Mullah Omar hands power to army chief


	November 24, 2001	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Mullah Omar hands power to army chief
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - With Taliban leader Mullah Omar said to have relinquished direct power to his army chief Mullah Akhtar Osmani, the Taliban are expected to engage in a more coordinated guerrilla campaign and military strategy that could involve them even surrendering their heartland of Kandahar.

Under Osmani, the Taliban will likely make a number of temporary advances on several fronts before retreating to scattered strongholds to made the most of their numerical superiority over the Northern Alliance.

According to sources, this approach will ensure that the Northern Alliance, with their troops tied up, will not credibly be able to lay any claim in diplomatic circles to be in control of the country, let alone form the core of a new government in Kabul.

Until two days ago, Osmani held the rank of corps commander, and was believed to head the Kandahar garrison, before being elevated to army chief. The handing over of power will apparently be temporary, depending on how the situation in the country develops. Mullah Omar has gone into hiding and his whereabouts are not known. Osmani will now orchestrate what will essentially be a do-or-die fight on the part of the Taliban.

A first test of the new strategy could come within days, depending on what happens in the northern city of Kunduz, where thousands of Taliban troops are encircled by Northern Alliance troops and cut off from supplies. Negotiations are continuing, amid fighting, for the surrender of the Taliban. Sources say that talks are under way between Taliban commanders and General Rasheed Dostum. Both parties have agreed that Taliban forces should be given a safe passage to their stronghold in the south. However, Dostum wants the Taliban to surrender all of their arms, while the Taliban leaders insist that they be allowed to keep their light weapons, handing over only heavy armor.

The situation is complicated by differences between Dostum (Uzbek) and Northern Alliance army commander General Mohammed Fahim (Tajik), who wants an unconditional surrender and who does not want Dostum's single-handed occupation of Kunduz.

And even if Fahim and Dostum agree on the same terms of surrender, the Taliban convoy moving south would have to pass through Mazar-e-Sharif, Shabargan and Herat, which are controlled by different commanders, and there is no guarantee that they would be given safe passage.

The fate of the several thousand foreign fighters besieged in Kunduz among the ranks of the Taliban, including British Muslims, Cheychens, Bengalis, Pakistanis, Indonesians and Arabs, is still not clear. Pakistan is now heavily involved in trying to secure the safety of its nationals - if too many bodies are returned to the country it could set off serious unrest.

Other than surrender, the only hope for the Taliban in Kunduz is that they hold off a bit longer and allow Osmani to begin his mini-offenses elsewhere to draw off troops from the north.

In the pre-September 11 days, the Northern Alliance forces were said to total about 15,000. However, these have been increased, given money supplied by the United States and arms by Russia. Dostum, who controls Mazar-e-Sharif, is alone said to have 10,000 troops. Similarly, Fahim has also increased the strength of his militia. Total Northern Alliance strength is now closer to 25,000.

For the Taliban, after retreats, defections, surrender and killings, their strength is likely to be about 40,000, of which approximately 5,000 are non-Afghans. It can also rely on the support of non-Taliban Pasthuns. For instance, the recent attack on Northern Alliance forces from Maidan Shehr was made by the Wardak tribe, assisted with some Taliban militia. Similarly, the Hizb-i-Islami (Gulbaddin Hikmatyar group) is now an ally of the Taliban, although its strength has yet to be fully assessed.

The reclusive Mullah Omar has been criticized as being out of touch with what has been going on. Sources say that his only contact outside of Kandahar has been with his commanders in the field and that was only by radio. He never watched television, read newspapers or listened to the radio to assess the situation, even after the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

He depended solely on two people, Interior Minister Abdul Jalil and Foreign Minister Maulvi Mutawakil, for information. The sources point out that Mullah Omar avoided people to such an extent that he even performed his prayers alone in his room, rather than is usually done in a congregation.

"Personally, we do not agree that he was competent enough to run the country effectively. Most of the time he fully depended on his lieutenants. What they suggested came out - lock, stock and barrel - in his decisions," the sources added.

There appeared to be no input on his part in the decision-making process. "He was hardly forceful or enterprising in his meetings. He would say a few words and instead preferred to listen." Referring to a meeting in Kandahar, one source said that Mullah Omar did not utter a single word, and only replied with nods.

By comparison, when the same source met Osama bin Laden, the source could not get a word in edgeways as bin Laden was obsessed with speaking out against the United States. Mullah Omar and bin Laden are believed to have a very close relationship, and the Taliban leader has refused point-blank to hand over the Saudi exile to the US, which wants him on charges of international terrorism.

((c)2001 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact ads@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)