After dubious performances in post-war
Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States now has
the opportunity to demonstrate in Myanmar what has
been learned at a great price in both these
countries. All three countries share one distinct
feature: they are highly diverse ethnic societies
that demand their ethnicity be both valued and
balanced.
The question now is whether the
US government truly understands the game to be
played in Myanmar in a context rich in human
factors and abundant in strategic implications.
Myanmar's critical position for giving
China access to the Indian Ocean is also of
strategic importance to the US. The US has shown a
strong willingness to engage President Thein Sein's
reformist government,
though there are nagging issues that have
compelled the US Congress to leave certain
sanctions in place.
Still the Barack Obama
administration has been positive and
solution-oriented in response to the various
reform gestures, including the release of hundreds
of political prisoners, a loosening of media
censorship and allowing for opposition leader Aung
San Suu Kyi and her National League Democracy to
take seats in parliament. The question now is
whether the US is on the right path for enduring
progress, particularly considering America's past
history of getting it wrong when it comes to
dealing with ethnic matters in diverse societies.
The United States famously read the people
wrong in Vietnam and Somalia, both countries where
it intervened through military means. Carrying
over its Cold War diplomacy, the US has found it
expeditious to engage at nation state-to-nation
state level, while often ignoring the unpleasant
human conditions on the ground. In this regard,
both Iraq and Afghanistan have been wake-up calls,
providing evidence that an approach focused on
empowering central governments and strong armies
alone is poor policy.
The present danger
in Myanmar is that the US and other Western
nations have focused solely on the figures of
Thein Sein and Suu Kyi, both of whom dominated the
limelight during recent trips to the US. By
contrast, ethnic minority groups, including the
Chin, Kachin, Karen, Mon, and Shan, have received
comparatively scarce attention and have generally
been relegated to the margins of US and European
engagement initiatives.
Minority ethnic
groups, most of which have been disempowered,
oppressed and impoverished by a succession of
repressive military regimes for the past six
decades, now find themselves at a significant
disadvantage in bringing critical facts to the
fore.
Part of their challenge is fear of
being perceived as obstructionist in the eyes of
the international community in light of recent
conciliatory gestures offered by Thein Sein. The
groups also lack single charismatic or compelling
leaders, such as Thein Sein and Suu Kyi, to
capture the imagination of global audiences.
But as US and other Western governments
lock in policies, programs and commercial
relations in Myanmar, they risk overlooking
crucial ethnic issues that will ultimately make or
break their engagement initiatives.
Plight and power First, Burman
ethnics in power have convinced the world that
non-Burman ethnics are a minority in Myanmar. In
fact, non-Burman ethnics may well make up over 50%
of the population, their ancestral lands cover
most of the country's borders and international
trade routes, and contain much if not most of
Myanmar's natural resource wealth. This wealth has
been the basis of Burman-dominated governments
power past and present. A succession of
repressive regimes counted anyone who was Buddhist
as Burman - a practice that has allowed ethnics to
become characterized as a minority factor in
Myanmar. Ethnic plights are now often portrayed as
if they are lingering peripheral issues pertaining
only to a few hold-out recalcitrants. The reality
is that ethnics constitute the single most
important power block to be engaged for future
durable peace and stability in Myanmar.
It
should be appreciated that ethnic resistance
forces have by some estimates an impressive record
of killing Burman soldiers at up to 100:1 ratios
in the field. This is testament to freedom
fighters defending families, ancestral lands and
cultures. This grassroots resilience is something
the US and its allies have experienced at a bloody
cost in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. In the
end, it may well be that human resolve will
outlast the dominant military and logistical
capacities of the nation state in Myanmar.
Second, the ethnic Burman-led army of
Myanmar has been the enduring tool of repression
for decades, stealing ethnic ancestral lands rich
in natural resources. This practice is still going
on, as up to 120 government army battalions attack
Kachin villages in northern Myanmar at a horrific
human toll. In spite of this, the US government
has apparently been dealing with Myanmar defense
officials discussing the prospect of future
military-to-military relations.
Long-standing crimes against humanity and
current attacks by the Myanmar government's army
are disturbing facts that remain unaddressed by
Western governments keen to engage Thein Sein's
supposed new democratic order. The fact that the
Kachin were the most devoted ally to America
during World War II makes this silence all the
more dishonorable. The fact that Thein Sein is
seemingly unable to control his generals in the
field should be of great concern to US and
European governments.
Third, the Burmans
have used ceasefires with ethnic groups as a badge
of honor and indication of their supposedly
progressive intentions. The international
community logically equates ceasefires with good
news. The reality is that while appearing
positive, ceasefires are often used to (1) divide
ethnic unity one ethnic group at a time, (2)
enable the Burman-led army to strengthen all its
forward bases and outposts on stolen ethnic lands,
(3) allow the army to concentrate forces to attack
remaining ethnic resistance forces and villagers
and (4) enable the Burmans to use ceasefires to
threaten ethnics they will be perceived as
impediments to internationally backed peace
processes.
The Burmans have avoided
dealing with the major pan-ethnic
political-military alliance, the United
Nationalities Federal Council, as they prefer to
cut deals with ethnic groups on an individual
basis to prevent ethnic unity and power in
negotiations. This divisive process is now ongoing
with ethnic Karens, a tactic that has caused a
deep rift among Karen leaders while Burman-led
armed forces reinforce their forward basing in
Karen State. All this has been deftly masked from
international sight.
Fourth, the West has
become fixated on and somewhat entangled in the
human-rights and political complexities of
Myanmar. In this context, Thein Sein has convinced
the US and Europe that reform is complex and will
take time and that by lifting their economic and
financial sanctions they can help to accelerate
the process. His big hand-wave gestures of
releasing political prisoners have resonated well
with the West, and Suu Kyi now effectively
functions as a poster child for Burman-led
democracy. Yet neither politician has taken a
clear and consistent stand on how to empower
oppressed ethnics.
This all masks arguably
the most important issue in Myanmar today:
equitable land reform. Ethnic lands stolen by
Burmans are now the basis of Myanmar's economy.
Not addressing this issue, while incrementally
lifting sanctions and granting legitimacy to the
ethnic Burman-dominated government, will provide
power and momentum to Burman reformists and old
guard oppressors alike. This is double jeopardy
for ethnic peoples, who remain ever on the outside
of the equality equation in Myanmar.
The
unfortunate reality in Myanmar today, as in the
past, is that ethnic peoples as a political,
economic and military power force are still a
source of fear to Burman elites, whether they are
reform-minded or staunchly old guard. It is now
regarded as bad form to mention this fact in the
face of the honorable reform efforts of Thein Sein
and his quasi-civilian, Suu Kyi-endorsed regime.
Yet this uncomfortable fact remains and
must be addressed if there is ever to be lasting
peace and stability in Myanmar. As the US
continues to experience in Southwest Asia, the
game to be understood, played and sustained is one
of fostering a dynamic balance among all
stakeholders in any given society.
We now
live in a time in which the nation state cannot
afford to create losers, as so-called "little-men
losers" across Northern Africa and the Middle East
have toppled governments in rapid succession.
This is no less the case in Myanmar, where
ethnic groups have unambiguous permanence, posture
and power. Washington would be well advised to
take a more balanced approach to engagement and
development in Myanmar and one more inclusive of
ethnics, or risk a repeat of the interventions in
Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Tim
Heinemann is a retired US Army officer and
strategist who does volunteer work in support of
ethnic pro-democracy groups in Myanmar.
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