Patience a necessity in
Myanmar By Christopher O'Hara
Thein Sein's government has made a number
of high-profile reforms since his inauguration in
March 2011. The release of political prisoners
including Aung San Suu Kyi, the easing of media
censorship laws and the National League for
Democracy party's victory in this year's
bi-elections, have been reciprocated by the
suspension of European Union and United States
sanctions. However, the true intentions of reform
remain unclear.
Aside from the reforms,
there has been minimal structural change in the
government. The military has veto power over any
proposed changes to the constitution. The defense
services are represented by 25% in the upper house
and 33% in the lower house. Major constitutional
changes can only be made with the approval of 75%
of parliamentarians from both the lower and upper
house, meaning that the military retain power over
proposed reforms.
Added to this, it is
generally accepted that one of the leading
political parties, the Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), which is
made up largely of former senior generals, is a
vehicle for the military. A very likely scenario
is that the USDP will remain in control and
continue to window dress for the international
community, allowing for decreased economic
isolation whilst rehabilitating the regime's
appearance in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. This is an image change that is at
present underway. Ultimately the ruling party will
lead the re-branding of the country to allow for
international approval for wider foreign
investment.
However, this current reality,
while not ideal, is likely a positive scenario out
of a number of worse ones. These reforms,
regardless of the intent of their makers, have
opened up the country to non-Chinese foreign
investment, international assistance and the
chairmanship of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations. These reforms should be seen as the start
of a process not the conclusion.
A new
investment bill that no longer requires a local
majority shareholder may bring in a much-needed
injection of overseas companies that are bound to
uphold corporate social responsibility and,
although probably limited, it would be an
alternative to the actions of Chinese state-owned
enterprises that have operated with near impunity
for years.
The opening up of the country
to new investment, most importantly from regional
heavyweight India, will also allow for a
convergence of trade routes and energy corridors
in Southeast Asia. Multi-national organizations
such as the EU and countries such as Norway and
Australia, offering much needed assistance can
also assist in economic and political reform.
Inter-governmental organizations and
non-government organizations will be important in
stabilizing the investment climate through the
establishment of peace initiatives in ethnic
areas.
The beginning of a democratization
process in previously autocratic countries is
usually a time of instability if the old guard
suddenly disappears, leaving a power vacuum. One
could draw comparisons to Egypt after Hosni
Mubarak or the Balkans after Josip Broz Tito. Or
one could simply refer to Myanmar's history. For
example, the coup d'etat in 1958, under General Ne
Win, occurred following a decade of weak
government, wide-spread insurgencies and political
violence. Again, in 1962 after only two years of
civilian rule, the military were forced to seize
power after ineffective civilian government,
continued insurgency and a growing independence
movement in Shan state.
The present
structure, with the military at the apex making
incremental reforms, should be seen as the start
of a process. It is a mistake to assume that
overnight democracy is the cure to the ills of
Myanmar. This was a mistake that has been made by
the West in many other places. In Iraq when the
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein fell or Yugoslavia
after the demise of the communist superstructure
are examples of this.
This process could
lead to a number of scenarios, the most likely of
which are: a golden-era where imperfect political
reforms continue to gain momentum, increasing
international trade and investment, increasing
peace agreements in ethnic areas (with limited
skirmishes) and greater power for reformists in
the administration; or a democratization process
that moves too quickly, where the opposition
demands rapid change, with calls for the ousting
of the military government and splits between
reformers and hardliners, which in turn lead to a
resurgent military and the roll-back of reforms.
The outcome will depend on the actions of
the present administration, the opposition and the
international community and how they view this
current process. As they say, patience is a
virtue. In the case of Myanmar, it is a necessity.
Christopher O'Hara is a Research
Fellow at the Institute for Security and
Development Policy, Stockholm.
The
opinions expressed are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of ISDP or its
sponsors. www.isdp.eu. Published with permission
the Institute for Security and Development
Policy.
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