Asia Times: Uzbekistan consolidates dominant hold in Central Asia


	February 24, 2001	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Uzbekistan consolidates dominant hold in Central Asia
STRATFOR.COM's
Global Intelligence Update
Feb 23, 2001

Summary

Uzbekistan is becoming more adversarial in relations with its Kyrgyz and Tajik neighbors. Using the admittedly real threat of Islamic militants as a pretext, Uzbekistan can be expected to begin seizing control of border regions with the intent of eventually controlling all of the Ferghana Valley.

Analysis

Talks between Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan broke off in acrimony on February 15 after Uzbek negotiators insisted on concessions unrelated to border delimitation. With 140 points of disagreement, the talks are expected to drag on for some time. But Uzbekistan's increasingly bold stance and its ever-more invasive military actions against rebels operating out of neighboring states underline its position as the most powerful Central Asian state.

In order to ensure its security, Uzbekistan's dealings with its neighbors will become more unflinching over the next 10 years as Uzbekistan looks to broaden its horizons - literally. Uzbekistan's poor relations with its neighbors is nothing new. Since independence in December 1991, Central Asia's largest, richest and most populous state has sought to mold itself into the role of regional hegemon.

Uzbekistan has dragged its feet on demarcating its borders and recently cut off natural gas supplies to its neighbors. Some Kyrgyz negotiators involved in the border targets have said Uzbekistan has asked for territorial compensation in exchange for resuming gas supplies. A decade after independence, the ownership of factories in the Ferghana Valley is still in question, and Uzbekistan continues to operate oil fields in the same area without paying rent. Citing the danger of Islamic militants, it has pulled out of the CIS visa regime and repeatedly closed its borders, making simple commutes in the Ferghana Valley very difficult for non-Uzbeks.

The geographic and cultural core of Central Asia has always been the Uzbek-dominated Ferghana Valley. It is one of the few areas in the region with a reliable water supply, stable agriculture and natural boundaries. But Uzbekistan only controls the valley's lowlands. Kyrgyzstan holds the valley's upper reaches while Tajikistan controls territory and infrastructure at the valley's access point. There is also Uzbek territory buried within the territory of Uzbekistan's neighbors, making the entire region a geopolitical hash.

This fragmented control of the Ferghana makes it easy for Islamic militants to launch attacks against Uzbek targets and quickly escape, leaving Uzbek President Islam Karimov repeating his favorite mantra: "There is only one policy here: security, security and security." Karimov has made it clear his draconian political measures will continue as long as the Taliban remains a threat. His authoritarian political strategy has driven all legitimate opposition either out of the country or into the arms of the Islamists - ensuring there will always be an excuse for a crackdown. And with Tashkent's control of the Ferghana incomplete, the militants will always be able to escape to fight another day.

But if Uzbekistan could assert control over the entire valley and the connections to it, the militants would find their ability to run and hide severely compromised. Annexing northern Tajikistan would also assert Uzbek control over most of Tajikistan's 1.2 million Uzbeks, the most industrialized portion of Tajikistan and road and rail links to the Ferghana. Hollowing out the boomerang-shaped state of Kyrgyzstan would give Uzbekistan access to Uzbek inclusions in the upper reaches of the valley and control of a number of gold mines, petroleum wells, disputed factories, as well as the Toktogul Dam, a structure controlling the region's most reliable water source.

There is little the Tajik or Kyrgyz governments could do to stop a determined Uzbekistan, especially if Tashkent nibbled away at the two states a piece at a time. Kyrgyzstan can barely maintain its internal security in the Ferghana, much less fight off an invasion from a qualitatively and quantitatively superior foe. Tajikistan's military is dependent on Russia for supply and training as well as for guarding the Afghan border. Tajikistan is also preoccupied with containing a rising surge of instability of its own. Moreover, during the Tajik civil war, Uzbek military forces played a decisive role in ending the conflict.

Unlike Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is largely self-sufficient in energy and machinery. While Uzbekistan needs to import food, its two potential targets need to import it as well, largely via Uzbek territory. Citing military requirements as justification, Tashkent can expand its control over the Ferghana as its security needs dictate. It has already begun mining sections of the border, the wrong sides of the border according to the Kyrgyz and Tajiks, to inhibit the militants' movements.

So how would major powers perceive an Uzbek expansion? The United States lacks the projection capability to intervene, and now that Washington has labeled Uzbekistan's Islamic movement a terrorist organization, the United States is unlikely to offer more than bland admonishments. Rugged mountains barricade China from assisting either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan even if it wanted to. Moreover, China fears the region's Islamic-sponsored chaos will spread to its own Uighur minority. Beijing would likely welcome a firm and competent Uzbek as a change to Kyrgyzstan's weakness and Tajikistan's civil war.

That leaves Russia, the region's traditional power broker and the only state Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan could realistically appeal to for assistance. In Uzbekistan, Russia has a unique challenge and opportunity. If Uzbekistan is successful in assimilating more territory, it will be a more significant political rival to Moscow. But since it will still lack control over Central Asia's export routes and petroleum resources, Moscow's twin pillars for involvement in the region, even an empowered Uzbekistan does not constitute an economic or military threat to Russia.

Moscow and Tashkent would actually have even more reasons to work together. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Uzbek counterpart Karimov favor similar tactics with regard to Islamic militants willing to take up arms against the state: hunt them down and kill them. But while Putin, for reasons of international pressure, is unwilling to pursue Chechens into Georgia, Karimov has no problem following them into Tajikistan.

With an empowered Uzbekistan as an associate, Russia may be able to strike at Afghan-based militants by means currently denied to it. If Uzbekistan is willing to assume part of the burden, Moscow will be quietly thrilled - especially if Tashkent's ambitions do not extend to the Christian and largely Russified north of Kyrgyzstan or to Russia's own private playground of Kazakstan. Tashkent seems to recognize this stipulation; Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have moved steadily toward a formal delimiting of their mutual border. The vitriol that existed between Moscow and Tashkent in years past has also given way to mutual backslapping, especially on security matters.

While Uzbekistan, Russia and China certainly have their arguments, their desire to contain and destroy Islamic militants, especially of the cross-border variety, makes them natural partners. Of all the Central Asian states, only Karimov's Uzbekistan has demonstrated the stomach and power needed to fight them effectively. Uzbekistan's incursions into its neighbors' territories will not end until the "Islamic threat" ends, and this will only happen when Tashkent can control the entire Ferghana Valley.

(c) 2000, WNI, Inc.

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