Asia Times: Putin builds a big hammer



	August 21, 1999	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Putin builds a big hammer
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
August 20, 1999

Summary:

Russia's response to the incursion of Chechen guerrillas into Dagestan was slow, erratic, and perhaps even conspiratorial. But today is not yesterday, and new Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is not Sergei Stepashin. The current delay is not a reflection of Russian military incompetence or fear, but is the result of Putin assembling a substantial hammer. The elite forces being deployed to Dagestan are intended to set a new precedent for Russian military power and to form the nucleus of the rebuilt Russian military.

Analysis:

Russian media has become critical of the Russian military's response to the incursion of Chechen guerrillas into Dagestan and Russian military leaders have giving the media plenty of reason. First, the initial response to the rebels on August 7 came from 1,000 Dagestani Internal Police, one reinforced motorized infantry battalion of the Russian Interior Ministry's 102nd Brigade, and one reinforced motorized infantry battalion of the Russian Army's 136th Motorized Infantry Brigade. These troops, mostly underpaid, undertrained, and underequipped conscripts were no match for the guerrillas. Russian helicopters accidentally fired on Dagestani troops, and the army battalion from the 136th Brigade was, for a time, besieged in Botlikh.

Compounding this initial response was the Russian military commanders' poor public relations skills, as they vowed success in a matter of days, then weeks, and now perhaps months. Russia clamped a ban on media contact with the rebels, issuing a series of overly optimistic and frequently contradictory reports of battlefield successes and casualties. Criticism of Moscow's management of the situation soared and conspiracy theories proliferated, when reports emerged that Russian officials, including Boris Yeltsin's pet oligarch Boris Berezovsky, had met with guerrilla leader Shamil Basayev prior to the attack. The conspiracy theories were fed by official acknowledgement that border guards were withdrawn from the Chechen-Dagestani border prior to the guerrilla raid, despite public warnings that the raid was imminent, thus allowing the guerrillas to enter Dagestan unopposed. Apparent hesitation in Russia's approach to combating the guerrillas, including reluctance to bomb or shell villages where the guerrillas are holed up, has provided further fodder for Moscow's critics, with some in the Duma crying ''treason.''

Two major factors are driving the current slow and erratic Russian military progress in Dagestan and they are neither treason nor incompetence. The first factor is the new sheriff in town. New Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is a very different man than his predecessor Sergei Stepashin. Stepashin was an agent of Yeltsin. Putin is an agent of the Federal Security Service, and beholden to the Russian defense and intelligence community. Stepashin went to Dagestan to do Yeltsin's bidding - either to bury the crisis so as not to disrupt domestic politics or to manipulate the crisis to Yeltsin's political favor. Putin intends to do one thing to the guerrillas in Dagestan, destroy them.

Before he can unload on Basayev and company, Putin first has to clean up Stepashin's mess. While Stepashin kept the Interior Ministry in charge of operations and laid down ground rules against risking Russian military or Dagestani civilian casualties, Putin and Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev have taken control of operations from Interior Ministry commander Vyacheslav Ovchinnikov and handed it to the Russian Army. Anatoliy Kvashnin, chief of the Russian General Staff, laid out the new policy: ''The objective of the units is the annihilation of the militants. They must be destroyed completely. We will do the weeding thoroughly.'' Putin made clear that there would be no question of driving the guerrillas out of Dagestan. He warned that Russia would not hesitate to destroy them inside Chechnya as well. Putin intends to set a new precedent in the North Caucasus and create a new image for the Russian military.

To achieve this goal, Putin has to deploy the necessary resources to the theater. Two battalions of conscripts and a hoard of Dagestani volunteers are utterly inadequate for the task. Dagestani volunteers have already been removed from the front lines to defend villages in rear areas, while a steady stream of Russian reinforcements have been flowing into the area. This is the second reason for the delay. Putin has to pull together the best of a badly deteriorated Russian military and create a unified command capable of leading troops to victory. That deployment is well underway. Identified additional units thus far deployed to Dagestan include:

* One reinforced battalion of the 31st Airborne Brigade [formerly the 104th ''Scorpion'' Airborne Division], based in Ulyanovsk, deployed August 16-17. The 450 paratroop battalion is reinforced with artillery and an engineer unit and now numbers approximately 500. The unit is armed with Nona self propelled mortars, BMD IFVs, and SU-23 towed anti-aircraft guns (used in an anti-personnel role) . The battalion has been issued with a 40-day food ration. The 31st has seen regular combat action since 1988 and is preparing a second battalion for deployment to Dagestan.

