China tests the will of the
Philippines By George Amurao
David met Goliath on a tiny spit of rock
and sand off the western coast of Luzon in the
Philippines earlier this month. The giant here is
China, with the Philippines as the puny David, and
the confrontation occurred in Scarborough Shoal,
an atoll-like collection of reefs, rocks and
sandbars in the South China Sea.
National
Coast Watch System observers in Luzon have for the
past three weeks watched the presence of Chinese
fishing vessels in the area, which the Philippine
government claims is within its 200-nautical mile
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). A Philippine Navy
aircraft confirmed on April 8 that eight Chinese
boats were inside the lagoon of Scarborough Shoal.
The Philippine Navy dispatched its newest
flagship, the frigate
BRP Gregorio del
Pilar, to confront the perceived Chinese
intruders. Upon arrival at the shoal, the ship
sent a boarding party that gathered evidence
showing that the boats contained corals, giant
clams, and live sharks, all apparently harvested
from Philippine waters.
Before the
fishermen were arrested, however, two vessels from
China's maritime surveillance unit, the Fisheries
Law Enforcement, arrived on the scene and placed
themselves between the Philippine frigate and the
fishing boats.
On learning of the
situation, Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto
del Rosario summoned Chinese ambassador Ma Keqing
on April 11 and filed a diplomatic protest on
China's alleged intrusion of Philippine waters. In
turn, Ma charged the Philippines with encroaching
on Chinese territory and demanded that the warship
be pulled out of the shoal.
The
Scarborough Shoal, like the disputed Spratlys
Islands to the south, is a festering regional
flashpoint. Unlike the Spratlys, though, only the
Philippines and China lay claim to the territory
(ironically named Panatag Shoal, or "Calm Shoal"
by the Philippines), which energy analysts believe
could be abundant with natural gas.
Chinese fishing vessels have always
trawled in the area, playing a cat-and-mouse game
with the Philippine Coast Guard. China used to
place markers on bare rocks jutting out of the
waters while Philippine warships subsequently
destroyed them with naval gunfire. The ongoing
stand-off is not only the latest but also the one
with the highest profile, similar to the recent
tensions over the disputed Spratlys.
As
both sides publicly exchanged charges and demands
for withdrawal, backroom channels were utilized to
defuse an incendiary situation. Though the
Philippine frigate has enough firepower to take on
the two Chinese ships - and a third one that
joined its sister ships later on - a firefight
would only prompt China to send reinforcements
from its military bases in nearby Hainan island
and flex its naval superiority.
In a
meeting held in Malacanang earlier that week,
President Benigno Aquino reiterated his policy of
"white to white, gray to gray", which meant that
"white" or civilian ships would have to deal with
civilian ships while "gray" or naval ships could
only face their foreign counterparts.
By
April 12, the tense situation appeared on the
verge of de-escalating. A Philippine Coast Guard
search and rescue ship, BRP EDSA, relieved
the BRP Gregorio del Pilar. The frigate
then proceeded to Poro Point naval station in La
Union on Luzon's west coast for refueling and
replenishment.
The following day,
Philippine officials announced that two of the
Chinese ships and the eight fishing boats had
slipped away from the shoal. Though no marine
resources were confiscated or Chinese fishermen
were arrested, the Philippine government
reiterated that it had not backed down in its
confrontation with the Chinese. At the time, one
ship from each country's coast guard service was
left at the shoal.
This image was
reinforced on April 14 when one of the Chinese
maritime surveillance vessels returned to the
shoal, outnumbering the lone Philippine coast
guard ship. An unidentified Chinese aircraft also
reportedly did fly-bys in the area. The Chinese
ships and aircraft were also accused of harassing
a Philippine-registered yacht, M/Y
Sarangani, which had been conducting an
archaeological survey in the vicinity.
As
of April 19, the impasse continued as the M/Y
Sarangani incident prompted the Philippine
government to lodge another diplomatic protest
with China. The Chinese Embassy in Manila fired
back by claiming as its own the shipwreck that the
crew aboard the M/Y Sarangani had been
surveying. It also called again for the withdrawal
of the Philippine Coast Guard ship from the shoal.
Communications Secretary Ricky Carandang
told reporters on April 18 that the government
would not pull out the BRP EDSA from the
shoal, and reiterated that China should be the one
to withdraw. This particular stand-off, some
analysts reckon, could result in a moment of
strategic truth: Can the Philippine government,
through a combination of diplomatic skills and
military maneuvers, take a firm stand against
China's intrusions into its territory?
If
a naval battle were to break out, the Philippines
could only field its former US Coast Guard cutter
that saw action in the Vietnam War, a handful of
second-hand patrol boats from the United Kingdom
and South Korea, and other older vessels, some
dating back to World War II. Such a flotilla would
not stand a chance against the Goliath of China's
bolstered navy.
