Mixed US messages in
China-Philippine spat By George
Amurao
As the maritime standoff between
China and the Philippines enters a fourth week,
attention has shifted to what role the United
States may play in the escalating territorial
conflict over a shoal in the South China Sea.
During an unprecedented "2+2" meeting held
earlier this week between US State Secretary
Hillary Clinton, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
and Philippine Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto
del Rosario and Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin,
the US said it will remain neutral in the
sovereignty dispute, but reaffirmed its commitment
to the 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty
(MDT), which provides for each country to come to
the other's defense in the event of a third
country attack.
Clinton clarified that the
US will defend freedom of navigation in the South
China Sea, areas of which Manila refers to as the West
Philippine Sea. "While
we do not take sides on the competing sovereignty
claims to land features in the South China Sea, as
a Pacific power we have a national interest in
freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace
and stability, respect for international law, and
the unimpeded, lawful commerce across our sea
lanes," she said.
Del Rosario called on
the US to help bolster its naval capabilities and
for greater assistance towards developing a
"minimum credible defense posture". Over the
years, successive Philippine governments have
relied on the MDT with the US for matters of
external defense, often to the detriment of
developing domestic military capabilities.
However, the current standoff with China has put
the bilateral treaty and the US's stated strategic
"pivot" towards Asia to an unprecedented test.
Until 1992, the treaty was buttressed by
the US's presence at Subic Naval Base and Clark
Air Force Base in the Philippines, then the two
biggest American bases outside of the continental
US. Aside from these two, there were also almost
100 other smaller US military bases situated
across the country, making the Philippines a vital
American foothold in projecting its power in Asia
during the Cold War years, including during the
height of the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early
1970s.
Though the Philippine Senate voted
to reject a renewal of the military bases treaty
in 1992, the two countries continued to conduct
joint military exercises over the years. Under a
separate Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) forged in
1999, the US was eventually granted permission to
rotate special operations forces and support units
in shifts at a military base in the southern city
of Zamboanga in pursuit of Washington's so-called
global war on terror. Although confined to an
advisory role, US troops are known to have been
involved in ground operations against the Abu
Sayyaf terror group in the remote Sulu province.
Clinton's ambiguous position on the
Scarborough Shoal standoff was a word-for-word
playback of a US Congressional Research report
issued in early April. The parse of the US
response was that unless China attacks integral
Philippine territory, rather than contested claims
in the South China Sea, the US will refrain from
any military intervention.
Philippine
officials involved in the 2+2 meeting accepted the
US's non-committal response and echoed Clinton's
call for a diplomatic solution to the territorial
dispute. In their statements, the two ministers
admitted that the Philippines has neglected its
external defense capabilities as the government
poured military resources into internal conflicts,
including combating a communist insurgency, Muslim
separatist groups and the Abu Sayyaf terrorist
group.
At the same time, Manila produced a
military hardware wish list, including ships,
planes and radar facilities. The US acknowledged
the pending sale of a second US Coast Guard cutter
to the Philippines later this year. Philippine
officials have requested that the second ship be
delivered with its electronics search and weapons
systems, including the Close-In Weapons Systems
(CIWSs) vital in air/missile defense, intact.
Reports last year indicated that President
Benigno Aquino was keen to acquire at least one
squadron of refurbished F-16 fighters from the US.
Should such a deal push through, it would help to
place the Philippines on a near equal footing with
its regional neighbors, which operate a mix of
Western and Russian multi-role fighters (MRFs). It
remains to be seen, though, if Washington will
agree to this prospective fighter deal and its
implications for the regional balance of power.
In recent years, the Philippines has
expanded its coastal observation capabilities
under the so-called Coast Watch program, details
of which remain inaccessible to the media. This
same surveillance program was responsible for
spotting the presence of Chinese fishing vessels
at Scarborough Shoal some 125 miles [201
kilometers] away from the western shore of Luzon,
prompting the military to confirm it through a
Navy observation plane and the subsequent
deployment of its flagship, BRP Gregorio del
Pilar (the former US Coast Guard cutter
acquired last year), which precipitated the
month-long standoff.
