Page 1 of 2 SPEAKING
FREELY Sinking feeling in the South China
Sea By Nazery Khalid
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The unprecedented
failure of the 45th Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Ministerial Meeting in Phnom
Penh in June to issue a joint communique that
captured the decisions of the meeting was as
disappointing as it was predictable.
Prior
to this, ASEAN, whose current motto is "One
Community, One Destiny", had never failed to issue
a collective statement at the conclusion of their
annual summit in its 45-year history. At the
meeting, the current
ASEAN chair, Cambodia, thwarted Philippines' push
to include a statement on the territorial disputes
in the South China Sea on grounds that it did not
want to add to the rising political temperature on
the matter.
The absence of the joint
communique was nothing short of a monumental
disappointment and presents a potentially
morale-sapping loss of face on the bloc's part to
its powerful regional northern neighbor, China in
dealing in the issue. The failure of ASEAN to
agree and endorse a common position on this
divisive matter is effectively an act of ignoring
the elephant in the room and a glaring display of
disunity among its member nations.
Seen in
the context of ASEAN acting as the protector of
regional unity and a shield against external
powers' influence, one could be forgiven for
thinking that ASEAN centrality is cracking under
pressure from the sheer weight of the issue.
Four ASEAN nations, namely Brunei,
Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam, claim parts of
the South China Sea, which are also claimed by
Taiwan. China claims the entire sea based on what
it says are its historical rights. Prior to the
meeting, ASEAN could not agree on facing China as
a bloc in discussing disputes in the sea. There
was reluctance from member nations that have no
claims in the sea and did not want to risk
upsetting China over the matter.
Following
the diplomatic impasse in Phnom Penh, it would
take a major effort for ASEAN to pick itself up
and muster the will to negotiate collectively with
China in addressing disputes in the sea. By
succeeding in preventing ASEAN from coming up with
a united position on the issue, China would not be
wrong to see the Phnom Penh meeting as a
triumphant outcome of its strategy of not wanting
to engage the issue on a multilateral basis,
inadvertently splitting ASEAN in the process.
Feeling cornered The upshot of
the ASEAN meeting has been described in
unfavorable terms by several analysts. Phrases
such as "step in the wrong direction" and "act of
obstinacy" have been used to describe Cambodia's
failure to take charge of the meeting and to
preserve ASEAN unity. China was accused of causing
a rift among ASEAN members and of capitalizing on
ASEAN divisions on the disputes in the sea. ASEAN
was seen as disjointed and lacking in autonomy in
its handling of the matter.
To blame the
situation on Cambodia, China and ASEAN alone for
the outcome of the meeting would not do justice to
the complex interplay of actors and factors
related to the issue. The influence of external
powers weighed heavily over the matter. The
failure of ASEAN to come up with a common position
on the issue is as much a perhaps unintended
end-result of the "pivot to Asia" policy of the
US, a key external protagonist in the region, as
it is a result of Cambodia's and China's conduct
and ASEAN's split opinion on the subject.
The US has half-heartedly, and at times
awkwardly, tried to disassociate its "rebalancing
in Asia" strategy with China's rising influence in
the region. In doing so, it has only succeeded in
fueling China's perception that the policy is a
calculated construct to contain its growing power
and clout. Feeling cornered, China has come out
assertively to defend what it sees as its
"undisputable sovereign right" over the entire
South China Sea. This chain of actions and
reactions has significantly contributed to the
convoluted situation in the sea today.
How
has the US factor influenced the current state of
play in the sea? It has been suggested by several
analysts that the pluck shown by Vietnam and
Philippines in standing up to China in the sea was
a by-product of US involvement in the matter.
Emboldened by Washington's pronouncements that it
has a "national interest" in the sea and what they
interpret as US siding with them in their disputes
with China, Hanoi and Manila have reacted more
assertively towards Beijing compared to other
claimant states.
Other developments such
as the deployment of US Marines in Darwin,
Australia; the US proposal to deploy Littoral
Combat Ships in the region using Singapore as its
base; the resumption of military ties between US
and Indonesia; and the launch of US-led Trans
Pacific Partnership economic pact that excludes
China were also interpreted by China as part of a
grand American design to contain Beijing's growing
might and ambition in the region.
Despite
its professed commitment to work with ASEAN
towards coming up guidelines to implement the
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea, China has never shown itself to be
comfortable with the idea of elevating the
political document to a legally binding Code of
Conduct that would govern their conducts in the
sea, prevent conflicts and manage disputes among
them. China sees signing up to such a code as
potentially curtailing its strategic options in
the vast, resources-rich sea.
China has
kept itself busy looking for signs of Washington
attempting to build a soft alliance in the region
to contain Beijing. It perceived the visit by US
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to Cam Ranh Bay in
Vietnam in June 2012 and the strongly worded
description by US Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton during her visit to Phnom Penh just before
the ASEAN meeting that China's conduct in the sea
could end up becoming a "recipe for confrontation"
as evidences of this intention.
Gaps in
ASEAN defenses The signs were already on
the wall that Cambodia, a close ally of China,
would break ranks from its ASEAN fellowship and
not risk defying Beijing.
An early
indication of China exerting its powerful
influence on Cambodia was when its Premier Wen
Jiabao stressed during the 20th ASEAN Summit in
Bali in November 2011 that disputes in the sea
should only be discussed between the claimants and
not at the ASEAN level, and warned against the
involvement of "outside powers" on the matter.
Subsequently, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited
Cambodia in March 2012, a move seen by analysts as
pressuring the ASEAN chair not to raise South
China Sea disputes in the recent ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting.
On account of the failure of the
meeting to agree on a common position on the
subject, fears that China would coerce Cambodia
into dropping the disputes in the sea from the
discussion were not misplaced.
This move
was seen by many analysts as consistent with
Beijing's insistence of not wanting to
"'internationalize"' the disputes in the sea and
preference of discussing the matter on a bilateral
basis. This approach works to its advantage on
several counts; first, it can exercise its might
and muscle in direct discussions with claimant
states; second, it prevents ASEAN from taking a
common position on the disputes hence preventing
the bloc from discussing the matter on a
multilateral platform.
One outcome against
China's interest arising from its approach is the
involvement of external powers in the issue. This,
China feels strongly about; it has directly told
the US not to interfere on the matter, which
Beijing sees as a regional dispute to be settled
among the claimant states. Washington said its
"national interest" in the sea covers ensuring
freedom of navigation and seeing to it that
disputes are settled peacefully and using
international law as a basis, and it has offered
to play a role in the process. This irked China
which resisted US advances to mediate, denouncing
it as an unwelcome "interference".
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