January 27, 2000 
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| January 27, 2000 | atimes.com | |
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| China ANALYSIS: The China-Taiwan military balance PART THREE Taiwan is increasingly secure from any non-nuclear Chinese military threat China's sheer size and rapid economic development have engendered unreasonable fears about its military capabilities. It might be hard to imagine how an island of 22 million people could be secure next to a continental power of over 1.2 billion. Yet Taiwan today is quite secure from invasion and could probably stalemate a naval and air campaign against it, even without US help. Recent trends in the balance of power favor Taiwan, not China. China only decisive advantage over Taiwan is its nuclear weapons, but China could not hope to employ these without inciting the most severe international reaction, including, at the very least, an international embargo against China foreign trade, not to mention the horror and hatred that nuclear attacks would produce in Taiwan. Several reasons for Taiwan's relative security have already been mentioned: the obsolescence of most of China existing weaponry, China low level of military expenditure and procurement, and China limited amphibious and air transport capacity. Taiwan's military procurement, like China's, has been impeded by foreign embargoes on certain types of weapons. During 1981-89, the heyday of warm US-China relations, the US prohibited sales of many important weapons systems to Taiwan, including major warships, many types of missiles, and sophisticated combat aircraft.[16] Most other major arms producers also restricted exports to Taiwan. The US did not, however, prohibit US companies from supplying arms components and helping Taiwan develop its own arms industry. Collaboration with Israel and South Africa also assisted Taiwan arms industry. Even with the foreign restrictions on arms exports to Taiwan, Taiwan arms imports were twice the value of China's during the 1980s.[17] Meanwhile, Taiwan indigenous arms industry developed the capacity to produce sophisticated fighter aircraft, warships, and many types of missiles. Since 1989, US relations with China have soured. In 1992, in reaction to China's purchase of Su-27 fighters from Russia, President Bush authorized substantial new arms sales to Taiwan, including previously embargoed weapons such as F-16 fighters and Harpoon anti-ship missiles. Although diplomatically the US still recognizes Beijing, not Taipei, US arms flow only to Taiwan. France also began selling arms to Taiwan, including sophisticated warships and fighters. During 1992-95, Taiwan became one of the world biggest arms customers, ordering $23 billion from the US and almost $10 billion from France. These purchases are far larger than China's recent purchases from Russia, but they have gotten much less attention in the Western press. Taiwan's domestic arms production adds considerably to these imports. Taiwan's military capabilities are expanding significantly faster than China's. Today any Chinese attempt to blockade and harass Taiwan would not likely succeed because of the superior quality of Taiwan air and naval forces. Until recently, Taiwan's air force relied on 424 older US fighters: 277 F-5 and 147 F-104. These are comparable to the few hundred best Chinese-made fighters (F-7-III and F-8), but inferior to China's new Su-27s. However, in the last few years Taiwan replaced all of its aging F-104s and some of its F-5s with new fighters. These include 130 Taiwanese-built Ching-Kuo, 150 F-16A/B,[18] and 60 French-made Mirage 2000-5 fighters. All of Taiwan's new fighters are in the same league as the Su-27, and much superior to any previous Chinese-built fighters.[19] These 340 first-rate fighters, plus 200 of the still-useful F-5E/F fighter-bombers, give Taiwan a considerable advantage over the PLAAF. Taiwan currently holds a big technological advantage over China in airborne warning, control and surveillance (AWACS) aircraft. These large planes, equipped with a long-range radar, extensive electronics sensors, and sophisticated communications equipment, monitor enemy and coordinate friendly air activity within a radius of several hundred miles. Such aircraft were invaluable to the US and its allies during the Gulf War. Taiwan's first four US-made E-2C AWACS aircraft were delivered in 1994-95. Four more are to be delivered by 2002. Each can track more than 2,000 aircraft within a radius at least 345 miles. A single E-2C circling over central Taiwan can detect any aircraft within 200 miles of Taiwan and 200 miles into China itself. Virtually any Chinese aircraft within range of Taiwan would be detected shortly after take off. An E-2C protects not only Taiwan itself, but also any Taiwanese ships operating within its radar umbrella, by warning of any impending air attack in time to allow interception by Taiwanese fighters. In a crisis, the E-2Cs, flying four daily six-hour shifts, could provide 24-hour coverage.