiva government.
There were certain early signs of reciprocity. Some have noted that unlike the
royal confirmation of two former Thaksin-aligned governments in 2008, the Royal
Household Bureau, which manages the royal palace's public relations,
distributed and allowed local newspapers to publish prominently photos of
Yingluck's meeting with King Bhumibol after he issued a royal command for her
to take the premiership.
Other moves, more apparently orchestrated by her self-exiled elder sibling who
is legally banned from politics, have been more provocative towards royal
establishment interests and indicate he is willing to risk pushing the limits
of the pre-election accommodation reached with the military and palace.
Yingluck's government is now purging the bureaucracy of perceived allies of the
outgoing Abhisit government and known royalists, and replacing them with known
Thaksin loyalists and family members. Thaksin's aggressive reshuffles,
including over security portfolios, have contributed to instability in the
past.
A recent high level police rotation that will pave the way for Thaksin's former
brother-in-law, Priewphan Damapong, to become national police chief later this
year. Surapong Tovichakchaikul, a Thaksin relative through marriage, was
appointed foreign minister despite a scant resume in foreign affairs. The new
government also ousted the National Security Council chief, an official with
known ties to top 2006 coup plotter and former spy chief Prasong Soonsiri.
The moves are consistent with past Thaksin-led political promotions of family
members to top government positions, including to the army's leadership, and
political enemies to inactive posts. Because Abhisit presided over five sets of
reshuffles and mini-reshuffles during his two and a half year tenure, Yingluck
and her Thaksin-affiliated advisers are moving aggressively to assert control
over the bureaucracy, traditionally viewed as a bastion of royal influence.
While these moves were mostly anticipated, the rapid reshuffle of top Justice
Ministry officials arguably carries a greater potential for ruffling royalist
feathers. That's especially true if promoted officials prioritize motions to
potentially absolve Thaksin's 2008 criminal conviction and reverse the 2010
Supreme Court decision that seized US$1.4 billion of Thaksin's personal assets.
The reshuffle of royalist judicial officials is considered sensitive because of
the special emphasis King Bhumibol has in recent years placed on top judges to
rule with independence and righteousness in adjudicating the country's complex
and increasingly volatile political problems. Weeks before the July 3 polls,
Bhumibol made high profile speeches to newly appointed judges, advising them to
be vigilant and impartial in serving the nation.
Since the 2006 coup, the judiciary has emerged as an important royalist power
center, one that Thaksin's "red shirt" allies have accused of double standards
in political rulings they've likened to "judicial coups". A series of pivotal
decisions have gone against Thaksin and his political allies, including the
2007 dissolution of his original Thai Rak Thai party and decisions in 2008 that
brought down two of his aligned governments. More recent decisions, however,
have let Thaksin's family members off the hook for tax evasion and other
business-related charges.
While Thai court judges are legally independent of the Justice Ministry, it
seems clear that Thaksin's political allies are bidding to neutralize the
judiciary's future ability to undermine or even topple Yingluck's
administration. That said, there are widespread doubts about who is the real
power behind Yingluck, with a behind-the-scenes team of Thaksin-affiliated
advisors more clearly controlling her government's policy and pace.
Deputy Prime Minister Chalerm Yoobamrung, a former tough-talking high-ranking
police official and long time patronage politician, has filled much of the
leadership vacuum left by Yingluck's inexperience. He has taken the rhetorical
lead in calling for a reversal of Thaksin's criminal conviction and lobbying
for his return to Thailand via a royal pardon. Thaksin has said he would like
to return to the country to attend his daughter's wedding in November.
Chalerm, who was instrumental in securing Thaksin's original state concession
to outfit the national police force with computers in the 1980s, embodies the
double standards in Thai society that Thaksin's "red shirt" movement rallied
against in opposing Abhisit and a royalist aristocracy, and has exposed clearly
and early the disconnect between Thaksin's reform rhetoric and political
actions.
(Chalerm's son, Duangchalerm, was acquitted in 2004 on what international
experts say were questionable legal grounds in the fatal shooting of an
off-duty police officer in a Bangkok nightclub. He was handed down a one-month
suspended jail term and a US$25 fine.)
Analysts believe Chalerm's elevation was also prompted in part by his
historical antagonism towards privy council president Prem Tinsulanonda, one of
King Bhumibol's top royal advisers and a former prime minister and army
commander. Prem stands accused by "red shirt" activists of orchestrating the
2006 coup that toppled Thaksin's administration, charges he has denied. Chalerm
helped to bump Prem from the premiership in 1988 through allegations of
misconduct at a naval facility he claimed to have recorded on videotape.
The more delicate dynamic, however, concerns relations with the military. The
appointment of Deputy Prime Minister for Security Kowit Wattana, a known
royalist and Bhumibol favorite, and Yuthasak Sasiprapha, a retired general with
family ties to military elites, was interpreted widely as a conciliatory first
move. Yuthasak has vowed not to rotate any top commanders, including army chief
and palace favorite Prayuth Chan-ocha, at this year's reshuffle, which is due
to come into force on October 1.
Security analysts will comb through the reshuffle list's mid-ranking promotions
and demotions for indications that Thaksin is putting allied pieces in place to
consolidate his control over the armed forces at future reshuffles. A bid this
week to nominate retired General Panlop Pinmanee, a Thaksin ally and UDD
supporter who advocated the protest group form a "people's army" to topple
Abhisit's government, to head the military's Internal Security Operations
Command (ISOC), Thailand's powerful equivalent of the US Department of Homeland
Security, is indicative of such designs.
