Eurasia: An axis of uncertainty


	February 8, 2002	atimes.com

Central Asia/Russia

Eurasia: An axis of uncertainty
By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - The "black holes" of insecurity in Asia cannot function in isolation - they require financial resources and sometimes even the complicity of governments. Afghanistan's Taliban regime had backing not only in Pakistan but also in Saudi Arabia.

It was clear, however, that the United States and its allies could not have been successful in their Afghan campaign if it had been necessary to extend the fight into Pakistan. Islamabad was obliged to end its complicity with the Taliban and sever its ties with its former allies. Pakistani security agents who had been working with the Taliban had to give up their former friends and fight against them. This effort was to an extent successful, but not totally so. The Americans knew where to draw the line. It was like operating on a tumor: the surgeon decides to remove only a certain part, curing the rest of the cancer with other therapies.

The same strategy could also apply with Saudi Arabia. It is no mystery that while intelligence support for the Taliban came from Pakistan, the larger world network and financial resources for Osama bin Laden came from Saudi Arabia, the very country defended by the United States against Iraq in 1991.

In this light one could see Iraq as a true avenger for the West. Baghdad first attacked the anti-western Shi'ite regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in Iran in the 1980s, and then it threatened the anti-Western Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia. One could also argue that a large secular Arab state based in Baghdad could have been a bastion of stability in the region, helping to keep in check Islamist fundamentalism. The problem, however, was that Baghdad's rulers were totally unpredictable and with huge ambitions. Had the Iraqis conquered the Arabian Peninsula they would have been sitting on huge oil reserves, which could have been defended with nuclear weapons, a mix sure to put the world on the brink of war.

The Middle East predicament reveals the deep division among Arab countries, which are not easily labeled and where secularism is no guarantee of reliability. In fact, there are only two things that keep these governments together: their oil and their more or less latent opposition to Israel.

The power of oil is waning. The world has more than it can consume, a trend that will continue. The history of the bankruptcy of Enron is also the history of oil dependency. If oil were as important as 20 years back, a giant like Enron would have endured much worse failings in accountancy. While the price of oil drops in real terms year after year, energy conservation and such innovations as fuel-cell cars could within 20 years spell diminishing political returns for the Middle East.

Under that scenario, the importance of the Israeli-Arab conflict subsides as the influence of Arab countries diminishes as compared with that of Israel. The former, if they do not undergo a technological transformation, are bound to matter less than technologically innovative Israel. The economic relations between Israel and the surrounding Arab countries could be turned even more in Israel's favor, deepening the existing divisions between Arabs and Persians, Sunnis and Shi'ites. In such a situation, the only thing that could bring together the many different geopolitical realities would the universalist push of fundamentalist Islam and the new religious tinge taken by the Palestinian cause.

The United States, therefore, needs to keep a strong political initiative, which might include covert operations, but it must be aware that direct military initiatives could have many drawbacks. Saudi Arabia may be the ideal example. Although suspected of having provided aid to bin Laden, it owes its existence to the US. It is protected by a foreign mercenary force and is held together by foreign technicians, leaving itself open to US influence against those within the kingdom who might protect America's enemies.

Iran is a different kettle of fish. Well-armed and still militantly pro-Palestinian, it owes little or nothing to the US, which thus has limited means to pressure Tehran. The consequences of a war with Iran would be uncertain, as it would redraw the map of the region and possibly even strengthen the cause of the Kurds, something that would hurt the interests of Turkey, the West's strongest ally in the region.

Yet recent Iranian initiatives toward Pakistan betray Tehran's isolation and weakness and open the door for US pressure on the country. The tables could be turned on Iran, which seeks accommodation with Pakistan in order to guarantee its historical interests in Afghanistan, in turn opening Iran to the West. And improved relations between the US and China also strengthen the American case with Iran.

Thus the US war against terrorism can trickle down in an array of political initiatives aimed at each country. These initiatives will have to be held together by a general policy, otherwise they could lose focus and produce effects contrary to those initially expected. Such a policy can only be realized by clearly defining the goal of the war on terrorism. So far there has not been any definition, and after the attack on Afghanistan the US has been floating ideas that lump together old American areas of concern - George W Bush's "axis of evil" includes North Korea, Iran, Iraq and anybody else who may fit the bill.

There is a tendency to tolerate dangerous regimes, or territories where the central government exercises little or no control, because it is believed that these entities are ultimately accountable as they can simply be bombed to death. But these areas can used for proxy actions, as Afghanistan possibly was used by certain Arabs. They cannot be fully accounted for and soon spin out of control. These geopolitical black holes are the central problem that should be tackled.

These black holes allow some governments to conduct proxy wars, but can proxy wars be totally eliminated? Any government or government agency, or even a single man if he is rich enough, can use forces in a black hole to achieve the most disparate ends. In an interdependent world, with myriad agencies and companies operating on myriad tacks, it is impossible to demand that a government keep all its agencies in check. The United States has failed to do so many times, with some of its people running on paths very different from what the administration wished for; many other governments may have the same problem. The growth of wealth and pluralism, political and social, is bound to make it more difficult to maintain control on everything.

Yet it is possible to close all the geopolitical black holes. Without them, the governments of countries such as North Korea would have to take initiatives directly, and thus be subject to the risk of direct retaliation. The risk of offensive actions could be dramatically reduced and governments' accountability would be increased. In other words, closing the black holes would help to bring down the axis of evil, whereas the opposite could be not true. Perhaps in this way the long-term war on terrorism can be fought and won.

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Part 1: The quest for balance