Nationalism runs high in Asian
disputes By Elliot Brennan
Tensions in Asia's territorial disputes
continue to escalate. A dangerous mix of
nationalist sentiments and domestic politics in
China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the
Philippines, have exacerbated long simmering
disputes over several island clusters throughout
the region.
One such dispute between Japan
and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands had the
US Secretary of Defense discussing unmanned aerial
vehicle patrols with his Japanese counterpart. A
flotilla of 20 Japanese activist boats dispatched
there caused further headaches for politicians in
Beijing and Tokyo.
Protests against
"Japanese aggression" were held in Beijing,
Shanghai, Changsha and Hong Kong following
postings on the
social network site
Weibo, which were quickly censored and removed.
Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have
locked horns over the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands, two
countries which, until recently, worked together
against China's rise with joint naval exercises
and resource stockpiling. The dispute with Japan
erupted when President Lee Myung-bak visited the
islands in early August sparking a diplomatic row,
which gained further airplay during the Olympic
Games due to the exploits of a Korean football
player. The tensions appear to have already
reignited old grievances from Japan's long
occupation of the Peninsula and soured what was
proving a stronger alliance in intelligence
sharing and overall cooperation.
Russia
has also weighed in on territorial claims. In
July, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited
Kunashiri, one of four islands off Hokkaido that
Japan claims as its own. The visit was one of
opportunism while most eyes were trained on the
South China Sea, and this opens yet another
frontier for Japanese diplomacy to navigate.
Indeed, Russia holds a further hand in the
disputes, supplying Vietnam's six Kilo-class
diesel submarines - which are yet to be delivered.
The procurement will help build Vietnam's
capability for limited sea denial around specific
waters. Meanwhile, in April this year Russia
staged joint naval exercises with China in the
Yellow Sea.
Stirring the South China
Sea At the heart of the Spratly and Paracel
islands dispute is control of the all important
sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that run
through the South China Sea and act as the
maritime superhighway for China and its neighbors,
while also being of tremendous importance to
global trade. Of similar importance is ownership
over valuable fisheries, minerals and hydrocarbons
in the South China Sea, the East Sea, and the Sea
of Okhotsk.
The stakes have recently been
raised. Formally established on July 24, Sansha
city will hold a military garrison and act as
China's administrative capital for all that lies
south of Hainan. The creation of the
administrative capital, on an island 220 miles
south from Hainan province in the South China Sea,
drew criticism from the US and Asian states.
Two weeks after the establishment, the
Congressional Research Service released a report
for discussion in Congress on China's military
modernization and implications for the US Navy. In
the corridors of Capital Hill whispers of a last
resort US military strategy targeting China are
reported to have echoed louder than before. The
bellicose rhetoric could be found on both sides of
the Pacific.
For Vietnam, the creation of
the garrison evokes memories of the 1974 Battle
for the Paracel Islands. In the battle, China led
a successful sea assault supported by an air
attack launched from Hainan and forced a
Vietnamese retreat, leaving over 70 dead. The
capability of the PLA Navy and the PLA Air Force
has increased significantly since then.
All eyes are now on the US. It has pledged
its commitment to greater involvement in the
Asia-Pacific. Joint naval exercises have been
undertaken with several Asian states. Yet it
remains unclear whether it will honor
long-standing agreements such as the Mutual
Defense Treaties with the Philippines (1951),
Australia and New Zealand (1951), Japan (1951),
and South Korea (1953).
This would either
pit the US against China, or severely deflate the
current chest puffing of smaller Asian states as
they realize that they are on their own. China
knows it has some leeway in an election year in
the US; the Obama administration will not cast the
first stone.
While many analysts have long
argued that any major open conflict in the South
China Sea is unlikely due to the negative economic
impact such conflict in the SLOC could have, the
opening of two shipping lanes in the Arctic - the
Northeast Passage and the Northwest Passage -
could soon provide China with an alternative route
to Europe and the Pacific ports. Trade between
Asia could continue, albeit more limited, even if
"sea denial" of the South China Sea occurred. It
is therefore no surprise that China has been vocal
in the Arctic Council, vying for a louder voice,
and has in the past month opened an Institute for
Arctic Studies in cooperation with Iceland.
Internal troubles and rising
nationalism "Conflicting mandates" and "a
lack of coordination among Chinese government
agencies" were said to plague the Chinese
government according to an International Crisis
Group report published in April.
Military
and civil society are jockeying for influence. The
military have traditionally held great sway in
power transitions in the People's Republic of
China. Yet in recent decades, following the
passing of China's founding generation of
revolutionary leaders, the bifurcation of civil
and military elites into their respective
institutions has reduced the military's sway in
the Politburo and thus in the power transition.
Meanwhile, the power and influence of the
administrators of large provinces, which collect
big taxes and control populations similar to that
of European countries, is always looming in the
wings. In what is a year of transition for the
Chinese government, the implications of a
civil-military power struggle could have dire
consequences on the South China Sea dispute.
Competing interests may lead to a break down in
centralized decision-making and the ability to
diffuse any conflict.
The media across the
region are continuing to nationalize the South
China Sea issue through bellicose rhetoric,
perhaps no more so than in China. In a year that
marks the 600th anniversary of Chinese seafarer
Zheng He's expeditions across Asia, it should come
as no surprise that nationalist sentiments are
high.
Cultural mobilization has been a key
element of binding the populous country together;
the most striking example of which was Mao
Zedong's Cultural Revolution. Further, it should
come as a no surprise that increased national
unity has been a key issue in a year where a
transition of power is to happen at the highest
echelons of government, and in a year where global
economic turbulence, particularly in Europe,
continues to threaten trade balances and therefore
employment of hundreds of millions of Chinese
workers. National unity is necessary to prevent
internal unrest.
The problem of course
with any such cultural drum-up is that it provokes
the masses. That in turn has implications that
complicate centralized control. Fishing vessels
stretch further into the resource-rich waters
backed by the cultural drumming. And a navy, which
still lacks a blue-water capacity and which
requires continued modernization, sees an
opportunity to jump on the back of the cultural
dragon to justify or increase its slice of the
budget pie. Meanwhile, at home, protests and mass
rallies demand action from the government.
Calming the seas Further
confidence-building measures and dialogues are
needed between the claimant states. The US should
sign the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS), which would provide for a framework to
resolve territorial disputes at an international
level. Until it does it has no authority to
censure signatories, such as China for upholding
their claims. Yet any move toward signing of the
UNCLOS has been blocked in the US Senate.
Despite its superior naval capabilities,
the US is hampered by the lack of credibility from
having not ratified that document - although, that
the UN could act as a forum for negotiation is
hopeful at best, and reckless at worst.
Nationalist sentiments run high, and there is a
lot to lose through UN moderation, namely for
China who can negotiate much more favorable
resolutions on a bilateral basis. Yet there
remains a view, cocksure and boisterous, that
conflict is impossible due to the
economic-integration between the China and the US.
How these crises are managed, in
particular the escalating nationalism in China,
Japan, South Korea, Vietnam and the Philippines,
will give great indication of whether conflict can
be averted in the all-important South China Sea
dispute. Indeed the recent territorial disputes in
northeast Asia appear as litmus tests for the
response further south. Yet the immediate danger
is in the unpredictability of growing nationalism
coupled with the actions of an overzealous fishing
trawler or a flotilla of activists.
Elliot Brennan is editor at the
Institute for Security and Development Policy
(ISDP), Stockholm, Sweden. This piece is a revised
version of a Policy Brief for ISDP. The opinions
expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of ISDP or its
sponsors.www.isdp.eu
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