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2 Iran's practical
nationalism By Dmitry
Shlapentokh
Iranians have recently
demonstrated interest and appreciation of their
country's past, including the 6th-century BC
Achaemenid Empire. This topic has become extremely
sensitive, as violent Iranian reaction to the
recent movie 300 demonstrated. This changed
approach to the distant past demonstrates what in
the Russian Revolution was known as "national
Bolshevism", the transition from belief in world
revolution to emphasis on the importance of the
state. And this has a direct implication for
Iranian foreign policy.
The history of Iran has always had a
political context, and Iran's recent increased
interest in its Achaemenian past may be a sign of
an important change in the ideology and
geopolitical posture of the regime. The Achaemenid
Empire was the first universal empire (barring
possibly the Assyrian Empire), and it is usually
regarded as the beginning of Iranian national
history. For most Western historians, it also
reflects inefficient and repressive Oriental
despotism, as demonstrated by the Achaemenids'
inability to defeat the Greeks and their final
conquest by Alexander the Great of Macedonia in
the 4th century BC.
In general, Western
historians show the Achaemenids playing an
important role in the early history of what is now
Iran, albeit mostly as a demonstration of the
superiority of the West. Iranian interest in its
pre-Islamic past has been extremely limited until
the last - Pahlavi - dynasty. The last shah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (reigned 1941-79), was
especially fond of the Achaemenids. He made
references to them, and encouraged his subjects to
call their children after their great rulers. At
the very end of his rule, he staged lavish
celebrations of what he regarded as the 2,500th
anniversary of the Iranian monarchy. Soldiers
dressed as warriors of all the Iranian dynasties
marched in parades in front of the shah, Iranian
dignitaries and foreign visitors.
The
ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the
Iranian revolution, naturally hated the
Achaemenids. In his philippics, he was hardly
different from most Western historians, who saw
the Achaemenian kings as brutal despots who
wallowed in luxury and debauchery amid the misery
of the masses. It was not Achaemenid glory, or
even the Iranian state, but a utopian drive for a
worldwide Shi'ite revolution, spreading true Islam
and embedding social justice, that inspired the
protagonists of the Islamic Revolution (1979).
It was not books about ancient Iranian
history but the Koran that pushed the wave of
Basij Iranians to attack Iraqi positions during
the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Still, as time
progressed, the eschatological, anti-state
ideology that disconnected past and present
started to change, along lines not unknown in
other great revolutions of the modern era, the
Russian Revolution (1917-21) in particular.
Russian national Bolshevism The
ideology of the early Russian (Bolshevik)
Revolution was, in many ways, similar to that of
the Iranian revolution. The history of the czars,
actually the entire history of Russia, was
discarded, relegated to the place of, as Leon
Trotsky put it, "icons and cockroaches". The
sources of inspiration for the revolution were
outside Russian borders: the "prophet" Karl Marx
was born in Germany, and the holy book - Das
Kapital - was originally in a foreign tongue.
Their Mecca and Medina, the passion and
heroic feats of the Russian Revolution, their
Karbala, where they were martyred for the
"salvation of humanity", were also in foreign
lands, embedded in foreign histories. The
Bolsheviks looked for inspiration to the French
Revolution and the Paris Commune of 1871, giving
them much more attention than their native
historical tradition.
The early Bolsheviks
also discarded the state, making it not a goal in
itself but a springboard for worldwide revolution,
close to the revolutionary Iranian state and the
Taliban quasi-state in Waziristan. Like the
Iranian revolutionists and the Taliban, the
Bolsheviks had no respect for their oppressive
national history. The rulers of the past were
denigrated and their effigies destroyed, along
with priceless artifacts from the treasuries of
the country's long history.
As time
progressed, however, the nature and perception of
the regime started to change. The worldwide
revolution did not happen, and the Red Army horde,
which supposedly strove to liberate toilers all
over the globe, was stopped near the gates of
Warsaw. At the same time, many Russian
intelligentsia discovered that under the coating
of the Soviet regime was the same old Russian
Empire. The revolution not only changed the
socioeconomic matrix but also reinvigorated the
state, bringing a stronger elite into play.
These observers were quite aware of the
regime's despotic nature and brazen
repressiveness. In contrast to most emigres and
foreigners, however, they did not see the regime
as hindering the rise of the state. In fact, they
saw the brutal elan of the regime as a sort of
prerequisite for Russia's glory, believing that
after reaching a degree of security, the regime
would relax its iron grip. The sense of change,
the solidification of the regime, its economic and
geopolitical success - its problems
notwithstanding - also started to be understood by
the Soviet elite.
Profound changes in
ideology took place. Russia was no longer seen as
just a springboard for worldwide revolution; it
became the goal in itself. The revolution was seen
as a force not so much to liberate the proletariat
worldwide as to forge a mighty Russian state, not
a break with but a continuation of historical
tradition. Not surprisingly, the view of the
Russian past also changed. The great Russian
rulers re-emerged in official discourse in all
their glory.
Mighty Alexander Nevsky
crushed the "dog knight" invaders from the West,
and equally glorious Dmitry Donskoi repelled the
menacing Mongols/Tatars from the East. By bloody
purges, Ivan the Terrible, a 16th-century czar,
cleansed Russia of traitors and turncoats. And
Peter the Great, while preserving the basic matrix
of Russian political culture, acquired the
necessary Western know-how to make Russia one of
the greatest European powers.
This view of
history de-emphasized Russian defeats and found
convenient explanations for Russia's problems,
such as the treasonous ineptitude of the
foreign-born elite who wormed their way to the
top. After Russia's victory in World War II,
national Bolshevism reached its pinnacle: Russia
was not just the mightiest state in history but
the source of all human invention. Balloons,
aircraft, radio and electricity had been invented
in Russia long before the West discovered them.
Moreover, it was Russian culture in its universal
appeal that had crystallized the drive for
universal brotherhood.
It was natural that
the people of the Earth should unite around
Russia, for the Russian state was qualitatively
different from the West. Western states usually
conquered other states for exploitation and
domination; Russia just brought them into the
extended family, where they were provided care and
love.
In fact, Russia, as a sort of
collective Christ, sacrificed itself for others.
And this spirit of universal brotherhood was
already clear in Russian literature and poetry,
all the marvelous jewels of the unsurpassable
Russian culture. This spiritual greatness had been
in the Russian soul long before the Bolshevik
Revolution, which made it possible to materialize
these ideas in their fullness.
In all this
ideological construction - whose legitimate pride
in great achievement was mixed with mythology -
one point was clear: the ideology of a mighty
nation shaped its foreign policy by raison
d'etat - not the preconceived shibboleths of
the revolutionary era.
Chinese national
Bolshevism The Russian experience was
hardly unique; the same evolution of
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