ASIA
HAND Daring double game in
Thailand By Shawn W Crispin
BANGKOK - Is Thailand headed towards
national reconciliation or new confrontation?
While Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra
has taken a conciliatory tack to the country's
still unresolved seven-year-old political
conflict, her self-exiled elder brother, former
premier Thaksin Shinawatra, and his advisers have
worked from behind the scenes to consolidate
political power at the expense of rival royalist
establishment interests.
Bureaucratic
reshuffles, newly laid or threatened criminal
charges and proposed constitutional changes have
all enhanced the criminally convicted Thaksin's
negotiating leverage vis-a-vis royalist power
centers, including in the military, judiciary and
palace, to achieve a political amnesty that would
restore his
court-confiscated wealth
and ultimately allow for his return to Thailand as
a free man.
A new drive to achieve an
amnesty through parliamentary means has met
predictable resistance from the opposition
Democrat party and anti-Thaksin People's Alliance
for Democracy (PAD) protest group, and raised the
specter of new instability after over a year of
relative political calm.
Recommendations
submitted by a local think-tank to a parliamentary
reconciliation subcommittee proposed an amnesty
for offenses committed on both sides of the
political divide and a reversal of decisions
handed down against Thaksin by military coup
maker-created bodies.
A similar amnesty
proposal in 2008 by a previous Thaksin-aligned
government provided the initial spark for PAD
protests that for months laid siege to Government
House and temporarily shut down Bangkok's
international airport. While the Democrats and PAD
have claimed that adoption of the new amnesty
recommendations could lead to new instability,
that will likely depend more on how the military's
royalist leadership perceives the latest proposed
deal.
Military, palace and Thaksin
representatives reached an accommodation brokered
in Brunei ahead of the 2011 elections that were
eventually won by Yingluck and Thaksin's Puea Thai
party. That deal centered on a top brass vow to
accept the poll results in exchange for a Thaksin
promise to refrain from prosecuting soldiers for
deaths caused in 2010 street violence and to rein
in known anti-monarchy elements in his camp.
Over a year since the secret deal was
concluded, it appears that its terms have only
partially held. Yingluck has bowed deeply and
often to royal authority, and expanded a
Democrat-initiated crackdown on anti-monarchy
materials posted to the Internet. At the same
time, Thaksin and his allies have moved
aggressively to challenge the military top brass,
currently led by army commander and palace
favorite General Prayuth Chan-ocha.
The
challenge has included potential criminal charges
for the military's role in the lethal crackdown on
Thaksin-supported United Front for Democracy
Against Dictatorship (UDD) street protestors in
April-May 2010. A police investigation has found
that state actors were responsible for at least 16
of 92 protest-related deaths. If pursued, Prayuth
will likely be implicated as the top of the
suppression operation's chain of command.
The appointment in January of known
Thaksin ally Air Chief Marshal Sukumpol Suwanathat
as defense minister was also viewed as provocative
by many top royalists and signaled Prayuth's
potential removal at the main military reshuffle
in October. Sukumpol's cousin, General Prin
Suwanathat, served as Thaksin's First Army Region
commander, a key position responsible for
Bangkok's security, when the 2006 coup toppled
Thaksin's caretaker government.
Prin
reportedly had a gun put to his head during the
Special Forces-led operation and was later
sidelined as coupmakers moved to purge Thaksin
loyalists from top military commands. Despite
serving as a commissioned officer, Prin reportedly
played a key operational role in the "war room"
that directed the UDD's militant wing's operations
during the 2010 street violence and unrest.
Prayuth and Sukumpol reportedly wrestled
over a recent mini-reshuffle list, including over
Prayuth's bid to elevate his brother to the Third
Army Region command's top post. One military
insider, however, says that Prayuth mostly had his
way over the promotion list which is due to take
effect in April.
A government reform
initiative to give more civilian control over
military reshuffles is another growing point of
contention between the two sides. Diplomats
speculate that Yingluck could move to appoint a
deputy defense minister, currently a vacant post,
that would tilt future six-member Defense Council
votes on military reshuffles and appointments in
Thaksin's favor.
Carrot and stick Whether Thaksin would be willing to ease these
pressures in exchange for an agreement on amnesty
is unclear but would be consistent with his past
negotiating tactics. One source familiar with
Thaksin's recent thinking claims he has grown
"tired" of reconciliation efforts and is prepared
to use "force" to push his agenda. The well-placed
source believes that recent swings between
reconciliation and confrontation are often
reflective of the former premier's mood swings.
Pansak Vinyaratn, one of Thaksin's current
strategists and past chief policy adviser, has
said alternately in recent meetings with foreign
delegations that Thaksin's side is "winning" or
has "already won" the political conflict. He has
suggested to different audiences that the royal
establishment, including the military top brass,
can be co-opted and subdued through cash and
contracts, according to people involved in the
recent discussions.
Until Thaksin wins an
amnesty deal or elevates enough of his loyalists
into positions of military power, fears for his
personal security will likely preclude his return.
Diplomats here speak in hushed tones about a
possible "Aquino moment", reference to former
Philippine senator Benigno Aquino who was
assassinated at Manila's airport in 1983 upon
returning from exile, should Thaksin attempt to
return before the conflict is considered mutually
settled.
