SPEAKING
FREELY Indonesia and Chinese 'congagement'
By Jennifer McArdle
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
Online feature that allows guest writers to have
their say. Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing.
If one were to ask
various Indonesian strategic thinkers, what
policy, if any, Indonesia is pursuing towards
China; one would likely hear phrases like Foreign
Minister Marty Natalegawa's "dynamic equilibrium",
"balance of power", or President Susilo Bambang
Yudhoyono's doctrine of "one thousand friends,
zero enemies".
"Congagement" would not be
mentioned. Congagement, or the idea of combining
engagement and containment, seems to make
Indonesian strategic thinkers uneasy. The
engagement part
seems to pose no problem -
Jakarta is deepening economic and political ties
with Beijing. The idea of containment, however,
still conjures up images of the Cold War when the
US embarked on a policy of preventing the spread
of communist ideology.
Yet, "congagement"
does not solely advocate pursuing a policy of
engagement in congruence with a policy of
containment. Rather, it asks policymakers to
transcend both. "Congagement" [1] seeks to offer
strategic flexibility in an opaque period of
Chinese transition. In essence, it would yoke
Beijing and Jakarta together, enmeshing China
within the current international system, while
giving equal consideration to deterrence. It would
prepare for potential Chinese provocations within
Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), while
also notifying the Chinese leadership that such
adventurism could prove to be hazardous.
Indonesian policy makers, although they
may be unaware, are already pursuing the
beginnings of a "congagement" strategy. Jakarta
has been building an economic and political web
between itself in Beijing, while also in some ways
hedging against China's uncertain rise.
Indeed, economically, China is Indonesia's
second-largest trading partner. Trade reached
US$60 billion in 2011, with expectations that it
will reach $80 billion by 2015. Beijing has been
heavily investing in Indonesia's infrastructure
with $19 billion of investment credit pledged and
another $9 billion in infrastructure loans
offered. China also recently offered to build a
coastal surveillance system to complement the
existing US funded Integrated Maritime
Surveillance System (IMSS).
Politically,
Jakarta and Beijing entered into a Strategic
Partnership in 2005, with plans to boost cultural
exchanges and people to people cooperation in the
coming year. Both Indonesia and China have sought
to maximize bilateral ties, while keeping
political disputes as modest as possible [2]: Jakarta
has embraced Beijing's "One China" policy, while
Beijing remained fairly mum after the 1998 riots
in Jakarta against Indonesians of Chinese dissent.
Indonesia, as de-facto leader of the
10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), has encouraged the inclusion of China in
various regional forums from ASEAN+3, the broader
ASEAN Regional Forum and APEC (Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation). Jakarta and Beijing have
also enhanced military-to-military cooperation
through joint naval missile developments, joint
exercises, maritime security, national defense
industry exchanges and cooperation in
non-traditional security fields.
Yet,
despite increased engagement, Jakarta has
attempted to curb against potential incursions
within its maritime backyard through military
modernization and multilateral initiatives. The
Ministry of Defense's strategic planning objective
of achieving "minimum essential forces" by 2024
envisions a naval force with "green water"
capabilities [3], with the capacity to protect key
sea-lanes and choke points against potential
conventional or non-conventional threats.
Acquisition plans include diesel electric
submarines, missile-guided destroyers, fast attack
missile boats, torpedo boats and minesweepers.
Additionally, Jakarta, by supporting the inclusion
of key extra-regional actors, such as the United
States and Russia in forums such as the East Asia
Summit, while also discreetly encouraging the
United States to remain actively involved in the
region is providing a diplomatic hedge to possible
Chinese expansionism.
Indonesia's current
policy, despite showing signs of a "congagement"
strategy, falls short of credibly responding to
the various destabilizing trends that are
currently rippling through the South China Sea.
Notwithstanding certain forward thinking
acquisition plans, Jakarta's current strategy
revolves primarily around a "diplomatic security
perspective" - with diplomacy construed as the
first line of defense [4]- through regional and
international cooperation. If diplomacy failed to
prevent a conventional military strike on
Indonesia's territory, then Indonesia would revert
to a seemingly archaic "Total People's War"
strategy to protect its territorial integrity.
