Bali
bombings as unrealized powder
keg By Gary LaMoshi
BALI - On October 12, 2002, a ragtag gang
of radicals set off a series of bombs here that
left 202 people dead, mostly foreign tourists. The
attack also shattered preconceptions about
Indonesia, the country with the world's largest
Muslim population.
Before the blasts at
Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club in Kuta Beach, plus
the US Consular Agency a dozen kilometers away,
Indonesian Muslims were seen as moderate, disengaged
bystanders in the conflicts
involving the Muslim world.
The bombings
prompted a closer examination of Indonesia and its
longstanding struggle between secular and Islamist
forces, dating back to the nation's founding in
1945. With four presidents in five years, Muslim
and Christian militias clashing across the
archipelago, rampant poverty and endemic
corruption, Indonesia in 2002 made a credible
candidate for the world's next failed state.
Tops in anti-terrorism Ten years
later, Indonesia is now solidly in the camp of the
world's democracies and an anti-terrorism success
story. The record on Muslim extremism, as well as
corruption and poverty, is decidedly mixed, but
things are far more peaceful than many could have
expected in the smoldering aftermath on the Jalan
Legian thoroughfare a decade ago.
"After
the Bali bombing, it was clear that Indonesia did
share in the problems of the South and Southwest
Asia," says Greg Barton, the Herb Feith Professor
for the Study of Indonesia at Monash University in
Melbourne, Australia. "The lesson for observers of
Indonesia, certainly for Australia, was that the
problems of the Middle East could reach
Indonesia."
The Bali bombers were part of
Jemaah Islamiyah, a group loosely affiliated with
Al Qaeda and dedicated to restoration of Islamic
rule across Southeast Asia. Its spiritual leader,
Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, had been jailed by the
authoritarian Suharto regime and then taken refuge
in Malaysia.
Barton says that Ba'asyir
took advantage of the fall of Suharto in 1998 and
the reformasi climate to return to
Indonesia and resume his radical preaching, as did
many other hard core Islamists.
Clues
abound Ahead of the Bali bombings, there
were other instances of Muslim extremist violence,
including the Christmas Eve bombings of churches
in 2000 and Muslim militias recruited to fight
Christians in Ambon and central Sulawesi. But no
one then connected the dots to see a radical
network capable of large scale violence.
Rohan Gunaratna of Singapore's Nanyang
Technological University first sounded the alarm
about Al Qaeda's "second front" after the
discovery of a terrorist cell planning attacks on
US military facilities there but few at the time
took his warning seriously. "Gunaratna grossly
overstated the threat while others understated
it," Barton says.
"The 2002 Bali bombings
were quite transformative," Barton notes. "It led
to a series of changes." First and foremost,
international assistance for anti-terrorism
efforts poured into Indonesia, beginning with the
bombing investigation. Within weeks, the key
members of the plot were under arrest.
With Australia leading the way, the
Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement was established
to train Indonesia's police. The force had been
split from the army after the fall of Suharto and
badly needed the dose of self-esteem and
professionalism that the successful bombing
investigation and skill development provided.
Since the Bali bombings, Indonesia has convicted
more than 600 terrorists, punctuated by the
execution of three of the Bali bombers.
Happiness is a warm gun Special
Detachment 88, funded and trained by US and
Australian police, military and intelligence
services, has since decimated Jemaah Islamiyah's
leadership. In 2009, the unit culminated a lengthy
manhunt with the killing of bombing expert Noordin
Mohammad Top during a shootout in Central Java.
Dulmartin, suspected of triggering one of the Bali
bombs by mobile phone, was killed in a Jakarta
firefight in 2010.
Densus 88, as it's
known in Indonesian, has come under criticism for
an apparent shoot-first approach that leaves many
suspects dead and therefore unable to provide
intelligence. It has also faced allegations of
human rights abuses during its operations.
Overall, though, Detachment 88 may be the world's
most effective anti-terrorism force, at least
among the ones known to the public.
"In
light of expectations, given a police force that
was undertrained and underfunded, Indonesia has
done very well combating terrorism," Barton,
author of Indonesia's Struggle: Jemaah
Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, judges.
"Terrorism was looked at as a law enforcement
issue at first. There's a growing realization that
you have to see the sociological dimension."
Although some groups that march under the
Islamist banner are mere opportunistic thugs, many
are true believers. Barton notes, "There was a lot
of soul searching among radicals after the
bombings about the sharia [law] legality of what
they did. They're not as soulless as they're often
portrayed."
Non-violent
consensus The smaller-scale 2005 Bali
bombings proved to be a turning point. Twenty
people were killed plus the three bombers; all but
five of the dead were Indonesians. The attacks on
a restaurant in Kuta and the popular beach dining
area at Jimbaran Bay, were the first confirmed
instances of suicide bombings in Indonesia.
The Kuta bomber was caught on tape and the
Jimbaran aftermath included the severed head of a
suspected bomber. In the wake of the bombings, a
consensus emerged among religious and political
leaders that, even if jihad was justified,
Indonesia was not the right battlefront.
In the face of that consensus, Jemaah
Islamiyah may have splintered but terrorism still
hasn't disappeared in Indonesia. "Today there are
lots of rapidly developing small cells with little
central control or coordination," Barton says.
These groups have carried out attacks such as the
2009 bombings of Jakarta's JW Marriott and Ritz
Carlton hotels and last year's attacks in Central
Java on a police mosque and Protestant Church.
Police recently claim to have uncovered an alleged
plot to attack Parliament.
These
terrorists are protected, according to Barton, by
social networks that include family, neighbors and
co-religionists. "There's a strong cultural
proclivity to be part of networks," he says,
noting that Indonesia has the world's second
largest number of Facebook users. "While networks
may have opposed attacks, there is a sense of
solidarity with the brothers that protects them."
Barton, interviewed while he was in
Indonesia for research and meetings last month,
believes, "If radicals play their cards right,
they can win support. But if they overplay their
hands, they'll lose support."
Space
exploration Similar social dynamics are a
key factor in intolerance toward religious
minorities. "Market forces are at work," Barton
says. "Contestation between advocates of
secularism and Islamists has been seen throughout
Indonesian history. Under Suharto, there was no
space for Islamists. In the reformasi era,
there's more space."
In recent years,
there's been a rising tide of violence against
members of minority Muslim sects, including
Ahmadiyah and Shia. Church burnings have also
flared up. Demonstrations featuring threats of
violence and local government defiance of courts
and the national constitution have led to
years-long impasses over the construction of new
churches, leading congregations to worship in the
open under police protection. Local governments
continue to pass sharia-inspired statutes in
defiance of the secular charter.
What's
different in the recent cases of terrorism and
intolerance is the absence of a firm consensus
against such acts among political and religious
leaders, as happened in the aftermath of the 2005
Bali bombing.
"If there was strong
political leadership drawing a line in the sand, a
lot of this would go away, but they're not,"
Barton says. "It's the role of the government and
[mainstream Muslim organizations] Nahdlatul Ulama
and Muhammadiyah to set limits, to say this is
beyond the pale and won't be tolerated. Until
they're forced, the Islamists won't stop."
Longtime editor of award-winning
investor rights advocate eRaider.com, Gary
LaMoshi has written for Slate and Salon.com,
and works an adviser to Writing Camp (www.writingcamp.net).
He first visited Indonesia in 1994 and has been
watching ever since.
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