BANGKOK - The release of
more than 200 political prisoners and a tentative
ceasefire with the rebel Karen National Union
represent the latest of steps taken by Myanmar
president Thein Sein's government to improve its
international image and assuage its many critics
at home and abroad.
The cosmetic change in
the traditionally military-run country is
unmistakable. In recent months, it has become
easier for ordinary citizens to access the
Internet and local magazines and journals are able
to publish articles on topics that would have been
unthinkable only a year ago.
Pictures of pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi,
who spent 15 of the past 21 years under house
arrest, are now for sale in markets not only in
the former capital Yangon but also in small
upcountry towns.
The United States
government, for more than two decades the fiercest
critic of successive military-dominated regimes in
Myanmar, promised enhanced engagement in exchange
for "further reforms" immediately after Friday's
prison release. As a first step, the US is going
to send an ambassador to its embassy in Yangon,
which has been headed by a charge d'affaires since
Washington decided to downgrade relations with
Myanmar in 1990 in response to a brutal crackdown
on pro-democracy demonstrators.
Many
Myanmar citizens undoubtedly welcome the easing of
the extreme authoritarian pressure they have lived
under as long as they can remember. But critics
maintain the loosening is not tantamount to a
"reform process", which would require changes in
the country's fundamental power structure, and
that the US may have other diplomatic objectives
in mind over concerns for human rights and
democracy.
Meanwhile, some Myanmar
dissidents are beginning to ask, albeit in hushed
tones, the hitherto unthinkable: is Suu Kyi being
used by the Thein Sein's military-backed,
civilianized government as a pawn in its efforts
to break the country's long isolation from the
West? And, has she come under pressure from the US
and possibly other Western powers with a stake in
Myanmar's future geopolitical role to strike a
deal with her former military adversaries?
Less than a year ago, Suu Kyi was known to
have said to visiting foreign diplomats that she
was apprehensive about talking to the new
government that assumed office after a blatantly
rigged November 2010 election. At the time, she
reportedly said that the main problem was the new
constitution, which was adopted after an equally
fraudulent referendum in May 2008 and guarantees
the military 25% of the seats in parliament.
For instance, the charter's Chapter 12
lays out the complicated rules for constitutional
amendments, which effectively give the military
veto power over any proposed changes. The upper
house currently consists of 168 elected
representatives with a quarter, or 56 delegates,
directly representing the defense services; the
lower house is made up of 330 elected MPs and 110
appointed to represent the military. The ruling
Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP),
meanwhile, is widely viewed as a vehicle for the
military's political interests.
Minor
constitutional changes may be considered by the
bicameral parliament if 20% of MPs submit a bill.
However, a tangle of 104 clauses mean that major
charter changes can not be made without the prior
approval of more than 75% of all MPs, after which
a nationwide referendum must be held where more
than half of all eligible voters cast ballots.
This complicated procedure, coupled with
Myanmar's record of holding bogus referendums -
the first in 1973 for the 1974 constitution was as
lacking in credibility as the one held in 2008 -
make is virtually impossible to change those
clauses, which in various ways and means legally
safeguard the military's now indirect hold on
power.
For instance, one of the first
sections of the constitution guarantees the
military's "national political leadership role of
the State" and, in case of an "emergency", the
"Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services has
the right to take over and exercise State
sovereign power" after consulting the president.
"No legal action" can be taken against the
military for what it does while exercising such
emergency powers, according to the constitution.
Another clause bars anyone whose parents,
spouse or children who "owe allegiance to a
foreign power" from becoming president. Suu Kyi's
late husband, Michael Aris, was a British citizen,
as are their two sons. The military's right to
appoint a quarter of all seats in what is
otherwise an elected parliament is also
guaranteed, as is military control of one-third of
all seats in local assemblies.
In 2008,
Myanmar's generals got the constitution they
wanted and through rigged elections now controls a
solid majority of all seats in the parliament.
Consequently, they can now afford to make some
minor political concessions in response to
international pressure. Allowing MPs from Suu
Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) to take
part in a by-election on April 1 for 40 seats in
the lower house and six in the upper chamber left
vacant by the appointment of ministers, will not
affect Myanmar's fundamental power structure with
the military at its apex.
Reversible
reform The semblance of reform, however,
has improved Myanmar's standing in the
international community, as are other steps
expected to be taken by Thein Sein's government,
including new laws allowing for limited public
protests and the creation of labor unions.