[20] China is acquiring similar capability with four Russian-made Il-76 AWACS, but it may be a few years yet before they are operational. Once both sides have AWACS, the advantage goes to the defender, because the attacker loses the chance of surprise. Taiwan's navy is smaller than China's, with only about two-thirds as many major surface warships (destroyers and frigates), but is improving more rapidly and has superior anti-submarine, anti-aircraft, and anti-missile capabilities. Taiwan surface fleet is the world's seventh largest, ranking just behind China's in numbers, but is arguably more powerful. However, Taiwan's overall naval strength is hampered by having only two modern submarines. Taiwan wishes to procure a dozen more, but has been frustrated by the unwillingness of European submarine manufacturers to risk China ire by selling to Taiwan. (The US builds only very expensive nuclear-powered submarines, which it does not export.) Until recently, most of Taiwan's major combat ships were fifty-year-old US-made destroyers, but these have been extensively modernized with the addition of new missiles, electronics, and, on many, a helicopter. Some of these old destroyers have been replaced recently by 24 new frigates, seven built in Taiwan to a US design (with one more under construction), six built in France, and 11 refurbished veterans of the US Navy. The remaining 13 old destroyers are to be replaced within a few years by more new frigates and four US Aegis destroyers. These Aegis destroyers have anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities far more advanced than any available to China. Taiwan's lack of submarines somewhat compensates for China's weak anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, but the PLAN would be pretty helpless to defend itself from a strong submarine force. Taiwan has superior ASW capability. The most effective weapons against submarines are: first, other submarines, if they are quiet and have modern sonar; second, ASW aircraft, either land-based fixed-wing or ship-based helicopters; and, third, ships equipped with variable-depth towed sonar and homing torpedoes. China few 'Kilo' and 'Song' class submarines and Taiwan's two Dutch-built submarines have significant ASW capability. Taiwan has 32 land-based ASW aircraft to China's four (plus four obsolete flying boats). Nearly all of Taiwan's 37 major warships carry a helicopter and all 24 new frigates are equipped with towed sonar, whereas only nine PLAN warships carry a helicopter and even less have towed sonar. The most potent weapons against warships are accurate sea-skimming anti-ship missiles (ASMs) such as the French Exocet and US Harpoon, both used by many nations and credited with sinking or damaging several ships, including modern US and British warships, in the Falklands, Iran-Iraq, and Gulf Wars. ASMs may be launched from properly equipped submarines (a few Chinese submarines have them), surface ships, or aircraft. There are three main defenses: 1) destroying the attacker before it can launch the ASM, 2) destroying the ASM before it can hit a ship, or 3) distracting the ASM's homing system to a false target. The PLAN is inferior to Taiwan's navy in all three defensive capabilities. If the attacker is an aircraft, destroying it depends on either early interception by friendly fighters (AWACS help) or hitting it with surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) beyond the range of its ASMs. No PLAN warships have long-range SAMs, and they thus have no way to attack aircraft beyond about 11 miles, much less than the range of any modern ASM. Fourteen of Taiwan's major warships carry US SAMs able to outrange the most common Chinese air-launched ASM, the C-801 (similar to the Exocet), though not the new C-802. The four planned Aegis destroyers would be able to intercept Chinese planes beyond even the range of the C-802. If the attacker is a ship, the most effective defense is the hit it with ASMs first. Only 12 PLAN ships carry ASMs,[21] whereas all major Taiwanese ships do. All 24 new and 7 of the old Taiwanese warships have a US Vulcan Phalanx automatic radar-controlled gun that fires 50 20mm shells per second to destroy ASMs in the last seconds before they can hit the ship. The six new French-built frigates also have Crotale SAMs capable of intercepting ASMs. The PLAN is rumored to have an anti-missile system under development, but so far has no weapons to destroy missiles except for three ships with the French Crotale system. Systems to confuse missiles include radar jammers and chaff or flare rockets that produce a false radar or infrared image to distract the missile's homing device. These systems are most effective when computer-integrated with sensors, so that ASMs can identified and the most appropriate decoy activated automatically. Chaff rockets are common, but only 11 PLAN warships carry radar jammers and only two have modern computer-integrated defenses, whereas these are universal on Taiwanese ships. In addition, Taiwan's six French-built frigates are designed to be "stealthy". Their reduced radar, infrared, and acoustic signatures make it easier for them to distract missiles and torpedos with decoys. China is acquiring two Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers that are much more powerful than any existing Chinese warship. These ships have excellent long-range, supersonic ASMs that are thought to be very effective. They also have good ASW equipment, fast-firing short-range anti-missile guns, and short-range SAMs. These modern, expensive ships will add significantly to Chinese naval power, perhaps enough to counterbalance the advantage Taiwan has gained with its new frigates. Without these new destroyers, the PLAN would suffer heavily from Taiwan's naval and air forces. These new ships do not much improve the PLAN's defenses against air attack, but they do give it a more even chance in the event of a sea battle. But such limited acquisitions do not give China any overwhelming naval capabilities. They will be more than counterbalanced by Taiwan four new Aegis destroyers, which are more