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West vs East: Australia
reorients
By Alan Boyd
SYDNEY
- Australia has quickly slipped into damage-control mode
with its uneasy neighbors after dispatching the last of
2,000 military personnel to the US-British alliance in
the Persian Gulf. In doing so it became the only
Asia-Pacific nation to commit ground forces to the
looming war against Iraq, though Japan, South Korea,
Singapore, Thailand and possibly the Philippines are
expected to play logistical roles.
Fresh from
talking up the Gulf campaign with George W Bush and Tony
Blair, Australian Prime Minister John Howard tried to do
the same with his Indonesian counterpart President
Megawati Sukarnoputri, who has become a flagbearer for
Muslim opposition to military action. That he failed
will have come as little surprise, given the turbulent
Indonesian political currents and the confused - some
would say beguiling - signals coming out of Canberra.
Even as Howard was jetting to Washington, his
spin-jockeys were doing a makeover on Australia's latest
strategy white paper, seemingly to deflect criticism
that the balance might have shifted too far to the West.
When they were first briefed on the paper late
last year, journalists were left in no doubt that the
pro-Asia foreign-policy slant initiated by a succession
of Labor governments during the late 1980s was in effect
redundant. The revamp, they were told, would position
the US relationship as Australia's preeminent strategic
issue; in the previous white paper, released in 1997,
the United States was ranked alongside Japan, China and
Indonesia. Howard had already hinted as much in his
inaugural address after taking office in 2001, though
the emphasis then was on a more even- handed approach
after the single-track Labor stance.
But
Canberra was unprepared for the uproar that followed the
white-paper briefing, which was compounded by a related
statement that Australia reserved the right to strike
against terrorist targets in Asia without prior warning.
By the time the white paper itself was released
last week , the eye of the storm had passed, Asian
diplomats accepting Howard's explanation that the
government had been misquoted or at worst misunderstood.
Howard said Canberra had no intention of acting as
Washington's "deputy sheriff" for security in Asia, and
was even less inclined to downgrade its diplomatic links
in the region.
Yet while the document may be
more circumspect than the briefing, the underlying
message has not changed: Australia does need a good
relationship with Asia to protect its economic
interests, but has a far greater desire for a solid
security partnership with the United States.
"The depth of security, economic and political
ties that we have with the United States makes this a
vital relationship. No other country can match the
United States' global reach in international affairs,"
the white paper states. "Further strengthening
Australia's ability to influence and work with the
United States is essential for advancing our national
interests."
Asia still attracts the most
attention in the document, perhaps reflecting its
paramount economic importance as a market for 56 percent
of Australian exports and the source of US$2 billion
worth of student income.
However, the tone is
apologist. Canberra's commitment to Asia is an "abiding
priority" that "focuses on the common interests between
Australia and the countries of Asia, while acknowledging
our differences".
"The issue for Australian
governments is not what priority to accord Asia, but
rather how, as circumstances change, Australia can best
advance its national interests in its relationships with
Asian countries," the document advises guardedly.
As the white paper notes, there are strong
historic, cultural and political reasons, as well as
shared liberal-democratic values, for maintaining the
unique relationship with the United States. In part,
these date back to the war in the Pacific in 1941-45,
when American and Australian troops together repulsed
Japanese forces from Southeast Asia and prevented a
possible invasion of Australia.
In 1951
Washington and Canberra set up the ANZUS Treaty with New
Zealand as an anti-communist front that would become the
cornerstone for security in the southern Pacific for
half a century. Australia allowed the United States to
open three top-level defense facilities on its western
coastline that help track nuclear submarines and
satellites and eavesdrop on communications throughout
the region. Thousands of Australians served in the
Korean Peninsula in the 1950s and in Indochina in
1965-72 under the same treaty.
Military and
training exchanges were nurtured, even when New Zealand
in effect dropped out of the alliance in the mid-1990s
because of US resistance to its hardline position on
nuclear vessels.
Defense links with Asia began
in 1950, when Australian troops fought as part of a
Commonwealth contingent against Maoist insurgents in
Malaya, which was then still a British colony. Newly
independent Malaysia brokered the Five-Power Defense
Arrangement with Australia, Singapore, Britain and New
Zealand in 1968, and Australian frontline jet fighters
were based in Malaysia until the early 1980s.
Canberra has since signed additional training
pacts with Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, and
has information exchanges with South Korea and Japan,
the other two key players in the US Asian security
umbrella.
There is little doubt that the US
linkage offers more technological support. Under a
revised technical exchange agreement signed last year,
Australia's defense forces will gain priority access to
advanced weaponry and develop a joint logistical
capability.
But a constant theme of the strategy
white paper, as well as other recent policy documents,
is Canberra's contention that it is also serving the
interests of Asia by putting the US relationship first.
"The US strategic presence is the most
significant and positive force for stability in Asia,"
the document argues. "Australia's ANZUS alliance with
the United States is fundamental to our national
security. And as a pillar of US engagement in Asia, the
alliance strengthens the stability of our region."
Not everyone is convinced of the virtues of
Canberra's approach. Asia Foundation, an institute
dedicated to the improvement of relations with Asia,
noted that a blind commitment to US objectives, founded
in support for Indonesia's anti-communist regime, had
prolonged the agony of East Timor for 24 years. It
warned that Canberra's strategists appeared no more
capable now than in the 1970s of dealing with issues
that required dexterity and a deep understanding of
regional dynamics.
"Even more concerning is the
fact that the government has not learned from the
mistakes of East Timor, and is committing the same
errors in relation to self-determination in West Papua
or the province of Papua, formerly Irian Jaya," said the
foundation.
However, the US focus has won
backing from conservative analyst Des Moore, who
believes the regionalism argument is overplayed. Moore,
a member of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a
state- funded independent think-tank, even wants
migration policies to be tailored toward European
countries that have a strong history of democracy.
"If it be accepted that our foreign policies
should be fundamentally concerned with protecting our
national interest and hence our basic values, that
suggests an important conclusion: that being in the
Asian region does not itself constitute a basis for
giving Australian foreign policies an 'Asian' priority,"
he said.
"Advocates of emphasizing the 'Asian
approach' sometimes appear psyched into believing that,
because Asian countries seem 'nearby' and therefore more
likely to pose a threat, we should pay them greater
regard in framing our policies and in cultivating
friends.
"What happens on the other side of the
world from Australia can be - has been - of far greater
moment for Australia's security than what happens right
next door," Moore said.
(©2003 Asia Times Online
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