Brunei in the South China Sea hot
seat By Richard Javad Heydarian
MANILA - Territorial tensions in the South
China Sea created unprecedented divisions within
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
in 2012, with member states taking divergent
approaches to China's increasing assertiveness in
the contested maritime area.
Now, as the
chairmanship of the 10-member grouping shifts from
China ally Cambodia to Brunei, also a claimant to
South China Sea territory, in 2013, many analysts
wonder whether there will be a qualitative shift
in ASEAN's stance on the divisive but
strategically important issue.
As China
and Southeast Asian nations such as the
Philippines and Vietnam have pushed the frontiers
of their claims in the Spratly and Paracel
islands, ASEAN has shown unprecedented disunity,
raising doubts about the organization's future
ability to
steer regional integration
and manage complex security-related conflicts.
While some analysts and ASEAN states have
blamed Cambodia's apparent decision to prioritize
bilateral ties with China over ASEAN's
multilateral interests, others have accused the
Philippines and Vietnam of purposefully
antagonizing China and drawing the United States
into the situation.
Brunei, which is both
a claimant in the ongoing South China Sea disputes
and a major Chinese energy partner, faces the dual
challenge of managing territorial tensions while
reestablishing group unity as ASEAN moves towards
forming a single market and production base by
2015.
Whether the small oil-rich kingdom
can disentangle the complex set of competing
country interests and put ASEAN back on a common
track will be pivotal to regional stability in the
year ahead.
The South China Sea disputes
date back to the Cold War era, when Vietnam and
China first squared off over contested features in
the Paracel Islands. In the immediate aftermath of
the Cold War, the Philippines - after it evicted
US military bases in 1992 - lost the contested
Mischief Reef in the Spratly islands to Chinese
aggression.
To prevent future conflicts,
ASEAN and China agreed in 2002 to a non-binding
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DoC), which broadly called for a
peaceful diplomatic resolution to the disputes. In
2006, the three main protagonists - China, the
Philippines and Vietnam - forged a tripartite
agreement on joint marine seismic undertaking,
which provided a basis for shared exploration,
surveying, and potentially even the future
development of hydrocarbon resources around the
Filipino island of Palawan in the South China Sea.
In retrospect, this prolonged period of
on-off engagement created a sense of complacency
among the claimant states and within ASEAN. While
touting an atmosphere of goodwill, amity and
cooperation vis-a-vis China, ASEAN failed to
notice how the diplomatic niceties hinged on
China's willingness to maintain a moderate
approach, consistent with its economic-oriented
charm offensive towards the region.
Recent
experience has shown there were no group
contingency plans in place to deal with a more
hawkish Chinese posture or provocative moves by
member states such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
When tensions flared again in 2010, unlike before,
tough rhetoric from China was followed by
aggressive military posturing.
China,
responding to a rising tide of popular nationalism
and increasingly influential hard-line factions
within the ruling Communist Party, opted to up the
ante on the situation by harassing Filipino and
Vietnamese vessels, including oil and gas
exploration rigs, in the contested areas.
In response, the Philippines and Vietnam
looked to ASEAN and the US to help contain China's
rising assertiveness. When the US placed itself at
the center of the disputes by announcing its
commitment to "freedom of navigation" in the South
China Sea during an ASEAN Regional Forum meeting
in Hanoi in 2010, a new layer of Sino-American
rivalry emerged.
Over the next two years,
under the chairmanship of Vietnam and Indonesia,
ASEAN pushed for a binding code of conduct (CoC)
to settle the disputes and deter further Chinese
aggression.
However, that unified course
shifted in 2012 under Cambodia's chairmanship,
with ASEAN members failing to agree even to
discuss the disputes or to make mention of them in
a joint communique after the ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting in Phnom Penh in July. It represented the
first time the grouping failed to issue a joint
statement after such a high-level meeting.
Cambodia's chairmanship underlined two
important points: (a) the perils to group unity of
weaker member states with considerable ties to
China assuming the organization's leadership; and
(b) the impact of the presiding chairman on the
entire organization's performance, especially over
contentious territorial issues that require
unanimity in action and strategic vision.
Diplomatic test Similar to
Cambodia, but unlike Indonesia, Brunei is neither
a major nor an original member of ASEAN (it joined
in 1984, 17 years after the organization was
founded by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand). As such, there are
already concerns among certain member states about
Brunei's diplomatic maturity, capability, and
commitment to the organization and its ability to
effectively handle the ongoing and intensifying
disputes.
When ASEAN fell into disarray
after the fiasco in Phnom Penh, influential and
older group members such as Singapore, Malaysia,
Thailand and Indonesia played a crucial role in
salvaging the organization from diplomatic
implosion. In particular, Indonesia's proactive
mediation efforts, including shuttle diplomacy
between rival states, resulted in "Six-Point
Principles" which called for (i) a peaceful,
diplomatic resolution of the disputes in
accordance to prior agreed upon principles and
(ii) the development of a regional code of conduct
for the South China Sea.