Deterrent
build-up US support for upgrading the
Philippines' radar facilities would enhance its
ability to guard its shores and keep a closer
watch over disputed islets and waters. With the
focus of Manila's military modernization plan
scheduled to turn from internal to external
defense concerns, Manila has tapped into the
earnings of the Malampaya natural gas fields off
Palawan (near the contested Spratly Islands) to
acquire more arms. Revenues from the gas fields
were used for the purchase of the craft now known
as the BRP Gregorio del Pilar and the
forthcoming purchase of its sister ship this year.
A third ship and smaller vessel acquisitions are
also reportedly in the works.
Manila is
also currently reviewing bids for Lead-in Flight
Trainers (LIFTs), planes that ostensibly are used
for advance training of fighter jet pilot
candidates. Current models, however, now carry
almost the same capabilities as Multi-Role
Fighters (MRFs), including radar and missile
armaments. Such planes would give the Philippine
Air Force a trainer craft that could be adapted
for limited fighter or attack modes and serve as
preparation for the acquisition of proper MRFs.
Italian (M-346 aircraft), Italian-Brazilian
(AMX-ATA), Korean (T/A-50), and Russian (Yak-130)
companies are currently competing for the
contract.
But can the Philippine economy
bear the financial burden of logistically
supporting such a sophisticated fighting force?
With the standoff at Scarborough Shoal,
acquisition of these big-ticket items will be
given higher priority. Maintaining sophisticated
air and naval assets, providing support
infrastructure like airfields, radar facilities,
docks and supply and repair facilities, training
the pilots, ground crew, and naval crew, and
sustaining the cost of their operations will prove
more difficult.
If a shooting war breaks
out with China, military operations will take a
heavy toll on the national budget, as demonstrated
in 2000 when the Joseph Estrada government
launched a military offensive against the rebel
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The
Malampaya natural gas fields' earnings, while
substantial, are not entirely dedicated for
Philippine external defense procurements.
Military, political and financial concerns
are all driving Manila into winning unequivocal
assurance from the US for more military support.
The sense of strategic panic has even driven
President Aquino to declare recently that the
Philippines is open to the idea of allowing
American forces more access to Philippine bases.
The pronouncement tiptoes around a constitutional
provision banning the permanent stationing of
foreign troops in the country.
Secretary
Clinton's statement on US neutrality in the
territorial dispute, however, could put a damper
on any such deployments. But the US appears to be
making up in other areas. In an official statement
released by the Philippines on May 3, the US
government agreed to triple the Foreign Military
Financing (FMF) it will award to the Philippines
this year, from US$11.9 million in 2011 to US$30
million this year. The US also agreed during the
2+2 Meeting to share real-time surveillance data
on naval activity in the South China Sea with its
Philippine counterparts.
Clinton's stated
interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in
the South China Sea is also noteworthy. Not only
China, but Japan, South Korea, India and the US
have vital interests in keeping the flow of goods
and gas unobstructed in the South China Sea.
China's stated claim of the entire maritime area
as shown in its nine-dash map endangers those sea
lanes and has prompted the US to re-assert its
power and influence in the region.
Despite
its statement of neutrality, the US has also sent
a signal to the Philippine government (as well as
other smaller claimant countries in the region)
that it is willing to resume its role of global
policeman in one of the busiest sea lanes in the
world.
The US's evolving strategy appears
to include a stronger presence in the South China
Sea to counterbalance China's rising influence
(without resort to a shooting war) while at the
same time supporting the Philippines, Vietnam and
others to develop sufficient naval defense
capabilities to deter China and preempt tensions
among smaller claimant states. (As of this
writing, Taiwan had also waded into the
Scarborough Shoal controversy by staking its claim
to the territory.)
Such a strategy
represents a delicate tightrope act, one that aims
to contain China's territorial ambitions in the
South China while avoiding a destabilizing arms
race among smaller claimant states. This emerging
"US-China-smaller claimants" scheme could yet
achieve a new balance of power and uneasy peace in
the region, one that ideally keeps the diplomats
talking and hawkish elements on all sides from
opening fire.
George Amurao, a
former journalist in Manila, until recently worked
for the Southeast Asian Press Alliance. He is now
with Mahidol University International College in
Bangkok, Thailand.
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