Asia Times: All bright in North Korea?


	October 25, 2000	atimes.com

Editorials

All bright in North Korea?

Corny pun? Sure it is, but no cornier than the proceedings in Pyongyang during the visit of the US Secretary of State. We won't go into the "amazing" (Albright's words) details. You have seen the pictures on CNN or in your local newspapers. What puzzles us, sifting through the various public statements by Dear Leader Kim Jong-il and Madame Albright and news reports on the alleged content of their hours-long discussions, is what exactly was or even was supposed to be achieved during the Pyongyang meetings.

US President Bill Clinton is scheduled to attend the Apec summit in Brunei on November 15-16 and visit Vietnam during the same time frame. Having met with less than glowing success in his Middle East peacemaker role, Clinton won't want to miss out on the opportunity of entering the history books as a man having made a contribution to peace on the Korean peninsula. There is talk that a date for a Pyongyang visit by the president during his East Asia sojourn has already been decided: November 11. Well, let's see - and we won't be too cynical about it. We said in a recent editorial that a Clinton North Korea visit could have a positive impact and hope the Albright visit laid the proper groundwork for it.

As for Kim Jong-il, he must be tickled pink by all the attention that's being lavished on him these days. A day before Albright's arrival, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian was in town - by some counts to explore a Pyongyang visit by Chinese President Jiang Zemin. A few months back, Russian President Vladimir Putin stopped by and was handed something to talk about: a North Korean proposal to forego further long-range missile testing in return for foreign assistance with commercial missile launches. If Clinton shows up, what will he take home?

What worries us is that North Korea, in the short span of less than half a year after the summit between South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and the northern Kim, has now become a battleground for diplomatic influence between China, Russia and the United States and that under these circumstances it will hardly be a great tactical feat for Kim Jong-il to extract any number of political and economic concessions from his various suitors without having to offer much in return in terms of concrete changes in his realm. US ambassador to Seoul Stephen Bosworth said recently that "He [Kim Jong-il] obviously believes that he can gradually open North Korea to the outside world without jeopardizing the existence of his regime." But, he added, "We don't know how - or, in the long run, even whether - North Korea will be able to manage the process of external opening and change it has now begun."

Those are, indeed, the crucial issues. Do the little dictator and the ruling clique around him truly believe they can manage a carefully controlled opening, extract the economic aid and concessions they require, and live happily ever after? They most certainly do. Economically, they were in dire straits in 1997/98. What concessions could be extracted from winding down their nuclear weapons program had been extracted - free oil and two light water nuclear reactors. Then they launched a ballistic missile across northern Japan and asked for more aid for not doing it again. But Japan didn't blink - not very much, anyway - and the US didn't cough up any money either, though it talked of eventually lifting economic sanctions in return for a missile launch moratorium. Thus, when the two military threat cards had been played, a gradual opening was the only remaining ploy, the alternative being a slide into economic chaos.

It is clear by now that none of the major players - South Korea, the US, or China - were willing to risk the unpredictable consequences of driving Pyongyang into desperation. With signals from the North that gradual opening was an option, Kim Dae-jung responded with his "Berlin Declaration" laying the groundwork for the June Kim-Kim summit. But what next?

To achieve the goal of durable peace and reunification, South Korea and the West must be prepared to rise at least to the level of strategic and tactical sophistication Kim Jong-il has demonstrated over the past several years. After the past months of frantic diplomatic activity and feel-good meetings, it's time to take stock and insist in hard-nosed manner on effecting the economic changes which provide the best handle on internal change in North Korea. Aid crowds out trade. Freer trade between North and South should gradually replace free hand-outs. Southern investment in the North is required, but should not be state sponsored. Seoul might offer tax incentives for private investment in the North and then let such investment take its course. Pyongyang's blackmail potential must be removed for good. Only then will the Pyongyang controlled opening become real and an answer to Bosworth's question of how the North will manage it (or if it can) will be forthcoming.

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