The Philippine Air Force,
meanwhile, has practically no modern jet fighters
to achieve air superiority, much less meet head-on
any fighter jets deployed from Chinese bases in
nearby Hainan island. Non-committal
allies On the diplomatic front, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
yet to declare openly a common stand with the
Philippines in its territorial disputes with
China, notwithstanding Aquino's call for support
during an ASEAN summit recently held in Phnom
Penh. It is not surprising, considering that all
of ASEAN's 10 members are increasingly dependent
on China for trade and investment.
The
United States has also been quiet on whether it
would honor the Mutual Defense Treaty it signed
with its Philippine ally should a shooting war
break out with China. The US Congressional
Research Service said the US-Philippine Mutual
Defense Treaty is open to interpretation, with the
US obliged to respond only if a foreign military
attacks Philippine territory or military forces.
By this definition, the obligation for the US to
protect Philippine claims to the Spratlys or
Scarborough Shoal is uncertain.
With
support from its neighbors and superpower ally
ambiguous, the Philippines is bulking up its own
military muscle. Manila's revenues from the
natural gas fields off Palawan have given Aquino
the fiscal confidence to plan for more arms
acquisitions. Though the planned deal for a
squadron of second-hand F-16 fighters from the US
may or may not come to fruition, the Philippine
Air Force is eyeing the purchase of brand new
trainer jets from either South Korea, Italy or
Russia that can be configured into fighters and
beef up the Philippines' airpower for deterrence
purposes.
Washington is working in
Manila's corner through other means. Last year, it
facilitated the Philippines' acquisition of the US
Coast Guard's largest cutter, now renamed the
BRP Gregorio del Pilar, the same ship that
confronted the Chinese at Scarborough.
A
sister ship is due to be acquired in the middle of
this year and there is an ongoing deal for the
purchase of a third sister ship in the latter part
of 2012. Unlike the BRP Gregorio del Pilar,
sources said there is a strong possibility that
these sister ships will come with their weapons
and electronics systems intact.
Amid the
tensions, the US also pushed through with the
annual Balikatan ("Shoulder-to-Shoulder") joint
military exercise that started on April 16 and
involved 2,000 Filipino soldiers and sailors and
4,000 personnel from the US armed forces. It is no
coincidence that the exercise was held off the
coast of Palawan, just a few nautical miles from
the disputed Spratlys.
For now, Aquino
seems keen to stay the diplomatic course. The
withdrawal of the BRP Gregorio del Pilar
from the shoal and replacement with a coast
guard vessel to match the presence of the Chinese
"white" maritime surveillance ship signified his
government's willingness to defuse the situation.
Aquino is also enjoying popular domestic
public opinion over his handling of the issue, as
reflected in messages posted in online news
portals and forums, and the comparative dearth of
criticism from local media outlets. Surprisingly,
even left-leaning politicians have aired support
for Philippine claims to the Scarborough Shoal.
Manila believes strongly it holds the moral
and legal upper hand in the dispute, considering
that Scarborough Shoal falls within territories
provided for under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea against the more dubious
historical claims insisted on by China.
The Philippines also stands to win in the
court of international public opinion. While China
played the role of bully by sending additional
vessels and aircraft and harassing a Philippine
civilian boat in the vicinity, the Philippines was
seen as trying to de-escalate the situation.
Filipino diplomats' calls for bringing the dispute
before an international tribunal would also
resonate positively with other claimants in
Southeast Asia.
Despite China's aversion
to the involvement of "outside parties" in the
maritime dispute, the fact that the South China
Sea is a vital sea lane for trade and commerce
that affects the US and other countries makes it
impossible to limit any negotiations only to the
contending parties.
Political analysts
have pointed out that China may be painting itself
into a diplomatic corner in its attempts to lay
exclusive claim to the South China Sea and its
resources and risks eroding the "soft power" gains
it made through fostering trade ties to regional
countries.
At the time of this writing,
two "white" ships - one Chinese, the other
Filipino - are still squared off against each
other at Scarborough Shoal. Tensions may have
lowered a notch with the withdrawal of the other
ships and fishing boats, but both countries are
still scrambling for an acceptable end-game to the
stand-off.
The question now is not who
will blink first but rather how both governments
can secure a win-win situation.
For the
Philippines, the government has been given a
chance to draw up a new template for handling
Chinese intrusions in disputed territories that
could be a model for its Southeast Asian
neighbors. That is on the assumption that the
situation does not escalate into a shooting war
where the smaller claimant is outgunned and ousted
by the bigger.
George Amurao, a
former journalist in Manila, until recently worked
for the Southeast Asian Press Alliance. He is now
with Mahidol University International College in
Bangkok, Thailand.
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