However, as last month's ASEAN Summit in
Cambodia demonstrated, utilizing diplomacy as the
main mechanism for forward protection may not be
sound. ASEAN's July 2012 summit witnessed the
first time in 45 years that ASEAN was unable to
produce a joint communique, as the group was split
over the South China Sea. With the ASEAN member
states fracturing, concerns are arising that the
organization will no longer be able to effectively
respond to overlapping territorial claims amongst
themselves and China.
Indonesia's strategy
coupled with ASEAN's recent failure appears all
the more disconcerting as China more aggressively
flexes its muscles in the South China Sea. The
infamous 2009 Impeccable incident, the illegal
detainment of over 700 Vietnamese fisherman, the
Scarborough Shoal faceoff, and the 2009 and 2010
fishery standoffs in Indonesian waters, when taken
together, seem indicative of a larger trend by the
Chinese to assert control of its historic claims
to the South China Sea.
China's "9 dotted
line" (delineating its claim of much of the South
China Sea) overlaps with Indonesia's EEZ, adjacent
to the Natuna Islands: Indonesia's energy rich sea
bed with Asia's largest concentration of natural
gas reserves. An interview with a key Indonesian
strategic thinker, Andi Widjajanto, in Jakarta
early last month revealed that the Indonesian
government is beginning to view the Natuna Islands
and their surrounding waters as a potential major
flashpoint with the Chinese. Indeed, after a visit
to the Natuna Island this past May, Major General
Paul Lodewijk [5] asserted that its surrounding waters
were highly vulnerable to foreign incursions, both
Chinese and Malaysian, because of its resource
wealth and made plans to add additional troops.
Building on Indonesia's current policies
and instigating a full "congagment" strategy will
provide Indonesia with the versatility it
currently needs. If China in the future were to
cooperate and respect territorial delineations
outlined by Article 56 of the United Nations
Council on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) treaty, of
which China is a signatory, Jakarta's policy could
move it towards enhanced mutual accommodation with
Beijing. However, if China continues to pursue
expansionist policies, flexing its muscles in a
bid to gain access to key Indonesian resources and
sea-lanes, Jakarta's posture could revert into
classic containment and hard balancing through
other extra-regional powers.
What can be
done to expand on Indonesia's current policies in
order to flesh out a more substantive policy of
"congagement" towards China?
1. First of
all, work towards enhancing economic, political
and cultural ties with Beijing. Focus on
addressing key economic stumbling blocs between
both states, particularly difficulties faced by
Indonesian local industries due to flood of
Chinese imports from the passing of ACFTA.
2. Secondly, Indonesia should encourage
ASEAN members to delineate areas of conflict and
seek to resolve territorial disputes within the
group allowing it to present a united front when
engaging China. After the breakdown on the ASEAN
summit in Phnom Penh, Indonesia's efforts,
creating common ground among member states and
releasing a six-point statement asserting the
"ASEAN way", was a step in the right direction.
However, as the Philippines and Vietnam did not
entirely agree with the statement, more must be
done.
3. Third, Indonesia should work
towards developing and building upon current
military to military interactions and exchanges.
Military contact will help China's military
understand Indonesia's militaries capabilities,
concerns and intentions should it feel threatened.
More importantly, it will also allow the
Indonesian military to better understand China's
capabilities and potential weaknesses. When
engaging in defense cooperation, Indonesia should
explicitly state the nature of the defense
relationship to quell concerns among ASEAN member
states. Jakarta should continue to pursue trust
building military measures such as the proposed
trilateral military initiative [6] between China,
Indonesia, and the United States outside Darwin.
4. Finally, Indonesia needs to strengthen
its own capabilities in order to deter potential
Chinese expansionism. Indonesia's military must
develop an effective offensive sea denial
capability utilizing key asymmetric capabilities:
mines, submarines and missile armed fast attack
crafts. Indonesia currently does have an
area-access/ area denial (A2/AD) concept [7], which
emphasizes the deployment of naval mines and
submarines in Indonesian waters, however it
remains tactically defensive. In this field as in
others, it may prove useful for Indonesian
strategists to take a leaf out of China's book -
and adopt a posture that is more tactically
offensive, while remaining strategically
defensive.
Jennifer McArdle is a
Washington based Asia security analyst and a
Non-Resident Fellow at the Observer Research
Foundation, New Delhi
(Copyright 2012
Jennifer McArdle) Speaking Freely is an Asia
Times Online feature that allows guest writers to
have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
not necessarily meet the same editorial standards
of Asia Times Online's regular
contributors.
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