Asia Times: A new opportunity for Sino-US relations


	February 13, 2002	atimes.com

China

A new opportunity for Sino-US relations
By Jing-dong Yuan

US President George W Bush's upcoming visit to China is as symbolic as it is nostalgic. It is nostalgic, as the date of his arrival in Beijing - February 21 - coincides with that of the late US president Richard Nixon exactly 30 years ago. At the same time, the visit itself, lasting no more than 48 hours, can at best be one of symbolic value rather than substantive significance. But the very fact that President Bush decided to make this second trip to China, even against the advice of his staff, shows that he takes US-China relations seriously. And there is also an opportunity for Bush to size up and get acquainted with the new generation of Chinese leadership and, more important, to convey to Beijing how the United States views a rising China.

When Nixon extended his hand to premier Zhou Enlai 30 years ago, the United States had clearly defined strategic objectives. Washington was willing to end more than 20 years of hostility to and isolation of Beijing to enlist China's support to manage the challenges of retreating from the Vietnam quagmire and confronting an assertive and expansionist Soviet Union. China, coming out of the political turmoil of the Cultural Revolution at the time and an adamant supporter (and exporter) of revolution in the developing world, could not have been further apart from the United States considering their different ideologies and opposing social, economic, and political systems. Yet the two countries managed to pursue a common goal, driven by their mutual distrust of Moscow. The quasi-alignment served well the security interests of both countries for the next two decades.

The opening up of China has changed the once radical and combative communist country, for the better. China stands today as a country that seeks to be a responsible member of the international community even as it is still learning and adjusting to its norms and rules. It is facing growing challenges, domestic and external, as it makes the transition to the next generation of leadership and closer integration into the world economy with its accession to the World Trade Organization. If China has any ambition, it would be one of continued economic prosperity and political stability.

The global geostrategic landscape has also undergone dramatic changes over the past decade. With the collapse of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States has bade farewell to the 20th century as the sole superpower, wielding unprecedented power and influence in international relations. Since the end of the Cold War, the US has sought to promote democracy and the market economy, consolidate alliances, undertake humanitarian interventions, and prevent the rise of regional powers that could challenge its primacy. Increasingly, Washington has come to perceive China to be one such power. While broad consensus exists in the US on the emerging Chinese power in both economic and military terms, there is less agreement on its extent and implications, what security policy Beijing is likely to adopt, and the best strategy for handling change. This perception (or misperception, depending on one's perspective) is reinforced by growing differences and disputes between the two countries over issues ranging from human rights, trade, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to regional security, missile defenses, and the future of Taiwan.

Despite the occasional efforts to improve bilateral relations, as represented by Chinese President Jiang Zemin's visit to the United States in October 1997 and US president Bill Clinton's visit to China in June 1998, such efforts are undermined by reoccurring incidents and events that reflect lingering, if not deepening, mutual suspicion, distrust, and occasional revelation of outright hostility. Even the number of these events - US arms sales to Taiwan, missile defenses, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, the Cox Report and the Chinese nuclear espionage charges, the EP-3 incident, to name a few - demonstrates that the barriers to normal Sino-US relations remain large.

President Bush came into office with the campaign rhetoric of treating China as a strategic competitor, and he acted accordingly. The bilateral relationship rapidly deteriorated. There was the midair collusion of a US EP-3 spy plane and a Chinese fighter and the subsequent detention of US crew members; the Bush administration approved the largest arms sales ever to Taiwan in years; Bush alienated and shocked Beijing by his "whatever it takes" to defend Taiwan statement; and high-ranking Taiwanese officials were routinely granted transit visas by the United States. Then came the September 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

The attacks, to some extent, provided the opportunity for a fresh start for Sino-US relations. Chinese leaders hope their public support and increased cooperation in the area of anti-terrorism will help rebuild a stable bilateral relationship between the two countries. Beijing wants to persuade the US that instead of being strategic competitors, the US and China can and should actually work as partners. Despite major differences between the United States and China over human rights, humanitarian intervention, and regional security issues, the two countries have also pursued common interests in combating narcotics trafficking, international organized crime, and terrorism. Many Chinese analysts suggest that responses to the tragic events in September could mark a turning point for enhanced consultation and expanded cooperation in fighting terrorism and pursuing other areas of mutual interests.

However, while the September 11 attacks and President Bush's attendance at the October 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Shanghai have arrested the downward trends and provided some opportunity for bilateral cooperation, the foundation of post-Cold War Sino-US relations remains fragile and many of the dividing issues, from missile defense to arms proliferation to Taiwan, remain unresolved. The latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in late September, still warns of the rise of a military power that could challenge US interests in East Asia. These differences derive from fundamentally different perspectives and interests, and from the dynamics of domestic politics as China faces leadership succession.

President Bush now has the opportunity to chart a new course in Sino-US relations. But he needs a vision and a well-defined, pragmatic China policy, as much as Nixon had when he stepped on Chinese soil 30 years ago. The global geostrategic environment has changed and the US must adapt to lead, not to imagine and create enemies. A clear China policy must be formulated against explicitly articulated US interests, which fall into three general categories. The first is vital US interests, ie, the security and protection of American citizens and properties at home. The second is strategic interests, which include peace and stability in East Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Finally, there are normative interests in promoting and protecting democratic values and market economic principles.

The US could help facilitate across-Strait dialogue between mainland China and Taiwan to promote its normative interests. It could engage China in regional issues so that its strategic interests, including the stability of the Korean Peninsula and South Asia, could be maintained. The US must also seek China's cooperation and support in combating global terrorism. The need to build the broadest possible coalition against international terrorism will require the Bush administration to retreat from its tendency to rely on unilateral foreign policy actions. The US must determine where its interests lie and how best to protect them. This should be the basis of its China policy. That policy should envisage a rising China preoccupied with domestic and external challenges, one receptive and amenable to international norms and rules, and, most critical perhaps, with a leadership that does not seek to challenge vital US interests even as it differs in the interpretation of US strategic and normative interests.

But China could be provoked to be hostile to US interests, as was demonstrated in the aftermath of the embassy bombing. And there are elements in China eager to take the first opportunity to do so. Washington should formulate its China policy with these considerations in mind. Differences will always exist between great powers. But the way in which they are managed could make make the difference between a friendly and an adversarial relationship.

Dr Jing-dong Yuan is Senior Research Associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, US. The views expressed here are his own.

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