
| China
THE MIDDLE KINGDOM China and US are 'competitors', says W By Bradley Martin
George W Bush has unveiled a get-tough policy toward Beijing. In a major foreign policy speech he said China is a ''competitor'' of the United States, not a ''strategic partner'' as the Clinton administration had tried to portray it. The remarks of the Republican frontrunner for the US presidential nomination were a mixture of easy shots at Chinese domestic policies with some refreshingly straightforward realpolitik concerning genuine international issues.
China's behavior can be ''appalling at home'', the Texas governor said. The Beijing regime ''is an enemy of religious freedom and a sponsor of forced abortion'' - policies that he described as ''without reason and without mercy''. A bit of background is in order here: Bush is anti-abortion but not anti enough to please those Americans who will settle for nothing short of a legal ban. Beating up on China over the role of abortions in its population control program is an obvious attempt to get right with vociferously anti-abortion elements at home. A major element in Bush's own party, the Christian Right, is intent on imposing its religion-based moral standards on Americans and foreigners alike. And Bush obviously also hopes his position on religious freedom will resonate with the less militant religious believers who make up the majority of the US electorate. The Chinese leadership no doubt will dismiss such talk, which it has heard for decades, as unjustifiable meddling in another country's internal affairs.
More interesting are Bush's pronouncement on military matters. China is investing ''its growing wealth in strategic nuclear weapons, new ballistic missiles, a blue-water navy and a long-range air force''; it poses ''an espionage threat to our country'' and its conduct can be ''alarming abroad'', Bush said in his speech on Friday at the Ronald Reagan Library in California. ''We must deal with China without ill will, but without illusions.'' That was well said - although if Bush really added later, during a Sunday TV interview program, that the US should deal ''harshly'' with China, as he is quoted as having said, there may be a question whether he's following his own advice about eschewing ill will.
And the Chinese leaders? ''By the same token,'' Bush said, ''that regime must have no illusions about America's power and purpose.'' Well, there's precious little evidence that the rulers in Beijing harbor such illusions. They clearly recognize that the relationship is, in its essence, competitive - that China is rising while the West, led by the United States, fears that rise and seeks to slow it down. Beijing-written and Beijing-inspired commentaries have said as much repeatedly.
For one recent example, consider a lengthy analytical article, ''National Defense Modernization and the Taiwan Question'' in the October 27 issue of Hong Kong's Ta Kung Pao, a newspaper that is mainland-owned and that typically reflects official Beijing thinking. The article counsels against an invasion of Taiwan before the mainland has completed the military buildup that will make China a true global power. Falling flat in an ill-prepared invasion attempt would ''fulfill the wishes of the Taiwan authorities and Western anti-China forces'', author Zhang Zuqian warns. ''For what they want to see the most is the discontinuation of China's emergence, for some reasons, and this is also a main purpose of Western anti-China forces' support for Taiwan independence.''
Zhang's article makes a strong case that China will get nowhere regarding Taiwan until it achieves sufficient military power to terrorize the recalcitrant island's leaders into accepting reunification on Beijing's terms. Beijing's carrot-and-stick policy so far has come up short, Zhang argues. There have been lots of goodwill visits back and forth, and Hong Kong has been incorporated under the one country, two systems theory as a demonstration. But ''these developments have not led to noticeable increases in the number of people supporting reunification on the island, much less strong pressures on the Taiwanese authorities''.
Meanwhile, ''the 'hard' element of our policy on Taiwan does not provide sufficient deterrence. Otherwise how could it have been possible that Taiwan, having a population of only 22 million, an army of less than 400,000 men and an absence of strategic depth, and being surrounded by seas, has dared to challenge us repeatedly?'' Western military analysts dismiss China as a ''second-rate power''. That doesn't make the mainland scary enough to prevail. To ''make the Taiwan authorities accept the plan of peaceful reunification and one country, two systems, we also have to ensure that the Taiwan authorities are in a hopeless situation militarily, so that they will understand that there is no way out other than accepting our policy''.
Zhang observes that a military buildup sufficient to corner Taiwan - partly by deterring the US from intervening - fits nicely into achieving China's destiny of being able to project military power wherever in the world its interests lie. ''If the Taiwan question is resolved, will our large quantities of advanced weapons become a huge heap of garbage, thereby resulting in the wasting of large amounts of resources?'' Zhang asks rhetorically. ''No. History will demonstrate that the resolution of the Taiwan question and the achievement of the complete reunification of the motherland will be a mark indicating China's truly becoming a world power.
''Numerous cases in Chinese and world history have shown that a real big power is not only necessarily a military power but will also often have to use force abroad,'' Zhang notes. ''In today's world, not only the sole superpower - the United States - often uses force abroad, but Britain and France also take military actions overseas from time to time. After resolving the Taiwan question and becoming a world power, China will also have interests around the world. When necessary such interests will have to be protected with military force.''
That's clear enough - as is Bush's recognition of the competitive nature, in the long run, of the US-China relationship.
(Special to Asia Times Online)
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