Page 2 of
2 ASEAN
stumbles in Phnom Penh By
Donald K Emmerson
Compared with summits,
lower-level conversations are less likely to
attract attention and raise expectations. A
sub-ministerial venue for ASEAN-plus-China
discussions of the code already exists. In that
less prominent context, China may find it easier
to postpone any outcome it does not like.
If China were to stonewall the code,
consigning it to permanent limbo, could ASEAN go
ahead and sign it all by themselves? Not in an
atmosphere of intramural recrimination such as now
exists. But if the passage of time heals present
wounds while at the same time eroding ASEAN's
patience, that could conceivably occur.
ASEAN's 1976 Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast
Asia offers a precedent.
The group's member states initially drafted and
adopted that document by themselves, before
inviting China and other countries to sign. Nearly
20 governments outside Southeast Asia, including
China, have chosen to do so. Beijing would,
however, object to being given a fait accompli - a
text, a pen, and a dotted line on which to sign -
especially one meant to internationalize the South
China Sea.
China could yet change its
mind. Beijing could decide to embrace a
multilateral effort under ASEAN's aegis to draft a
code of conduct governing state behavior in the
South China Sea. China could even agree to a
dispute settlement mechanism of some sort. If in
2013, in line with expectations, the Xi-Li duo -
Xi Jinping as president, Li Keqiang as premier -
is fully ensconced in Beijing, the regime could
feel confident enough to turn its "frown
diplomacy" [4] upside down, into a smile.
One ought not hold one's breath waiting
for such a conversion, however. As a matter of
realpolitik, China's leaders will still be tempted
to remind ASEAN's leaders of the stark asymmetry
between them and their largest neighbor.
Size matters Compare ASEAN's
next chair, Brunei Darussalam, with the People's
Republic of China. Ostensibly, in the United
Nations General Assembly, they are equals; each
has one vote. Yet Brunei's population is 0.0003
percent of China's. No wonder China prefers to
negotiate with Brunei in a room with only two
chairs, rather than having to face all 10
Southeast Asian claimants in the same room at the
same time.
Although the total population
represented by those ten negotiators would still
be (slightly) less than half the demographic bulk of China, they would outnumber the lone
Chinese diplomat 10 to one. Variations on the
logic of inequality underpin China's repeatedly
stated preference for separate bilateral
negotiations, and only with each of the four
Southeast Asian claimants.
But size bring
its own discontents. Throwing its weight around in
the South China Sea may well keep lesser states at
bay, but it will confirm China's image as a bully.
If China wields its geo-economic and geopolitical
power as a blunt instrument - "I'm big and you're
not" - it will trigger joint pushback among
Southeast Asians while earning their disrespect.
Smart power in a networked world of
high-speed linkages, flows, and innovations means
knowing when recourse to physical preponderance is
counter-productive. Size does matter, but how it
is used matters more. By the evidence of Chinese
diplomacy regarding the South China Sea, that
lesson has not been fully learned.
Earlier
this year, for example, China proposed that an
unofficial (Track II) Eminent Persons and Experts
Group (EPEG) be formed and tasked to discuss the
draft code of conduct and make appropriate
recommendations. China proposed further that the
group comprise ten individuals, five from China
and one from each of five ASEAN states.
In
ASEAN circles, this allocation appeared blatantly
to illustrate an imperial mindset based on size
alone: "Because we're big, we're entitled to half
the seats on the EPEG. Because you're small,
you'll have to share the other half. And, by the
way, five of your ten members won't be sitting in
the room at all." Or thoughts to that effect.
It is possible that China floated the idea
of an EPEG in order to postpone the code. With an
EPEG in place, Beijing could delay decisions on a
text on the grounds that the advisory body had not
yet completed its report. With half of the EPEG's
members representing China, the report could be
postponed for years.
Reportedly, in
subsequent discussions, China has kept its five
seats while agreeing to let ASEAN occupy 10. To
reduce Beijing's ability to use the advisory body
to upstage and prolong the preparation of the
code, Southeast Asians have insisted that the EPEG
should be convened only after the negotiation of a
text with China has already begun. Had a
communiqu้ been issued in Phnom Penh, it might
have mentioned the EPEG. Without it, we can only
speculate about the fate of China's proposal.
Beijing's attempt to control half the EPEG
shows a toughening of China's line over time. In
2005 an ASEAN-China Eminent Persons Group was
established to review ASEAN-China relations and
suggest improvements. That body met the
one-country-one-seat rule: 10 Southeast Asians sat
at the table with one Chinese.
If the EPEG
does actually meet with China occupying a third of
its 15 seats, its deliberations will be more
amenable to Beijing's control, especially if
splits among the ASEAN states further weaken their
majority. As of July 2012 China appeared unwilling
to accept a principle of equality between states
that it had been willing to endorse seven years
before.
Few Southeast Asians pay attention
to events on Track II. Some of those who do will
be relieved that China has at least backed down
from its effort to disenfranchise half of ASEAN.
But if the 10 + 5 formula is retained, the
moral-to-realpolitik shift from 10 + 1 since 2005
will, however modestly, degrade Beijing's
legitimacy in foreign-policy circles in Southeast
Asia.
Already widespread in the literature
on state behavior is the idea that a "resource
curse" bedevils the political economies of
countries that are rich in oil and gas but poor in
governance. Could there be an "amplitude curse"
that inclines the world's most populous country to
throw its unmatched weight around? [5]
How
much of China's "soft power deficit" in the eyes
of Southeast Asians is a function of its
authoritarian regime? Will democratization, if it
occurs, make China more collegial? Or will it
magnify the curse of size by making it harder for
China's presently insulated elite to limit the
impact of popular and populist nationalism on
foreign policy?
Whatever the answers to
these questions, two things are clear: Beijing
feels entitled to the South China Sea, and that
sense of entitlement limits its ability to project
soft power.
Consider Beijing's ongoing
characterization of its claim to the South China
Sea as "indisputable." Is there no one in the
foreign ministry who recognizes how laughable this
description is? Whatever one thinks of the
nine-dash line on China's map, it is, beyond the shadow of a
doubt, being disputed. Four ASEAN states are
disputing it, not to mention its disapproval by
others.
Manila has suggested separating
those parts of the South China Sea that are
"disputed" from those that are not. Perhaps
Beijing thinks that in describing as
"indisputable" its claim to most of the entire
sea, it is simply protecting its position. But in
the realm of soft power, where words matter,
China's insistence on indisputability undermines
its case.
The deadlock in Phnom Penh may
delay a code of conduct for the South China Sea.
But it may also speed the unwillingness of at
least some ASEAN states to kowtow to their giant
neighbor, while strengthening their incentive to
cooperate prudently with outsiders, including the
United States, for the sake of their own national
and regional independence. In the meantime, it
behooves the four Southeast Asian claimants to
make sure that they too, being very much part of
the problem, are part of its solution.
Donald
K Emmerson heads the Southeast Asia Forum at
Stanford University. His latest publication is
"Southeast Asia: Minding the Gap between Democracy
and Governance," Journal of Democracy (April
2012).
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