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2 US gives Russia short
shrift By M K Bhadrakumar
Russia scored a propaganda victory when
President Vladimir Putin offered on June 7 during
the Group of Eight summit that Russia's Gabala
early-warning station in Azerbaijan could be a
substitute to the United States' planned
anti-ballistic-missile (ABM) system in Central
Europe.
Putin showed he could "float like
a butterfly and sting like a bee". The proposal
was the first of its kind from the Kremlin for a
strategic tie-up with the US in a former Soviet
republic. The
Americans were taken by
surprise. President George W Bush looked
bewildered.
But no leader likes to look
bewildered at a glittering political show.
Moscow's smart diplomatic judo flip may have put
the US in an unforgiving mood. It may harden
further the US policy of "selective engagement" of
Russia. The chill in US-Russia relations is set to
deepen, as a number of critical factors begin to
play out - Kosovo, the two secessionist regions in
Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - and the
breakaway Moldovan region of Transdniestr. These
are in addition to the entire US strategic posture
eastward into Ukraine, the Caucasus and Central
Asia, apart from the intensifying struggle for
control of hydrocarbon reserves and their
transportation routes.
Also, new discords
are waiting in the wings. Last Thursday at the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-Russia Joint
Permanent Council meeting in Brussels, Russian
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov said, "We could
start discussing transit [of military cargo] to
Afghanistan within the CSTO-NATO framework." (CSTO
refers to the Collective Security Treaty
Organization comprising Armenia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia and
Uzbekistan.)
But for the present, Moscow
commentators are thrilled that Washington was
pushed into a corner. The Russian proposal was
convincing. Undoubtedly, the Gabala radar built
into the wall of a towering six-story building
perched on the southern slopes of the Caucasus,
about 120 kilometers from the Azerbaijani capital
Baku and which has been operational since 1985 and
is now on lease to Russia (until 2012), is a
powerful early-warning station with a range of
6,000km that can detect the launch of any missiles
in a vast region stretching from Turkey to Diego
Garcia in the Indian Ocean.
While
unveiling the proposal, Putin placed it in the
broad context of Moscow's determination to
preserve the "strategic balance of forces" since
World War II. "If one side is under the illusion
that it is protected from the risk of
counter-strikes, the potential for aggressive
action increases, and this could lead to serious
conflict," he said.
Putin added, "We are
convinced that this [US ABM deployment in Europe]
would negatively affect Russia's security and that
of our citizens, and this forces us to think about
steps we can take in response." Putin highlighted
that since Gabala can transmit "real-time
information", the US wouldn't have to deploy
strike groups in outer space. Nor would there be
any need to build a radar station in the Czech
Republic or to deploy interceptors in Poland.
Also, Gabala can "defend" the whole of Europe,
including the southeast.
Besides, the
debris of intercepted missiles wouldn't fall on
Europe. Putin pointed out that cooperation could
be within a collective format that included all
interested countries, and, furthermore, all
participants would have "equal, democratic and
mutually acceptable involvement" in the Gabala
system's command.
But Putin underscored
two "preconditions". First, the US shouldn't take
any unilateral actions on the deployment of its
ABM systems in Europe until such time as
consultations and talks were over. Second, if the
Gabala system were found acceptable, "there would
be no need to build new radars in Europe or to set
up new bases for the interceptor bases". Putin
concluded by holding out the assurance that if the
Russian proposal materializes, that would preclude
Moscow targeting missiles at Europe.
The
Russian proposal was intended to improve Russia's
image in Europe. It may even have targeted
Euro-Atlantic solidarity. Equally, it was a gambit
by the Kremlin grandmasters aimed at kick-starting
a Russia-US political dialogue on a wide range of
issues of international security.
Russia
may have extracted propaganda mileage, but
Washington is in no mood to allow Moscow to impose
itself as an interlocutor on equal footing. Of
course, it is a non-option for Washington to
reject Moscow's proposal outright, as that would
have further negative propaganda fallout,
especially in European opinion.
Beneath
this one-upmanship lie several sub-themes. Russia
would like to avoid a fait accompli on the
actual deployment of the US ABM systems in Europe.
On the other hand, the Bush administration is keen
to have the work on the deployment of the ABM
systems commence in the Czech Republic and Poland
before it leaves office at the beginning of 2009.
Again, Russia hopes European opinion will build up
against the US deployment. But Washington is
ensuring that European opinion too "hardens"
against Russia. It counts on the new leaderships
in Germany and France. Europe is finding itself at
odds with Russia on a range of issues.
Washington believes Russia is too weak to
compete with the US, let alone the Western
alliance, in a new arms race. Also, Russia has
hardly any bargaining chips. It doesn't even have
an "Iran card" today. The Russian role in Iraq,
Lebanon, Palestine, Darfur or North Korea is
minimal. Russia remains transfixed on
"Westernism", at least under Putin, and in any
case, there are
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