Southeast Asia was an important front line
in the United States-led fight against communism
during the Cold War. That emphasis impacted on the
foreign policies of many regional countries,
including Indonesia, which emerged from a
post-independence period of left-leaning
nationalism to become one of the US's key
counter-communism allies.
Now, Indonesia
is emerging again as a crucial player as US
foreign policy "pivots" towards Asia, a
geostrategic shift aimed at counterbalancing
China's rising power in the region. The
geographical location of the sprawling
archipelago, through which the majority of the
world's trade flows, includes a strategic
chokepoint at the Malacca Strait for China's
energy imports in a
potential conflict with
the US.
China has acknowledged this risk
as its "Malacca dilemma", forcing its strategic
planners to look for alternate routes for its fuel
supplies, including a planned pipeline through
Myanmar. Many analysts view China's growing
assertiveness in the potentially oil and gas rich
South China Sea as indication of its desire to
secure energy sources in the region and mitigate
its dependence on distant Middle Eastern imports.
Whether Indonesia would be willing to play
such a role in a potential conflict is a wild
card. Even if it were so inclined, it's not clear
to strategic analysts that it would have the
capacity to project such power due to years of
under-spending on defense, including for crucial
naval capabilities.
The 1997-98 Asian
financial crisis brought about significant
geopolitical changes in the region, including the
end of more than three decades of authoritarian
rule in Indonesia. The crisis also pushed
Indonesia into a period of chaos that eventually
reshaped its politics, seen today in President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's more democratic order
and outward looking foreign policy.
To
recover from the economic and financial crisis, it
was essential that trade and commerce experienced
no hindrances as the country bid to export its way
back to economic health. The safety and security
of nearby sea lanes, long prone to piracy of
global shipments, became more important to ensure
smooth trade and later took on new significance in
the context of the US-led global war on terrorism.
This was one of the areas sought out by
external powers, including the US, to assert
greater influence over the region's strategic
order. However, strong opposition by mainly
Indonesia and Malaysia kept external players at
bay as they tried to find a regional solution to
the piracy problem.
In 2004, what emerged
was MALSINDO (an acronym made of the initials of
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia) which engaged
in joint operations to combat piracy in their
strategic waterways. Though the exercises were
publicly portrayed as a success, doubts remained
as to how far they could be stretched within
existing trilateral frameworks and how much the
countries were willing to allocate financially.
These joint operations raised some
important questions about the capabilities of
Indonesia to project power in the region in
relation to its size. Indonesia is a huge country
of over 17,000 islands, stretching near to the
Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the east, to
the northern Australian coast to the south, and to
the north towards the furthest southern reaches of
the Philippines.
Indonesia is thus a major
part of the geography, and a key driver of the
geopolitics, of Southeast Asia. Yet its power
projection capabilities remain geographically
asymmetrical. The Indonesian navy (TNI AL) has
been slowly but steadily increasingly its
procurements and spending, which are expected to
rise to US$8.1 billion in 2012-13 from US$7
billion in 2011-12.
That is a small sum
considering the country's vast territory and
population - and rising geostrategic importance in
the context of the US's pivot strategy. In
comparison, smaller states in the region such as
Singapore spend more. (The city-state has
earmarked $12.3 billion for defense spending in
2012-13). Indonesia's outlays are also
considerably less vis-a-vis larger countries such
as India, which is set to spend around $40 billion
on defense over the same period.
Analysts
believe Indonesia must beef up its naval forces if
it is to maintain a strong and effective presence
in the region, particularly in the context of
China's economic and military rise. Jakarta
carries out various joint exercises with
neighboring countries such as India, which help to
maintain cordial relations in the region but do
not do enough to bolster its overall strategic
position due to sensitivities over sovereignty.
As one of the original founders of the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
Indonesia remains a strong proponent of keeping
Southeast Asian regionalism intact. Its proactive
role as last year's chair of ASEAN saw many
regional successes, namely its mediating role in
the Cambodia-Thailand conflict over the contested
Preah Vihear temple area. Its active support for
East Timor, formerly a part of Indonesia, to
become an ASEAN member underlined the country's
new role as a force for peace and stability in the
region.
Indonesia's peacemaker role was on
display again in July when its Foreign Minister
Marty Natalegawa engaged in "shuttle diplomacy" to
resolve an intra-ASEAN rift that had broken out
into the open during a foreign ministers' meeting
held in Cambodia, by then the ASEAN chair. Member
states had failed to reach a consensus and issue a
final statement due to divisions over how to
respond to China's growing assertiveness over
contested territories in the South China Sea.
That diplomatic role masks Indonesia's own
strategic concerns about China. The two countries
had turbulent relations during the Cold War
period, aggravated by Indonesia's bloody purge of
hundreds of thousands of communist sympathizers in
the late 1960s. Relations were normalized in 1990,
but a territorial dispute over the Natuna Islands
kept relations on edge until 1995, when Beijing
renounced its claim to the islands but not the
nearby gas fields.
Indonesia has quietly
asserted its claim to the fields through joint
development foreign energy companies, including
from the United States. Unlike the situation of
its ASEAN neighbors, particularly Vietnam and the
Philippines, who remain embroiled with China in
disputes over the Spratly Islands and other island
chains in the South China Sea, Indonesia's claim
to the Natuna gas fields has gone largely
unquestioned by China.
On the diplomatic
front, Indonesia now plays a key role in ensuring
regional peace and stability and keeping ASEAN
reasonably united amid pro-and anti-China
sentiments among its member states. At the same
time, the country is promoting its image as a
mature and responsible world power, one that
willingly cooperates and engages with all major
global powers.
To consolidate these
positions and simultaneously demonstrate a
credible deterrent to Chinese expansionism,
Indonesia needs to bolster quickly and
substantially its defensive capabilities. As
tensions mount between China and other ASEAN
states, and the US places new priority on Asian
security, a strong and capable Indonesia
represents the region's best hope for maintaining
peace and stability.
Vignesh Ram
is a PhD research scholar at the Department of
Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal
University, India. His areas of interest include
Southeast Asia and its regional dynamics and,
Indian foreign policy towards the region
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