Like Cambodia,
Brunei has considerable economic ties to China.
While Beijing has leveraged multi-billion dollar
concessional loans, investments, and grants to woo
comparatively poor Cambodia, it has also become
increasingly involved in Brunei's crucial oil and
gas sector. Brunei is heavily dependent on its
soon-to-be-depleted hydrocarbon resources, which
currently account for around 60% of gross domestic
product (GDP) and 90% of total export earnings.
[1]
In the absence of strong democratic
institutions, Brunei's ruling royal family depends
heavily on hydrocarbon earnings to prop up its
security apparatus and appease the population
through generous welfare and subsidy schemes.
China is thus not only a major customer and source
of advanced offshore-drilling technology, but also
a means as Brunei's second-largest market for
Brunei to diversify its highly
hydrocarbon-dependent economy.
That
diversification has been seen in fast growing
bilateral trade. From 2001 to 2011, two-way trade
between China and Brunei ballooned from a meager
US$100 million to $1.3 billion, surpassing the two
sides earlier stated $1 billion target. Brunei has
recently exported between 13,000 to 20,000 barrels
of oil per day to China, accounting for as much as
one-eighth of its total crude exports. [2] [3] [4]
Meanwhile, Chinese energy companies,
ranging from the Zhejiang Henyi Group and Sinopec
Engineering Inc to the Chinese National Offshore
Oil Corp (CNOOC), are involved in large-scale
multi-billion dollar downstream, refinery, and
exploration projects in Brunei. [5] Small and
medium-sized enterprises in Brunei have also
ventured into China, bidding to tap into larger
market possibilities.
Chinese Premier Wen
Jiabao paid an official visit to the country last
year, while President Hu Jintao met Brunei's
Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah on the sidelines of the
2012 Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Summit,
underscoring the growing importance of bilateral
relations.
Those growing links explain why
certain ASEAN states, including the Philippines,
are concerned about Brunei's ability and
willingness to transcend its growing economic
interdependence with China to perform a more
decisive regional role as ASEAN's new chairman.
Given Brunei's generally low-key foreign
policy, where it has consistently avoided
controversy by maintaining neutrality in regional
affairs, many ASEAN states are keen to see the
country live up to the challenges of serving as
chairman amid the rising tensions.
Unlike
Cambodia, Brunei is a direct party to the ongoing
territorial disputes through its overlapping
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with other littoral
states. After Cambodia handed the rotational
chairmanship to Brunei last November, certain
regional states are known to have prodded the
small kingdom to play a more constructive role
than Cambodia.
"Brunei's chairmanship will
lead to 2015, so there is plenty of interest on
our part to make sure that there is a continuation
of agenda in the progress of ASEAN achievement. We
have confidence in Brunei's chairmanship," said
Teuku Faizasyah, spokesperson for Indonesian
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.
In
late November, just after the ASEAN Summit,
Vietnamese President Troung Tan Sang visited
Brunei to sign agreements in the areas of
commerce, industry and energy. Crucially, they
affirmed their commitment to the 2002 DoC and the
development of a regional CoC, as reiterated by
the Indonesia-sponsored "Six-Point Principles" on
the South China Sea.
With Vietnam's former
Deputy Foreign Minister Le Luong Minh set to
become ASEAN's secretary general for the next five
years, there will likely be more pressure from the
top of the organization to forge a multilateral
front to guard against rising Chinese
assertiveness.
For Southeast Asian
claimant states, there are certain reasons for
optimism. As the world's fifth-richest country
measured by per capita gross domestic product at
purchasing power parity, Brunei is not as
dependent on Chinese aid or investments as
comparatively poor Cambodia. The ruling monarchy
is also believed to be keen to use the status of
the chairmanship to raise the country's profile,
meaning it will likely emphasize conflict
management and the need for freedom of navigation
in the disputed waters.
Since its
traditional hydrocarbon resources are now heavily
depleted, Brunei also has a long-term interest in
developing offshore oil and gas fields, both
within the country's territorial waters as well as
within its contested EEZ. Neither an armed
conflict over the contested areas nor a move
towards total Chinese domination is in Brunei's
national interest. Whether it can avoid either
scenario will determine the failure or success of
its chairmanship.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a
foreign affairs analyst focusing on Iran and
international security. He is the author of the
upcoming book The Economics of the Arab
Spring: How Globalization Failed the Arab World,
Zed Books, 2013. He can be reached at
jrheydarian@gmail.com
(Copyright 2012
Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact us about sales,
syndication and republishing.)
Head
Office: Unit B, 16/F, Li Dong Building, No. 9 Li Yuen Street East,
Central, Hong Kong Thailand Bureau:
11/13 Petchkasem Road,
Hua Hin, Prachuab Kirikhan, Thailand 77110