* One battalion of the Pskov Airborne Division, deployed August 18. Some 400 paratroopers from the Pskov Division have been deployed to Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo as well.

* One battalion of the 21st Stavropol Airborne Brigade, along with a special operations battalion, deployed on August 12 and moved to the front on August 16. 600 total paratroopers and special operations troops were sent from Stavropol Territory, North Caucasus Military District. Observers counted approximately 60 APCs and IFVs, 20 howitzers, and 30 truckloads of troops.

* One battalion of Airborne troops stationed in Buynaksk, Dagestan, deployed to the front on August 16.

* One brigade of paratroopers from Asbest in the Sverdlovsk region, deployed sometime before August 14.

* Units of the 7th Airborne Division in Novorossiysk.

* One battalion of Marines from the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad, being formed in Kaspiysk, Dagestan. As of August 16, a company of Marines, a howitzer battery, a platoon of engineers, and an air defense unit, totaling 170 combined troops, were already in Dagestan, guarding the Chechen border. One battalion of Baltic Fleet Marines is already present in Astrakhan, where the Caspian Fleet, now on alert, is staging exercises.

* Units of the Shumilov Brigade of the Russian Interior Ministry's Internal Troops in Nizhniy Novgorod, possibly as many as 1000-1200 troops, deployed on August 14.

* 500 OMON elite military police troops from the Sverdlovsk OMON training base in Yekaterinburg, deployed August 12. The troops, from several Urals cities, will be divided between Dagestan and Karachaevo-Cherkessia. They have been issued 30-day rations. Urals OMON troops participated extensively in the Chechen war, and half of those currently being deployed have seen combat. OMON units from Nizhny Tagil and the Rossy special assignment detachment of the Regional Directorate of Internal Affairs are reportedly prepared for deployment to Dagestan.

* OMON unit from Samara.

* OMON and rapid reaction SOBR troops from the Federal Anti- Terrorism Commission deployed from Moscow and Kursk.

* 50 OMON troops from Murmansk.

* 55 OMON troops from Nakhoda.

* GROU (army secret police) Commando Brigade from Rostov na Donu

* A motorized infantry regiment, two battalions of self-propelled guns, and other units from the 20th Guards Motorized Rifle Division based in Volgograd, deployed August 18. The 20th Guards was involved in the assault on Grozny, during the Chechen war.

* Divisions of the 58th Army in Vladikavkaz, specializing in mountain warfare.

* 487th Helicopter Regiment

Putin is building a big hammer. According to anonymously sourced military estimates in the Russian press, the Russian military intends to commit from 10,000 to 15,000 troops to combat in Dagestan - a force roughly equal to that deployed against Chechen separatists during the 1994-1996 war. The Duma defense committee has reported that some 18,000 Russian troops and Dagestani militiamen are already involved, but as claims of Dagestani volunteers number up to 13,000, the deployment may have some time to go. The planned strike force includes five reinforced Airborne battalions, as well as Spetsnaz and other elite units. Yeltsin has downsized Russia's elite Airborne forces and many are deployed to trouble spots like Kosovo, Trans-Dnestr, and Abkhazia, meaning Putin will more than likely be forced to draw on regular army troops. Preparations are underway for that as well, with large- scale combined arms exercises underway in Siberia. The West-99 exercises in June should have highlighted some useable units as well.

Russia's North Caucasus response was slow. It was erratic. It may even have been conspiratorial. But yesterday is not tomorrow. Putin is now in charge and the continuing delay reflects only the intent that the Chechen debacle not be repeated. Dagestan is a test case for the Russian military and the troops and commanders involved will form the nucleus of the Russian military's revival.

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