Asia Times: Why China is taking America's side


	September 26, 2001	atimes.com

China

Why China is taking America's side
By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING - China has pledged its support for the "war against terrorism" by promising to provide intelligence for an American operation in Afghanistan. This will be the first concrete military cooperation between China and the US since the Tiananmen Square crackdown.

The pledge came after some foot-dragging on both sides. The US had been wary about the involvement of China in security issues, and until a few days ago China was earmarked as the greatest potential threat to America. China was skeptical about waging a war against fundamentalism, which could spin off into a crusade against Islam and thus arouse sedition in its sizeable Muslim minority.

On top of everything else, there is still deep-seated distrust between the two sides. The recent accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the holding of 25 US spyplane crew members in Hainan, to name two episodes, have created resentment and suspicion that sudden changes of geopolitical agendas can't solve immediately.

However, just this suspicion, if faced squarely, could become the basis for a new relationship between the two countries, according to some senior Chinese scholars.

Professor Zhang Xiaodong, secretary general of the Society for Middle East Studies, and author of a very comprehensive, recent work on Afghanistan, argues that US encroachment in Central Asia creates unprecedented pressure on China. American intervention in Afghanistan will draw Pakistan more into the American orbit, and the US could station troops there or leave behind military structures that could be used by its forces at short notice. China in this way may lose out, or at least see the dilution of its influence on a traditional ally by which it has stood for about 50 years.

It is clear that the key to controlling Afghanistan is to have influence in Pakistan, and the US is already working on that. Furthermore, the US might gain control of Afghanistan and, from there, radiate its power to former Soviet Central Asian republics, and thus in future push at will the touchy Chinese issues of Xinjiang independence or Islamic self-determination. It could turn out to be a very awkward predicament for China, caught in the vice of Japan and Taiwan in the east, both firmly in the American camp, and Afghanistan to the west.

Yet China cannot really deflect American intervention in Afghanistan. Suggesting an alternative intervention in Iraq, as some Chinese circles have been, won't address the issue. Clearly, the terrorist threat stems from the existence of some geopolitical black holes where terrorism can be prepared and planned. Afghanistan is in this sense out of control, with a largely unchecked border with Pakistan over which terrorists and resources can flow. The activism of its Taliban destabilizes a number of bordering countries and thwarts the development of a land route between the east and west parts of Eurasia.

Conversely Iraq, although still troublesome, is largely under control. Its borders are relatively in check, it is removed from the strategic central Asian plains, and it is safely cordoned by countries which are not subject to Baghdad's influence. In the past 10 years, a new, delicate balance of power has been reached in the area. To hit Iraq would tip this balance without solving the Central Asian headache.

Thus, US intervention in Afghanistan is unstoppable. In this situation, according to Zhang, China's options are either to stand by passively as the US acts, or to take an active stand. The first option has no positives. It would strengthen the US presence on China's doorstep without winning any gratitude from the US; on the contrary, the US would remember China's lack of active involvement in Afghanistan. China would not even gain credit from the Muslim world.

On the other hand, taking an active role in Afghanistan has many positive consequences. It would extend Chinese influence in Central Asia and thus balance the American extension in the region; it would win gratitude from the US, and in the process a new confidence could be built between the two countries. All these benefits would play in Beijing's favor on the Taiwan or Xinjiang issues. Even without any specific agreement on a quid pro quo, it is clear that a China-US rapprochement would undermine the forces in favor of Taiwan's independence and hasten the process of dialogue for re-unification. In other words, China's active role in Afghanistan would solve problems to its east and west.

The drawback of the the second option is that China doesn't want to become a primary target of terrorism and doesn't want to spoil her ties with the Arab world. Without the global clout that the US possesses, China needs a stable relationship with the Middle East, on which it will grow more reliant for oil imports in future years. Despite official statements, public opinion in many Arab countries is concerned, if not utterly against, American intervention. Beijing doesn't want to antagonize those Arabs, and is afraid that despite supporting the US in Afghanistan, Washington could turn against China whenever it wishes.

However, there is ample space for maneuver. On the American side, the reality of terrorist threats compels a two-pronged strategy: eliminate the geopolitical black holes like Afghanistan, and work on solving large political disputes - like the Palestinian question - that may foster terrorist ideas. On both fronts, the US can't act without China. The issue goes beyond the actual bombing of the notorious Osama bin Laden, or war against the fundamentalist government in Kabul. The issue is to eliminate Afghanistan as a source of instability in Eurasia and bring it back onto a track of development. This needs a long term program.

Tomorrow, Part 2: China and the future of Pakistan

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