advanced than the Sovremenny-class. The ineffectiveness of ballistic missiles The Chinese ballistic missile tests near Taiwan around the time of Taiwan's 1996 presidential election alarmed many in the West and in Taiwan that missile attacks are the most viable means for China to threaten Taiwan. Ballistic missiles seem at first to have many advantages: long range, difficult to intercept, relatively easy to conceal, and China has them, whereas Taiwan does not. These advantages are overwhelmed by one enormous disadvantage, however: their extraordinary inaccuracy relative to manned bombers or non-ballistic (mostly short-range) precision-guided missiles. Inaccuracy does not matter much if the missile's payload is a nuclear weapon, whose destructive effects extend for miles (at least if the target is not underground). However, if ballistic missiles are used with anything other than nuclear warheads they are mere nuisance weapons. Extensive experience with ballistic missiles in World War II (German V-2s), the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars has shown that as terror weapons against civilians they are much inferior to manned bombers. Any single major Allied bomber raid in World War II or US B-52 raid on Vietnam delivered more explosives more accurately than would the entire Chinese missile force, which, of course, can be used only once. Ballistic missiles are terror weapons of weak powers that cannot control the air and therefore cannot sustain truly devastating attacks by manned aircraft. Thus no advanced military power bothers to maintain ballistic missiles except to deliver nuclear weapons. Ballistic missiles with non-nuclear warheads are useless against any militarily significant facilities like railroads, bridges, airfields, ports or transportation lines. Such facilities are notoriously hard to damage and easy to repair, even under sustained bomber attack. Despite thousands of firings of ballistic missiles in several wars, not one has ever damaged any militarily significant facility, though indeed thousands of civilians and a few soldiers have been killed by them (mostly in London in 1944). Only with nuclear warheads are ballistic missiles transformed from a random terror weapon into a militarily significant (though not necessarily decisive) threat. Any Chinese use of nuclear weapons against Taiwan would risk, at the very least, worldwide economic boycott, and possibly a preemptive US nuclear attack against the dozen or so Chinese missiles that can reach the US and against other Chinese nuclear facilities. A nuclear missile attack is not necessarily decisive, as mentioned above, because even if Taiwan's air and naval forces were eliminated by nuclear attack, this would not make it any easier for China to transport an invasion force to the island. In fact, nuclear destruction of the naval bases, and thus the ports, of Taiwan would make it even more difficult for China to transport troops and supplies there. Widely dispersed ground forces in the mountainous interior of Taiwan would be extremely difficult to eliminate without using hundreds of nuclear bombs, ie, most of China's total arsenal. Since such extensive attacks would leave Taiwan an uninhabitable wreck, it is scarcely imaginable that China could believe that any useful result could come from it. Nor is it likely that widespread nuclear attacks on Taiwan would make a new Beijing-imposed government particularly popular in what would be left of Taiwan. Yet without eliminating Taiwan's army, there is no way for China to enforce a government of its will upon the island. Some argue that military force and capabilities do not really matter. What really matters is people's perception of the threat. If Taiwanese people believe that China is overwhelmingly powerful and might use force to secure reunification (admittedly, such beliefs are commonplace), might they decide to support reunification out of fear? This might be called the "Genghis Khan" strategy of submission through fear. The Mongol conqueror did manage to induce some cities to open their gates to him by the reputation he developed for massacring the population of cities that resisted. Yet Genghis Khan did have one important advantage over modern China: terror was not his only viable weapon. He could defeat armies as well as terrorize cities. As long as China lacks the capability to defeat Taiwan military forces, there is no assurance that any amount of terror against civilians would induce submission. If a civilian government were to capitulate to the fear of its citizens and invite in the PLA, would Taiwan's military submit? Or would they simply stage a coup and continue resistance? Nobody can be sure, including Beijing. Military experts in China must realize, however, that if the Taiwanese armed forces were to choose resistance, the PLA might have to fight a real war, for which their forces are ill prepared. The psychological and political effects of violence are highly varied. Terrorism does breed fear, but it also often breeds resentment, anger, and perhaps a renewed determination to resist and defeat the source of the terror. The Nazi liberal use of terror in occupied regions did not uniformly secure passive obedience. Many chose to resist, subtly or violently. China very modest saber rattling in 1996 has not seemed to influence Taiwanese voters in favor of pro-unification candidates. Would a reckless disregard for the lives of Taiwan's inhabitants push voters to a more pro-Beijing politics? Perhaps, but I doubt it.
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