Blog
wars underline Vietnam power
struggle By David Brown
Since early this month the Western press
has gotten wind of an extraordinary bit of
intra-Communist party bashing underway Vietnam,
but most have missed the crux of the story. One
after another reporters have filed reports to the
effect that Vietnam has launched a new round of
repression of the media that populate the vibrant
Vietnamese language blogosphere.
Case in
point is Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung's
September 12 instruction to "responsible
officials" to investigate and punish bloggers who
are publishing anti-regime news. Posted on the
government's website, Dung's circular singled out
three political blogs: Dan Lam Bao ('The People
Make the News'), Quan Lam Bao ('Officials Make the
News'), and Bien Dong ('East Sea') for publishing
stories considered "slanderous, fabricated,
distorted and false, with the intention of
blackening the leadership of the
nation, rousing
anti-party and anti-state sentiment, giving rise
to suspicion and bad opinions within society."
His directive said the blogs were part of
"a wicked plot by enemy forces." Dung instructed
the Ministry of Public Security to coordinate with
the Ministry of Information, and the latter to
work with the Communist Party's Propaganda
Section, to ensure the emission of "objective and
truthful news about the situation of our country .
. . and to crack down on mongers of news that
isn't true."
Finally, officials and party
cadre were instructed neither to read or
disseminate information that is published on
“reactionary” websites. A bit of digging by this
reporter revealed that two of the blogs were set
up a few months ago as vehicles for highly
partisan attacks on Vietnam's top leaders by
agents of their party rivals.
Quan Lam Bao
(QLB) first appeared in early June, vowing in its
first post to “wipe out corrupt cliques that
monopolize the nation’s economic and political
life.” By mid-July, QLB was reporting 10,000 “new
visitors” daily. The blog's tone is stridently
populist, not unlike Britain's Daily Mail or
right-wing 'talk radio' in the United States, and
its stock in trade is roasting premier Dung and
his close associates, often alleging corruption,
nepotism and dereliction of duty.
QLB was
the first to break news of the banker and Dung
crony Nguyen Duc Kien’s arrest on charges of
"illegal business activities," 12 hours before the
national police made their own announcement. In
the next 10 days, daily hits on the site were just
short of a million, an unheard of level in
Vietnam’s blogosphere.
The Bien Dong blog
surfaced on July 3 with a long, mundane account of
Vietnam's historic claim to the East Sea and
almost immediately segued into ad hominem
attacks on President Truong Tan Sang, and
detailed speculation that China was dictating the
editorial stance of QLB. Unlike the anti-Dung
site, however, Bien Dong went almost unnoticed by
Vietnamese readers until it was sanctioned in the
government's September 12 circular.
The
third of the three "slanderous" sites fingered in
the circular, Dan Lam Bao (DLB), is rather staid
by comparison, a mainstream blog that has built
its readership and reputation by addressing the
standard concerns of non-party dissidents, in
particular what its contributors regard as the
regime's limp-wristed response to Chinese
aggrandizement and bullying.
Interviewed
on a chat line by an Associated Press reporter, a
DLB editor professed to be delighted by his blog's
new notoriety. On the day the government circular
was published, DLB’s daily hits more than doubled
to more than half a million, he said.
Meanwhile, seemingly unfazed by the threat
of punishment, the editors of QLB continue to post
their usual scurrilous attacks on Dung and his
cronies. Bien Dong, the anti-Sang site, however,
has gone silent.
Unseen
hands Perhaps to underline its neutrality
in the intraparty dogfight, DLB on September 14
posted an analysis arguing that if Dung prevails,
Vietnam will continue to wallow in corruption and
nepotism, and if his rival should topple him, a
Sang-controlled government will be Beijing's
puppet.
Vietnam's state-controlled
mainstream media have dutifully followed up the
government's directive with stories analyzing the
dangers posed by uncontrolled political blogs.
Many simply reprinted copy provided by the
official news agency. None seem to have dared to
hint that the directive was in fact aimed at
suppressing an unseemly airing of intra-regime
dirty linen.
To Quan Doi Nhan Dan (QDND,
or People's Army), a newspaper that never strays
from the party line, the problem is the covert
manipulation of well-meaning "intellectuals,
social critics, even retired or currently serving
officials and party members" by the unseen hand of
"foreign organizations."
Quoting sources
in the Ministry of National Security who had
counted "more than 400 reactionary organizations
inside and outside the nation" that were posting
distorted and defamatory stories on the internet,
QDND concluded that weeding out such bad behavior
is, literally, a Herculean task.
Like the
mythical Hydra, a beast that grew new heads every
time Hercules lopped a few off, the blogosphere is
inherently uncontrollable, the army paper said -
that is, unless the government fortified security
agencies with clearer mandates, more resources and
tougher laws.
Of considerably more
importance to Vietnam's future than yet another
quixotic attempt to police the Internet is the
showdown between President Sang and Prime Minister
Dung. The two have long been rivals for power and
influence.
Sang, according to Vietnamese
Communist Party watchers, tried to take down Dung
in the build-up to the January 2011 party
congress. He ultimately failed; though accused of
mismanaging the economy and tolerating scandal,
Dung secured another five year term as prime
minister. As a consolation prize, Sang was named
president, a largely ceremonial role. The third
job in Vietnam's leadership troika, general
secretary of the Communist Party, went to Nguyen
Phu Trong, an ideology expert who'd done a
credible job steering the national legislature.
That should have settled internal power
struggles for another five years, but it hasn't.
It is argued by at least a plurality of analysts
that it was Sang who convinced Trong to launch a
"party-building campaign" last February that has
played a role in exposing recent scandals.
Reputedly, Sang played on Trong's well-known
concern that the corruption and venality of party
members has steadily eroded popular respect for
its leadership. The campaign, a classic Leninist
exercise in "criticism and self-criticism" from
top to bottom, is now building to a climax.
By most reckonings, Dung has been weakened
by the recent fracas. In addition to Kien, several
other businessmen linked to the prime minister
have been arrested in recent weeks. It took nearly
three months to secure the agreement of the
party’s secretariat to Dung's directive last week
against QLB and the other two critical blogs. As
noted above, QLB continues to savage the prime
minister, his government and associates.
Significantly, the rules of the reform campaign
provide for ballots of party members to identify
and remove under-performing officials. Rumors now
are flying that the party's Central Committee will
meet in special session sometime in October.
By past form, there's little chance that
the Central Committee will vote either Dung or
Sang out of office. Many of its 170 members would
probably prefer that the two shake hands and get
back to doing their jobs under the fa็ade of party
unity. However, the bad blood between Dung and
Sang is real, it is public and it overlies genuine
differences in intra-party temperament and policy
views. But with all the dirty laundry aired in the
blogosphere, it may now be impossible to put the
genie back into the bottle.
David
Brown is a retired American diplomat who
writes on contemporary Vietnam. He may be reached
at nworbd@gmail.com.
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