Page 2 of
2 China
seeks copper firewall in
Myanmar By Peter
Lee
China's fair-and-balanced foreign
affairs tabloid, Global Times, clearly regards
Myanmar as a major test of the authoritarian holy
grail of yoking democratic agitation to the cause
of economic development. In near-daily reports on
conditions in Myanmar, it has asserted that
democratic aspirations must be heeded but...
China need not lose confidence in
its peripheral diplomacy due to the failure of
its investments in Myanmar. What we see in the
country is the inevitable impact of its
democratization.
... Of course, Chinese
companies should focus more on the people of the
countries they invest in. It is the objective
requirement of the wave of
democratization that has
swept over poor countries. The Letpadaung
copper mine crisis has drawn Chinese people's
attention to Myanmar. Democracy has brought hope
there, but it has also blocked a major
construction project instead of liberating
productive forces.
This kind of
democracy can neither bring high growth for the
Myanmarese economy nor result in tangible
benefits for the people. Western countries'
lifting of sanctions cannot bring wealth.
[8]
Chinese media has determinedly "worked the
refs" by declaring that Aung San Suu Kyi
acknowledges the principle that contracts be
honored. Global Times correspondent Yu Jincui
visited Myanmar and reported relatively frankly
on anti-Chinese protests. Re Letpadaung, he
wrote:
The Letpadaung protests are the
largest and most significant ones. Several
months of slow boil brought the issue far beyond
just seeking more land compensation for local
villagers. Locals want the project suspended and
Chinese enterprises to be kicked out of Myanmar.
The challenges of appeasing the
protesters while protecting and encouraging
foreign investment and job creation make solving
the issue tricky.
The contract to
develop the Letpadaung mine was signed in 2010,
under the approval of the Myanmar government.
Opposition leader and parliament member Aung San
Suu Kyi, who was chosen to head an investigation
group into the project on December 1, admitted
the necessity of defending the country's
credibility during her visit to the mine to meet
both the company side and protesters in late
November. [9]
Global Times also tried
to draw a line in the sand, declaring that if
Letpadaung was canceled, China should demand
compensation (and not defer the issue, as it has
apparently done on Myitsone):
We must not give up on the project.
Even if it is eventually stopped, Chinese
companies should receive compensation according
to the contract and international
practice.
On the Myanmar government
side, things were apparently in disarray and
message discipline took a beating A key government
economic advisor, Aung Min, displayed commendable
honesty but not a great deal of political tact in
announcing the government's desire not to
terminate the mine contract, as Aung Zaw,
columnist for The Irrawaddy, wrote:
Aung Min, who exchanged some harsh
words with protesters at Letpadaung a few days
before the crackdown on Thursday, raised the
specter of China when he spoke of the costs of
shutting down big projects like the copper mine
and the Myitsone hydropower dam in Kachin State,
which was ordered suspended last year.
"If China asks for compensation, even
the Myitsone Dam shutdown would cost US$3
billion," he said. "But China still hasn't said
a word about it. We are afraid of China."
Aung Min added that Burma should be
grateful to China for its aid in 1988, when the
Southeast Asian nation faced a food crisis due
to nationwide unrest. He added that in the
1980s, the former Chinese president Deng
Xiaoping decided to cut off support to the
Communist Party of Burma, weakening the Marxist
insurgency against the central government.
"So we don't dare to have a row with
China!" said Aung Min. "If they feel annoyed
with the shutdown of their projects and resume
their support to the communists, the economy in
border areas would backslide. So you'd better
think seriously."
Many have criticized
Aung Min for his undiplomatic suggestion that
Burma's giant neighbor might actually try
destabilize the country if it doesn't get its
way, but others have said that he was merely
letting the public know the reality that Burma
faces. [10]
Defending Sino-Myanmarese
economic and security engagement is not a popular
platform in Myanmar, as the reporting of the
Guardian on the scene in Letpadaung makes clear:
Organisers have given fiery speeches
directed at China. "Driving out [the Chinese]
company is our aim," Thwe Thwe Win, 24, a
vegetable seller from the village of Wat Hmei,
threatened by the expansion plans, shouted into
the hand-held loudspeaker outside the plant last
week. "No Chinese on our soil. No Chinese here
near our village," the crowd shouted back.
[11]
Ambassador Li stated perhaps with
more optimism than accuracy that Myitsone and
Letpadaung were the only two troubled Chinese
projects in Myanmar.
Although the
Myanmarese political elite across the spectrum
from Thein Sein to Aung San Suu Kyi apparently
have no stomach for a political platform of
economic expulsion of China from Myanmar, populist
politics encourages an anti-Chinese agenda.
Aung Zaw of The Irrawaddy delivered the
unwelcome news that anti-regime agitation and
attacks on Chinese economic interests will be a
political perennial inside Myanmar:
In the future, many activists will
no doubt begin to raise the issue of the gas
pipeline project and other hydropower projects
in Burma. China is one of the main investors in
all of these projects.
The Chinese
side has taken the position that enforcement of
the contracts with PRC companies is a key measure
of the openness and rule of law that Myanmar is
hoping to sell to Western investors. If, on the
other hand, the interests of China and its allies
in the Myanmar government and military are
threatened, the PRC could presumably quickly make
Myanmar, with its welter of aggrieved ethnicities
in its unsecured borderlands, a most unwelcoming
investment destination.
The Chinese (and
Thein Sein) can take some consolation in the idea
that the re-emergence of Aung San Suu Kyi into
political life means that dissent is no longer
dominated by the priorities of vitriolic
chauvinists, confrontational students, and
intransigent, juice-box refusing Buddhist monks.
As Aung San Suu Kyi plans her path to
national political power over the next five years,
she is probably considering a middle path between
populism and canny compromise. In a press
conference on December 6, she struck some
"sanctity of contract" notes that the PRC probably
found reassuring:
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said the
conflict over the mine was the result of a lack
of transparency and accountability between the
government and the public. She said she valued
public participation in the investigation
process but warned against unlawful acts.
"If people want to enjoy the rights of
citizenship they also should accept the
responsibilities that come from that," she said.
"[Letpadaung] residents said they want
to stop the project completely when our team
members discussed it with them. We will take
into account their opinion. But we understand
that this project is being done in accordance
with a contract. Therefore, we must negotiate
with each other and solve the problems through
peaceful means. That's the democratic way, so if
we want to build democracy state, there must be
a negotiation process. It's not democracy if we
just stand for what we want without
negotiation." [12]
] The commission's
conclusions are scheduled for release on January
31, 2013.
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
