US
'pivots' on the Philippines By
Richard Javad Heydarian
MANILA - With
tensions intensifying between China and Japan over
contested islands and reefs in the East China Sea,
the Philippines is exploiting the distraction to
push its claims vis-a-vis China in the South China
Sea, via a controversial and potentially
destabilizing administrative order.
On
September 5, Philippine President Benigno Aquino
issued Administrative Order 29, which officially
renames the South China Sea as the West Philippine
Sea on national maps. After making the executive
order, he notably failed days later to meet
Chinese President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of
the recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) meeting held in Russia.
The
controversial order, which will be submitted to
the United Nations, aims to firm up Manila's
claims to disputed maritime
territories lying within
its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), including over
the hotly contested Scarborough Shoal. Chinese and
Philippine military vessels squared off over the
disputed outcropping for several weeks earlier
this year.
Aquino justified the action by
saying "it is important to clarify which portions
we claim as ours versus the entirety of the South
China Sea." At the same time, he expressed hopes
for "a dialogue [with China] where we can have a
heart-to-heart talk and share our thoughts in
total honesty and openness".
China's
Foreign Ministry swiftly dismissed the order,
saying in a statement that "China claims
indisputable sovereignty over islands in the South
China Sea." Invoking Beijing's wide-ranging
nine-dash map of its claimed territories over the
maritime area, those claims include areas within
the Philippines' 200-mile EEZ.
The
Philippines' growing assertiveness in the face of
veiled Chinese threats is more than a calculated
strategy to push claims while China is preoccupied
with a potentially more volatile dispute with
Japan. Rather, Manila's emboldened position banks
on expected United States' assistance in the event
heated rhetoric boils over into armed
confrontation.
Outmanned,
outgunned In terms of military
expenditures, China's spending on naval capacities
dwarves that of other claimants in South China
Sea. While the Philippines' decrepit and
under-equipped armed forces subsists on annual
expenditures of around US$1.5 billion (ranking
59th in the world), China is the world's
second-largest military spender with a scheduled
annual budget of $129 billion in 2015.
Much of that spending is focused on the
country's fast expanding naval capabilities,
including ramped up "anti-access" and "blue water"
capabilities. Many strategic analysts contend that
China's official military expenditure is grossly
understated to avoid panic among its lesser armed
Southeast Asian neighbors.
The
Philippines' acute military weakness is a
reflection of many factors, including an excessive
strategic orientation towards internal threats
such as insurgency and terrorism, chronic
under-investment in military modernization, high
levels of official corruption in military
procurements, and a heavy strategic reliance on
treaty allies such as the US.
Two decades
after the closure of American bases in the
country, the Philippines has failed to establish
even a minimum deterrence capability. When faced
with Chinese incursions in 1995 at Mischief Reef,
Manila had no choice but to rely on moral suasion
and regional multilateral mediation. Over the next
decade-and-a-half, Manila's foreign policy with
Beijing focused on diplomacy and trade to avoid
any territorial confrontation.
That
changed in 2010 when China stepped up its
paramilitary and military activities in adjacent
waters, pressing its territorial claims with a new
sense of vigor and destiny. To many Southeast
Asian states, those military moves marked the end
of China's two-decade long "charm-offensive",
where its diplomacy focused on economic aid and
exchange, and the beginning of rising territorial
tensions in both the South and East China Seas.
"The situation is made more complex with
China's navy becoming more influential within the
internal power equation in China, using the
territorial issue as a springboard to legitimize
their rising influence within the establishment,"
says prominent Filipino intellectual and
legislator Walden Bello. "There is a new sense of
China in the region. In the past, it was seen as a
big and influential neighbor, focused on internal
development with low profile external posturing.
But now we are entering a 'post-Deng Xiaoping' era
of greater assertiveness, whereby you have a big
neighbor that is laying claim to the whole South
China Sea."
Enter Uncle Sam The
Philippines is arguably at the center of the US's
declared "pivot" policy towards Asia. Already
zeroed in on Asia's booming markets as an antidote
to its flailing domestic economy, and seemingly
aware of its strategic over-extension in the
Middle East, the US has returned to the region in
force to counterbalance China's rising power and
influence.
Rhetorically the pivot's accent
has been on benign issues such as trade,
investment and economic integration. But strategic
analysts believe the policy is a clear attempt to
draw lines against heightened Chinese
assertiveness and preserve America's national
interest in freedom of navigation in economically
important Asian waterways.
"You are
talking about a US that understands it is
overstretched in its commitments in the Eurasian
region. However, on the question of the pivot to
Asia, a large part of US interest in the region is
centered on China," says Herman Kraft, former
director of the Manila-based Institute for
Strategic and Developmental Studies (ISDS). "In
one sense it is a logical rebalancing. But the
primary push in pivot to Asia is strategic
competition with China."
Frontline treaty
allies like the Philippines and Japan have been
among the most vocal proponents of a stronger
American presence in the region, legitimizing
Washington's long-time claim to serve as the
Pacific's "anchor of stability and prosperity."
China's recent actions, fueled in part by growing
popular nationalism, have pushed a new convergence
of American and its Asian treaty allies' strategic
interests.
Whether that convergence
fosters stability or stokes confrontation is yet
to be seen. When US allies such as the Philippines
openly called for enhanced military relations and
defense cooperation to counterbalance China, a
flustered Beijing has responded with even greater
assertiveness in recent months.
"Ironically in its attempt to avoid
strategic encirclement, China has - through its
increasingly aggressive posture - legitimized the
US's pivot to Asia, which is obviously to contain
Beijing," says Bello.