That said, there are indications
that the royal establishment's resistance to
Thaksin's push has weakened and that past tactics
- including the mobilization of threats to the
monarchy - are less likely to have the same
popular appeal in future. The establishment is
also apparently divided on whether its interests
would be best served by mobilizing again around
the PAD.
The PAD's recent decision to call
off a planned mass rally against proposed
constitutional changes came amid a weak popular
showing and is indicative of the broad
establishment's lack of support for more
destabilizing street protests. New illegal
assembly charges filed against PAD leaders were
likely also factored into the PAD's decision to
remain inactive.
Nonetheless, there is
still the potential for the PAD and UDD to be
mobilized simultaneously on Bangkok's streets,
setting the stage for possible confrontations in
the months ahead. Thaksin recently mobilized and
goaded his red-clad group to pre-empt the supposed
threat of an incipient military coup and rally
behind constitutional change.
Some
analysts warn that future street fights could
become more personalized than past mobilizations,
with rival protest groups openly targeting
business groups and interests perceived as red or
yellow leaning. UDD supporters launched bomb
attacks against Bangkok Bank branches after the
group's leaders criticized the bank's alignment
with establishment interests, including alleged
financial support for the PAD.
If
competing "red" and "yellow" groups were allowed
to establish encampments and launch attacks
against one another, the breakdown in public order
could provide national security-related pretext
for another military intervention that ousts
Yingluck. Some suggest the scenario could be
sparked to pre-empt Thaksin's anticipated attempt
to consolidate his power inside the armed forces,
including through Prayuth's removal at the annual
reshuffle due in October.
Breakaway
threat While the 2006 coup was widely
criticized for setting back Thai democracy,
conservative groups, including the military, have
since seen a resurgence in power and influence. At
the same time, diplomats and analysts believe
another military coup would be highly unpopular,
both domestically and internationally, and could
provide the spark for the provincial level armed
resistance Thaksin has suggested but not realized
during past Bangkok-centric confrontations.
After the 2010 military crackdown, there
were only isolated and short-lived incidents of
upcountry unrest, including arson attacks on
government buildings in two northeastern
provinces. The threat of a pro-Thaksin insurgency
has since gained more traction with the
mushrooming of so-called "red shirt" villages,
some of which have openly pledged their allegiance
to Thaksin over Bangkok's central authority, in
his northern and northeastern regional
strongholds. Reports of gun-running in the same
areas has underlined the threat of a possible
wider, more damaging future conflict.
Faced with these potential lose-lose
scenarios, some analysts believe the top brass
will ultimately agree to some form of amnesty,
though more in the spirit of detente than
reconciliation. One military insider says that
Prayuth and his allies have come to the conclusion
that neither side can win an absolute victory in
the conflict and that a new power-sharing
arrangement would be in the national interest. At
the same time, the insider says, the top brass is
wary of Thaksin's failure to honor fully previous
behind-the-scenes agreements, including the
pre-election Brunei deal.
Barring new
rounds of conflict, Thaksin's camp hopes that a
new constitution passed by national referendum
later this year will pave the way for general
elections staged in the name of national
reconciliation in early 2013. Diplomats here
believe that Yingluck and Puea Thai, soon to be
boosted by the return of 110 Thaksin-aligned
politicians who were banned from politics for five
years after the 2006 coup, would likely win an
even stronger majority over the Democrats. That,
they suggest, is why the Democrats are so strongly
opposed to an amnesty that would effectively
absolve former premier and now opposition leader
Abhisit Vejjajiva for the protest-related deaths
on his government's watch.
A longer view,
however, foresees that Thailand's political
impasse will not be resolved until the royal
succession from King Bhumibol Adulyadej to heir
apparent Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn is complete.
The construction of an apparent new palace in
Bangkok's Dusit district, a royal tradition known
as "wang na", is indicative of quiet
preparations underway for the first royal
transition in the country in over six decades.
Without a recent precedent, there is still
uncertainty about how exactly the process will
play out and how royal authority will be exercised
during an interregnum period of national mourning.
The palace apparently tried to allay some of those
concerns in a recent authorized biography of
Bhumibol that includes a chapter outlining the
succession process, but there are still questions
about the limitations of the royal advisory Privy
Council's role between the announcement and
crowning of the next king.
Some analysts
have suggested that Thaksin could receive more
sympathetic royal treatment, and perhaps even a
royal advisory role, after the transition due to
his known close ties with Vajiralongkorn. Calls
for a royal pardon for Thaksin, including in the
run-up to Bhumibol's 84-year birthday celebrations
last December, have consistently fallen on deaf
royal ears and sparked criticism that Thaksin's
camp has put undue pressure on the ailing monarch.
While his allies push for a parliamentary
amnesty, it is believed that Thaksin's return to
Thailand will still ultimately require a royal
pardon of his criminal corruption conviction. Some
of his supporters suggest that after an amnesty is
passed through parliament the Ministry of Justice
will recommend a royal pardon of his conviction
that will pass from Yingluck up to the palace.
But while some foresee a scenario where a
royally pardoned Thaksin is allowed to return home
to make a cathartic gesture of obeisance at
Bhumibol's feet, it is just as likely that his
next call for royal mercy will be met with the
same steely silence.
Shawn W Crispin
is Asia Times Online's Southeast Asia Editor.
(Copyright 2012 Asia Times Online
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