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Central Asia/Russia

Finally, Nato tests a resurgent Russia - in Kiev
STRATFOR.COM
Global Intelligence Update
Weekly Analysis, March 2, 2000

Summary

Nato's decision-making body - the North Atlantic Council - is meeting in Kiev, Ukraine. This gathering in the most geopolitically significant area of Russia's backyard is a direct challenge to the Putin government's assertive new foreign policy. The move, however, is unlikely to dissuade the government in Moscow and will likely only entrench Russian nationalists. Regardless, the alliance's diplomatic thrust indicates a shift change in Nato-Russian relations, likely for the worse.

Analysis

Nato's North Atlantic Council (NAC), in its simultaneous capacity as the Nato-Ukraine Commission (NUC), is meeting March 1-2. Composed of ambassadorial-level representatives of the alliance's 19 member states, the NAC is the alliance's principal decision-making body. The NUC, in turn, was formed in 1997 to bring the alliance closer to Ukraine. With mixed success, Nato and Ukraine have attempted to foster a closer relationship. What is significant now is the location of the meeting. The alliance's decision-makers are meeting in Kiev, not Brussels, the headquarters.

As striking as the location - in the most strategically important nation on the periphery of Russia - is the timing. The meeting appears to have been called in Kiev on relatively short notice. And it is taking place as Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin consolidates both his power and his foreign policy; the March presidential elections are approaching, and until now, the West has appeared bewildered by his actions both abroad and in the war in Chechnya. With this gathering, it appears that the alliance is sending two sharp messages: one of support to Kiev and one of warning to Moscow.

Nato's relationship with Russia has changed dramatically and has not truly recovered from the trough of last year's conflict over Kosovo. Russia under former President Boris Yeltsin opened to the West and is now afflicted with a criminalized economy, a demoralizing loss of status and a dangerously ragged strategic situation along its borders. Russia under Putin is not only increasingly nationalist at home - as in the war in Chechnya - but is pursuing a vastly different foreign policy abroad, one that is forceful and decidedly independent of the West.

Indeed, it appears that after standing by idly the last several months, Western governments are beginning to catch on and react - albeit cautiously, even timidly. Western institutions are launching initiatives around the Russian periphery. The European Union is accelerating its expansion, earmarking $1 billion for Poland's accession efforts last week - a quadrupling of previous outlays. European Commission President Romano Prodi has alluded to tighter links between the EU and Nato. Nato holds its first major military exercise in a non-member's territory, in Sweden June 3-19. The alliance is cooperating with neutral nations to arm the Baltic states as well. And at the other end of Europe, Turkey is engaging in intensive military exercise on its eastern border.

But the most striking aspect of the relationship between the alliance, in particular, and Russia revolves around Ukraine. Ukraine is the most strategically important piece of real estate between Europe and Russia; neither can be secure without Ukraine. And throughout the post-Cold War period, Ukraine has been contested. It is economically dependent on Russia but has insisted on ever closer ties with the West.

Much to Russia's dismay, Nato and Ukrainian forces have held joint military exercises on the Black Sea and at a number of locations ashore. Nato and Ukraine have also been busy building relationships between their respective officer corps. The Ukrainiain military has never made a secret of its desires to work with the West, recently and pointedly declining a role in exercises with the Russian navy, according to Deutsch Presse-Agentur. Ukrainian forces, however, will participate in Nato's Cooperative Partner 2000 naval exercises, June 19-30, in the Ukrainian sector of the Black Sea.

The Nato-Ukraine Commission has been the other important vehicle for security cooperation. Indeed, one of the commission's first actions, after being formed three years ago, was to establish the Yavoriv military facility in western Ukraine as a training center for the Partnership for Peace program - the first such facility in the former Soviet Union. Ever since, Yavoriv has served as a base of operations for Nato-sponsored exercises. Now, Nato's civilian leadership arrives not only to meet but to tour a variety of facilities.

It appears that this unusual meeting was called on comparatively short notice; the first word appears to have come in late 1999, according to spokesmen in Brussels, Washington and various embassies. This suggests that the meeting is an outgrowth of the events of late last year: when Russia's war in Chechnya was getting underway and senior US officials toured alarmed, neighboring nations. The decision to meet in Kiev indicates a desire on the part of Nato to send a message of support to Ukraine as well as a warning to Moscow.

It is likely that this warning will be counterproductive. Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov visited Kiev on February 22, in an apparent attempt to deepen Russia's influence over the Ukrainian economy. After all, Putin, the acting Russian president, draws support from the swells of Russian nationalism. An overly bold Western gesture in Ukraine - perceived as vital by Russians - will only strengthen nationalists. Further, a strategy of confrontation will likely cause stress fractures within the alliance. Also, the West has yet to offer the carrot as well as the stick; Putin will refuse to back down if the only option is resorting to a Yeltsin foreign policy.

Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma seems to be scrabbling to stay out of this brewing confrontation. Last week he left Kiev for a two-week vacation in western Ukraine, according to a spokeswoman, directing his foreign minister to deliver a speech to the Nato gathering on his behalf. Neither in one camp nor the other, Ukraine has been forced to gingerly tow a line between Moscow and Brussels. With both now openly competing for Ukraine, Kuchma will find it increasingly difficult - if not impossible - to maintain a balanced policy.

Curiously, Moscow has not officially responded to the NAC meeting. After meeting with Russian officials, German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping is currently en route from Moscow to Washington; he is likely to carry at least a partial Russian response. Russia seems to be waiting for the right time and place to voice its full retort.

Like Nato, Russia has many cards to play. Ukraine's Russian minority composes more than a quarter of the Ukrainian population. Russian security services undoubtedly retain a strong presence. In case of a conflict, no one in Kiev truly knows who would rally behind the flag. Russian influence over Ukraine's economy is deepening. Most importantly, despite the sheer size of Ukraine's territory and population, it still shares a long and nearly indefensible border with the Soviet Union's most powerful successor state: Russia.

A showdown is quietly brewing. Nato is trying to expand its ability to operate jointly with the forces of neutral nations and many former Soviet states. But it would be a high-profile Nato push into Ukraine that would ultimately tip the scale. Putin has decided that Russia will no longer play second fiddle to the West; the Western response is that if Russia wants a confrontation, one can most certainly be provided. Such a message will only further fuel Russia's nationalist fires.

(c) 2000 WNI, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/

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