The power play over ISOC also hints at a potential showdown between Prayuth and
Thaksin, via Yingluck, over control of the Armed Forces Security Center, the
military's main and highly effective intelligence-gathering apparatus. The
military has traditionally bid to retain control over the facility, which
generates a steady flow of domestic intelligence, including on politicians'
activities, by appointing its commander.
Past information gathered by the center, some military analysts speculate,
could be used to build legal cases against top military officials, including
Prayuth, responsible for last year's lethal crackdown on the UDD's protest,
where 92 people, mostly civilians, were killed. It is thus notable that
Chalerm, a former police intelligence chief, has called for new investigations
by police into a handful of the killings that apparently stalled under
Abhisit's watch.
Questions of unity
It's not immediately clear that the rhetoric and reshuffles are necessarily at
odds with the terms of the pre-election accommodation reached between Thaksin,
the military and at least one side of the royal palace.
The bigger question is whether the royalist establishment was initially and is
currently unified in doing a deal with Thaksin for the sake of stability, and
whether it will react in unison if Thaksin is perceived to break the bargain,
as royalists claim he has with several past behind-the-scenes agreements.
Indeed, there are indications of divergent thinking at the highest levels of
the royal establishment, though it's not clear if the apparent opposed views
represent real splits or are instead a diversionary good cop, bad cop routine
to keep Thaksin on his heels. Analysts note that royalists have a corporate
interest in maintaining the monarchy's exalted position in Thai society, and
would be expected to fall in line if a genuine threat to that continuity
emerged.
In particular, it seems unlikely that Bhumibol's advisory Privy Council would
support any exclusive royal pardon for Thaksin considering the emphasis the
revered monarch has placed on the need for greater judicial strength and
independence. Royalists will likely strongly balk at any motion that is
perceived to put political pressure on Bhumibol to decide in Thaksin's favor.
By law, the Thai monarchy is above politics.
That said, the royal establishment forces that remain opposed to Thaksin have
increasingly limited options to fight back - and those are being blunted. It's
ability to mobilize destabilizing street protests has diminished with the
marginalization of the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) Yellow Shirt
protest group that was pivotal in setting the stage for the 2006 coup and
judicial toppling of two Thaksin-aligned governments in 2008.
While the royalist Yellow Shirts could still be mobilized, it's not clear the
group will have the same popular pulling power or middle class resonance as
it's previous incarnations, particularly if it's viewed, as this and last
year's anti-Abhisit protests were widely perceived, as a front for a military
power grab. Those nationalistic demonstrations failed to galvanize the same
popular support as previous anti-Thaksin rallies and revealed uncomfortable
splits in the conservative camp that was earlier unified in its opposition to
Thaksin.
Moreover, there are questions about the once potent protest group's state of
allegiance. PAD co-leader and media mogul Sondhi Limthongkul has recently said
in private meetings that he views the ''feudalists'' as the heart of Thailand's
political problems, a line that would seem to echo last year's
anti-establishment "red shirt" protests.
At the same time, his local Puu Jaht Gahn-ASTV newspaper has remained highly
critical of Thaksin and Yingluck, including a scoop story that claimed a
Thaksin spin-doctor had purchased favorable press coverage of Yingluck's
election campaign in a handful of local media outlets.
If renewed anti-Thaksin street protests are remote, nor is it clear that
another military coup so soon after democratic elections would be viable -
though it is no doubt significant that military-influenced bodies continue to
sharpen and refine their authoritarian tools. While military power is widely
perceived to be on the ascendency, there are contrary indicators that Prayuth
and his top deputies are eager to step back from daily politics as long as they
can maintain enough power to guard against any political threat to the
monarchy, including during the royal succession.
Thailand's five-year-old political conflict will not be resolved until the
royal succession is put to rest and a new power-sharing order is established.
As the pre-election accommodation indicates, it is possible that Thaksin, the
military and palace can reach an accord and work together to assure stability
during the anticipated succession from King Bhumibol to Crown Prince
Vajiralongkorn. Thaksin could, after Bhumibol's passing, be brought in from the
cold and even granted a prominent position in a new royal order led by
Vajiralongkorn.
However, another succession scenario foresees the Privy Council declaring a
long period of national mourning, perhaps as long as 999 days in auspicious
recognition of Bhumibol's reign as the ninth monarch in the Chakri dynasty, and
a military-backed suspension of democracy to assure a smooth transition. By
law, the Privy Council will have two years to formally crown the next monarch
after his or her name is approved by parliament, and the council's members in
the interregnum will be legally empowered to assume royal responsibilities.
Some analysts believe such a scenario could bring Thaksin into direct conflict
with the royal caretaker, members of which his supporters have accused of
orchestrating the 2006 coup that ousted him from power. His "red shirt" protest
group has mobilized potent anti-monarchy sentiment in the past, and analysts
believe it may be easier to advocate in the highly revered Bhumibol's absence.
It's a dark sky scenario that could lead to more violence and a heavy-handed
military intervention, and it's a scenario that judging by current and past
events cannot be discounted.
Shawn W Crispin is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor. The article
is an adaptation of a longer September 21 presentation he made to the United
States-based Prince Street Capital Management hedge fund in Bangkok.
(Copyright 2011 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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