Crucial node
True to its historical role as an American
colony, the Philippines is emerging as a crucial
node in America's "pivot".
Subic and
Clark, the former site of the US's largest
overseas military bases, are expected to play a
key role in the implementation of the US's new
strategic policy. Although there is an explicit
constitutional prohibition against the
establishment of permanent US bases in the
Philippines, Manila has recently expressed its
willingness to host an increased "rotational" US
presence at the bases.
In June, Defense
Undersecretary for defense affairs Honorio Azcueta
said, "They can come here provided they have prior
coordination from the government." Manila has
recently welcomed US warships and fighter planes
to enhance the two sides' interoperability. The US
is set to deploy its most advanced jets and
warships to the region, including the EA-18G
fighter plane which is capable of flying faster
than the speed of sound and is geared to jam enemy
air defense capabilities.
Washington has
said it intends to deploy 60% of its surface ships
to the region, amounting to six aircraft carriers
and the majority of its submarines, littoral
combat ships and destroyers. It has already
reportedly deployed 60% of its aircraft carrier
battle groups and nuclear submarines to the
region.
Despite growing fiscal challenges,
Washington recently tripled its Foreign Military
Fund (FMF) allocation to the Philippines, from
$11.9 million to $30 million. Apart from selling
two Coast Guard Cutters to the Philippines,
Washington has also apparently agreed to provide
Manila with the P-3 Orion, the US Navy's frontline
maritime patrol aircraft. The US has also recently
deployed the USS North Carolina nuclear
submarine to Subic, a move met by increased
Chinese naval activity in nearly waters.
In April, the US and Philippines conducted
their annual joint Balikatan
(Shoulder-to-Shoulder) exercises with notable
modifications. The site of the exercises was
shifted to an area nearer to the disputed maritime
territories off the coast of Palawan); the number
of United States Air Force trainers was double the
size of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
trainees; and, the mission was primarily focused
on enhancing combined planning, readiness and
interoperability, including for sea-based
operations. All of these efforts came under US's
expressed commitment to enhance Manila's "minimum
credible defense posture".
In that
direction, reports revealed last month that the US
intends to install a second land-based early
detection radar system against ballistic missiles,
known as X-Band 2, in Japan. The US has claimed
the radar is aimed against the threat of North
Korea, but strategic analysts view the
installation as part of an emerging wider regional
missile defense shield against China's growing
anti-access and ballistic missile capabilities.
Those same analysts believe that the
Philippines could be a primary site for expanding
such a defensive arc into Southeast Asia. The US
is known to have concerns about China's ability to
target with ballistic missiles US forces based on
the Pacific island of Guam, making the
installation of X-Band radar in the Philippines a
potential frontline strategic priority.
Fiscal, geopolitical
realities That said, there are several
considerable constraints against a full and
credible American "pivot" towards Asia. Manila and
other Asian allies are now anxiously evaluating
the extent of American assistance they can expect
to receive should tensions with China flare up
into armed conflict.
With an anemic
economic recovery and constant bipartisan
wrangling over fiscal and debt legislation, the US
Pentagon now faces across-the-board budget cuts to
the tune of $500 billion. America's weak fiscal
position could thus badly undermine its ability to
redeploy forces to the Asia-Pacific.
Treaty allies such as the Philippines are
already complaining about their small absolute and
relative share of FMF allocations. Despite a
recently tripling of Manila's allocation, the
Philippines' share of FMF earmarked for East Asia
is half the amount it received in 2006.
"We hope this is not indicative of the
priority placed on the Philippines as a regional
partner, as even non-treaty allies appear to be
getting a bigger share of the FMF allocation,"
lamented Philippine Foreign Secretary Albert del
Rosario in recent public comments.
The
interpretation of the US-Philippine 1951 Mutual
Defense Treaty is a thornier issue. Unlike
previous US administrations, including the Jimmy
Carter and Bill Clinton administrations, Barack
Obama's government has yet to explicitly affirm
its commitment to come to the Philippines' defense
over contested maritime territories. Some analysts
believe Aquino pushed through the recent Western
Philippine Sea order to compel Washington to take
a stronger public stand on the issue.
So
far, America's expressed commitment has been vague
and scenario-based, meaning there has been no
clear indication of where, when, and how
Washington will come to Manila's rescue in the
case of an armed clash with China over disputed
territories. Washington has maintained this vague
footing despite frequent requests from Philippine
leaders to make a public statement in defense of
their claims.
Many in the Philippines are
thus wary of the centrality of US-China relations.
Locked in virtual economic co-dependence,
Washington likely sees its ties with Beijing as
the most consequential bilateral relationship of
the next few decades. Many in Manila fear America
could for the sake of systemic stability give
policy priority to the preservation of great power
harmony over defending marginal treaty allies like
the Philippines.
Moreover, it is not clear
whether the US will be able to disengage quickly
from the Middle East and South Asia and place
strategic priority on its Asia-Pacific "pivot".
With Iran threatening to close the strategically
important Strait of Hormuz if it comes under
attack from Israel, America has recently rapidly
bolstered its naval presence in the Persian Gulf.
"I doubt that US will be able to fully and
smoothly pivot to Asia because it is heavily
pinned-down in the Middle East, especially in
light of growing tensions over Iran's nuclear
program and Israel's constant blackmailing," says
Filipino legislator Bello. "Russia and China also
have an interest in keeping US pinned down
elsewhere, away from Asia."
Richard
Javad Heydarian is a foreign affairs analyst
based in Manila. He can be reached at
jrheydarian@gmail.com
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