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  February 1, 2002 atimes.com  

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The clashing perspectives of Iran and US
By Ehsan Ahrari

Iran has resurged as a country about which the United States seems puzzled. Iran has a Janus-faced approach to world affairs - oscillating between political moderation and extremism on various issues of regional and global significance - that is more of an outcome of internal politics than any deliberate attempt to be enigmatic to the outside world.

The continuing tug-and-pull between Iranian hardliners led by the Supreme Leader (Rahbar) Sayed Ali Khamenei and moderates guided by President Sayed Mohammad Khatami is impelling Iran in different directions. Even though the moderates have shown impressive gains at the polls, the hardliners have demonstrated little regard for the "voice of the people", especially since the majority in that country is clamoring for Iran to emerge as a moderate Islamic democracy and become reintegrated into the new economic and political world order. President Khatami, despite his inability to translate his electoral victories into effective public policies aimed at improving the standard of living of his people, continues to remain a ray of hope for the international community that Iran will emerge as a moderate Islamic state in the not too distant future.

The United States remains puzzled about Iran for a variety of reasons, however. Even though Iran condemned the US military actions against Afghanistan, it expressed its willingness to help in the search and rescue of American pilots on its territory in the wake of an air mishap during the military campaign. Iran sealed its borders to ensure against the escape to its territory of al-Qaeda fighters, and remained engaged in the Bonn negotiating process through its active support of a stable post-Taliban government. All these developments signaled to the United States that they could become bases for a rapprochement between the two governments.

But then came intelligence reports that Iranian officials had at least one meeting with Osama bin Laden, exploring the possibility of cooperation. There were also reports that Iran was sheltering al-Qaeda fighters. Iran vehemently denied those reports. Then the Israelis captured a ship, the Karine A, carrying weapons that were allegedly meant for Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Authority (PLA). Omar Akawi, the captain of that ship, claimed that he picked up the arms shipment off Iran's coast in the Persian Gulf. The PLA denied any knowledge or involvement in the affair, as did Iran.

To top it all came the news that Iran has continued its escalated pace of developing Shehab 3 ballistic missiles with Russian help. Shehab 3 is very similar to North Korea's No Dong missile. Iran has long been reported to have a highly active missile development program. The Rumsfeld Commission has fingered the country as a major threat to the United States in a highly touted report issued in 1998. The timing of the report describing the nature of Iranian research and the pace of that research is not at all helpful if Washington and Teheran are to initiate a dialogue for improved ties.

Russia has also been helping Iran in the latter's quest for acquiring nuclear and missile technology, whose stated purpose is "peaceful use". US officials remember only too well that India used precisely the same phrase when it exploded its nuclear device in 1974. Today, India is one of the two recently declared nuclear powers (the other being Pakistan).

Iran's continued high interest in perfecting the development of Shehab 3 ballistic missiles further strengthens the position of the hawks in the Bush administration, who are busily seeking "targets" for the next phase of America's "war" against transnational terrorism. Even though Iran has not been regarded as a "would-be target" anytime in the near future, as is Iraq, the thinking inside the beltway is that pro-Israeli forces are intensely busy making a case against Iran. Given that the hawks of the Bush administration are very sympathetic to the thinking of pro-Israeli elements outside the administration, this meeting of minds may result in, at least initially, an escalated tone of stridency in the US criticism of Iran. Such a development, in turn, will weaken the Khatami forces at the expense of strengthening the arguments frequently posited by the pro-Khamenei groups that the United States has never accepted the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic, and has remained ready and willing to pick a fight with it.

These types of explanation aside, the chances of rapprochement between the United States and Iran are remote for reasons that are part and parcel of their respective self-perceptions in the Persian Gulf region. Iran wants to be a regional power, and most regional powers have indigenous nuclear weapons and missile capabilities. Iran was equally determined to be a major regional player during the days of Reza Shah Pahlevi, except Iranian aspirations then complemented America's own resolve to remain a dominant power in that region. That was why President Richard Nixon had no problem with Iran's becoming a nuclear power.

Under the ayatollahs, Iran is high on the list of America's enemies. As such, Iran's desires to acquire nuclear and missile technologies are heavily couched in the phraseology of "threats" in the United States. And as the dominant global power, the latter will do everything, short of war, to delay (or indefinitely postpone, which is an eminent option) the emergence of a nuclear Iran.

About the only realistic basis for rapprochement from the US viewpoint is for Iran to foreswear the acquisition of missile and nuclear technologies, a highly unrealistic scenario from the Iranian perspective. As long as these two clashing perspectives remained unresolved - and there is no reason to think of any contrary scenarios for now - the United States and Iran will continue to remain far apart, to say the least. Additionally, the very fact that the United States is reported to be considering a permanent presence in Central Asia is likely to create yet another source of irritation between Tehran and Washington.

Dr Ehsan Ahrari is a strategic analyst based in Norfolk, Virginia, US.

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