Since the constitution bars Suu Kyi from
becoming president, some observers speculate that
if she wins a seat in parliament she will be
appointed minister of health or education, two
positions which she would consider important but
will not give her substantial political power and
certainly no influence over the military.
"She would be an excellent choice for a
person to be sent abroad to solicit aid for health
and education programs and to attend international
AIDS conferences and the like," says a veteran
Myanmar politician who spoke on condition of
anonymity.
Few would doubt that Suu Kyi
remains Myanmar's most popular politician - and
for many the country's main hope for a better
future. But for the first time critical voices of
her role are also being heard. In an unusually
candid interview with The Australian on January 6,
Win Tin, one of the original founders of the NLD
in 1988 who was imprisoned for 19 years for his
beliefs, said that the "reforms" taking place in
Myanmar "are a ploy by the country's dictatorship
to seduce foreign governments and neutralize Aung
San Suu Kyi".
Other dissidents - former
political prisoners and leaders of local civil
society groups - complain that Suu Kyi meets
readily with one foreign visitor after another but
has no time to see them. "One comment I hear
frequently is, 'what was the NLD fighting for if
Daw Suu [Aung San Suu Kyi] will run for the
by-elections and by that accepting the 2008
constitution'?" lamented one non-governmental
organization worker in Yangon.
Ongoing
fighting between ethnic rebels and government
forces are another point of division. "In
particular the Kachin are disillusioned that there
is no compassionate speech or letter [from Suu
Kyi] to their community, although some of the
Catholic Bishops have explicitly asked Daw Suu to
send such a message," said one civil society
activist. Since June last year, heavy fighting has
been raging between government troops and the
rebel Kachin Independence Army in the country's
far north.
Tens of thousands of civilians
have fled the fighting to the Chinese border, or
taken refuge in churches and community halls in
towns in the predominantly Christian state of the
Union. Farmers have been forced to abandon their
crops and most refugees are living as destitutes
in border areas under constant threat of being
pushed back by unsympathetic Chinese authorities.
Some critics argue that Suu Kyi has grown
old and tired - she will turn 67 this year - and
the present, slight opening, however flawed, may
be her last chance to achieve her vision of a more
democratic Myanmar. But it is equally plausible
that Myanmar's close relationship with China, and,
more menacingly, its military partnership with
North Korea, have prompted Western powers to push
her into accepting some kind of accommodation with
Thein Sein's government. Without her engagement
with the new regime, it would be hard for the US
and European Union to justify a dramatic change in
policy towards Myanmar.
When US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton met Thein Sein during her
historic visit to Myanmar last December - the
first by such a high-ranking US official in half a
century - China was tellingly high on her
diplomatic agenda. The first agenda item raised by
Thein Sein during the meeting was the importance
of Myanmar's relationship with China, which
Clinton apparently did not object to. However, she
emphasized that relations with the US would "if
reforms maintain momentum" - thus leaving the door
open for Myanmar to diversify its foreign
relations.
After Washington decided in
mid-January to establish full diplomatic ties with
Myanmar, Clinton said the US "will further
embrace" Myanmar if "the government releases all
remaining political prisoners, ends violence
against minorities and cuts military ties with
North Korea". After her December visit, she said
that the US would agree to and support assessment
missions to Myanmar by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, a first step toward
renewed multilateral lending for badly needed
infrastructure.
Myanmar's staunchly
nationalistic military may be willing to lessen
its dependence on China, and even cut its ties
with North Korea, provided the US and its allies
can offer something substantial in return,
including an eventual removal of economic
sanctions. However, if one reads the 2008
constitution carefully, Myanmar will not become a
genuine democracy any time soon, but rather a
thinly disguised authoritarian state that the US
and the West can cynically live with to
counterbalance China's influence.
That is
not what many pro-democracy activists, both at
home and in exile, have been fighting for since
the bloody, nationwide uprising against
military-dominated rule in 1988, when thousands of
protesters were mowed down by the military, and
when they overwhelmingly voted for the NLD in the
1990 election, a democratic result that the
military refused to honor. In the case of any
future "emergency", the limited new freedoms that
Myanmar's people are now enjoying can also be
curtailed, perhaps next time by constitutional
means rather than the barrel of a gun.
Bertil Lintner is a former
correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review
and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar,
including Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's
Struggle for Democracy (Published in 2011). He
is currently a writer with Asia-Pacific Media
Services.
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