SPEAKING
FREELY Old
allies, new dynamics in US
pivot By Julius Cesar I Trajano
Speaking Freely is an Asia Times
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SINGAPORE - The US's
"pivot" strategy towards the Asia-Pacific aims to
reinvigorate security alliances with its
established partners in the region. In Southeast
Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have long been
US treaty allies, affording them privileged access
to US armaments and in the case of the Philippines
a mutual defense guarantee if attacked by a third
party.
The Philippines and Thailand,
however, have had decidedly different responses to
the US's renewed security engagement with the
region. While Manila has warmly welcomed the US's military
presence, Bangkok has
adopted a hedging strategy to preserve its vibrant
ties with China. Washington's ties with Bangkok
and Manila are now influenced by two crucial
factors: (1) the perception of an existential
threat and (2) domestic political and economic
interests.
A key strategic hub for
American forces, the Philippines has offered the
US greater access to its military facilities in
exchange for assistance in the modernization of
its military. The Philippine government announced
on August 24 that it welcomed America's plan to
deploy "X-band", a powerful new early warning
radar, in Japan and the Philippines. The plan is
seen by some as the centerpiece of the US's
defense build-up in Asia to counter threats from
nuclear North Korea and to contain China's rising
military power.
As tensions mount in the
South China Sea, there is now a new facet to the
US-Philippines alliance, ie China's emergence as
an existential threat. The mutual defense treaty,
which dates back to 1951, is perceived as a
deterrent to China's creeping assertiveness in
nearby maritime areas, including the contested
Spratly Islands.
Following a naval
stand-off between Manila and Beijing in April this
year, Washington pledged to triple its military
assistance to Manila, deployed two US
nuclear-armed submarines to make symbolic port
calls at Subic, and sent thousands of American
troops and American warships for joint military
exercises with their Filipino counterparts.
Thailand has been a US treaty ally since
1954, a designation that was upgraded to major
non-NATO ally in 2003 as a reward for Bangkok's
cooperation in Washington's global war on terror.
Now, with enhanced commercial and defense ties
with China, Bangkok is less willing to open its
territory to facilitate US strategic rebalancing.
Most notably, Thai Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinawatra's cabinet decided in June to allow
parliament to scrutinize a US NASA request to use
U-tapao airbase for atmospheric studies. After
opposition lawmakers argued that approval of the
request could jeopardize Thailand's vibrant trade
ties with China, NASA withdrew its request after
the Thais missed a June 26 deadline to respond.
Since the Vietnam War, U-tapao has been
used by US aircraft to support military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as humanitarian
interventions, including in the aftermath of the
2004 tsunami. US troops also have special access
to U-tapao through the annual Cobra Gold war games
held in Thailand and staged with various
international actors. NASA initially planned to
use the airbase for a six-week climate study but
the request was viewed in some quarters as a
veiled attempt to spy on China.
Unlike the
1960s and 1970s when China backed communist
guerillas in Thailand, Washington and Bangkok no
longer have a common security threat to motivate a
significant enhancement of their existing
alliance. This "threat deficit" has significantly
affected US-Thai cooperation in recent years.
Though Thailand may be wary of China's perceived
growing assertiveness, it nonetheless highly
values its robust political and economic relations
with Beijing.
While US-Thai strategic
relations have arguably stalled, Thailand and
China upgraded their ties to a "comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership" during
Yingluck's visit with a high level military
delegation to Beijing in April. One reason why
Sino-Thai relations are strong is the absence of
contentious territorial disputes. (Unlike Brunei,
the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, Thailand
has no claim to contested areas in the South China
Sea.)
Strategic
economics Thailand's recent strategic
behavior has been driven clearly by economic
interests. Bangkok has benefitted enormously from
China's economic rise. Although the US remains a
major investor in Thailand, China is now
Thailand's largest export market. Sino-Thai trade
was valued at US$64.7 billion in 2011,
overshadowing US-Thai trade of $35 billion in the
same period.
China has also pledged strong
assistance in Thailand's reconstruction and water
management projects in the wake of last year's
devastating floods. As Thailand benefits from
China's soft power diplomacy, it is not surprising
that Bangkok has adopted a hedging strategy.
In the Philippines, the US is the largest
source of foreign direct investment and
second-largest trade partner. In 2011,
US-Philippines bilateral trade reached $13.6
billion, slightly higher than the $12.1 billion
value of China-Philippines commerce. China's
economic muscle flexing has in instances pushed
the Philippines closer to the US. When Beijing
recently tried to sanction Manila by banning
Philippine banana imports, a move that threatened
to hit come 200,000 Filipino farmers and weaken
exports, the US offered to buy the surplus
bananas.
The stagnation of US-Thai defense
ties is likewise tied to Thailand's turbulent
domestic politics. Since the 2006 military ouster
of former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a
focus on domestic politics has come up at the
expense of foreign relations. The opposition
Democrat Party claimed that Yingluck would approve
the NASA proposal in exchange for granting her
exiled, criminally convicted brother Thaksin a
visa to travel to the US. While the NASA project
was cancelled, Thaksin was nonetheless given a
visa, with the caveat that he not travel to
Washington, according to press reports.
In
the Philippines, domestic politics under Benigno
Aquino's administration have been conducive to a
vibrant US-Philippines alliance. Most political
leaders, apart from left-leaning nationalistic
parties, have backed Aquino's efforts to bolster
ties with the US to counterbalance China's rising
assertiveness in the South China Sea. He has
notably made a number of trips to Washington to
request stronger strategic cooperation and arms
transfers.
Unlike his predecessor Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Aquino has appeared to be less
receptive to Beijing's dangled commercial
incentives. Elected on an anti-corruption
platform, Aquino has cancelled certain
Chinese-funded projects which were marred by
irregularities. His diplomatic balancing is
reflective of the national mood: a Social Weather
Station survey conducted in the second quarter
showed that 55% of Filipinos have little trust in
China, representing a record low, while the US
notched a public trust rating of 62%.
The
convergence and divergence of threat perceptions
has determined the depth of US defense cooperation
with the Philippines and Thailand as Washington
attempts to implement its "pivot" policy in Asia.
Local political and economic concerns have
dictated how both countries have received
Washington's strategic overtures. Whether the
split among two of the US's top traditional allies
will undermine the "pivot" policy's overall
effectiveness will be closely watched and
aggravated as much as possible by China.
Julius Cesar I Trajano is a
Senior Analyst at the S Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological
University, Singapore.
(Copyright 2012
Julius Cesar I Trajano)
Speaking Freely
is an Asia Times Online feature that allows guest
writers to have their say.Please
click hereif you are interested in
contributing. Articles submitted for this section
allow our readers to express their opinions and do
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