Asia Times: COMMENTARY: Nuclear Rivals India, Pakistan Hold Key To Peace in 1999



	January 08, 1999	atimes.com

India-Pakistan

COMMENTARY: Nuclear Rivals India, Pakistan Hold Key To Peace in 1999
By Praful Bidwai

NEW DELHI - Deadly adversaries India and Pakistanhold the key to the world's nuclear or non-nuclear future.

Much of what happens in their inimical relationship, and moreimportant, whether the world can at all be free of these mass-destruction weapons, will become clearer in the coming year thanit has been any time in the past decade, even two decades.

If nuclear arms are indeed the horror weapons and instrumentsof mass destruction they are deemed to be, 1998 will go down asanno horribilis for India and Pakistan.

The decision by India and Pakistan to cross the nuclearthreshold in May this year had much more to do with the organiccrisis their societies and political systems face than withgenuine considerations of security.

The decision came on top of tumultous developments over thepast decade or more: the rise of militant, sectarian nationalismin India; declining legitimacy of the two states as they fail tomeet basic obligations to the people; deepening crisis ofgovernability in Pakistan and the failure of democracy to takeroots.

In addition with rampant corruption in both countries, alongwith the persistence of mass poverty, illiteracy and growinghopelessness, the ruling elites' search for shortcuts to high-power status and glory was through military-nuclear routes.

Security concerns were only an excuse for India. In recentyears, until May, India's security environment had improved, notdeteriorated, thanks to major tension-defusion, peace andcooperation agreements with China, and better relations with SriLanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

Nothing in the external environment could justify the suddenjettisoning of long-held doctrines and policies, includingopposition to nuclear deterrence and a commitment to the ideathat nuclear weapons do not produce security.

This disconnect is reflected in the mutually incompatiblerationales proffered for the tests by the right-wing HinduBharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition. These have rangedfrom seeking a shield against nuclear adversaries China andPakistan, to feigned impatience with the Big Five's reluctance todisarm, to simply asserting ''the right'' of one-sixth ofhumanity to nuclear arms (although no such right to food or wateris asserted).

The same incoherence marks India's post-Pokharan-II strategicthinking. New Delhi took six weeks of fumbling and contradictoryposturing before it declared a no-first-use policy. And it wasnot four months after May that it said it only wants a ''credibleminimum deterrent''.

To many questions, there are no coherent answers still fromIndian officials: just what larger diplomatic or politicalobjective do they seek to achieve through the Bomb? What do theyunderstand by a ''minimal'' deterrent, how is that different fromwhat China or France understands? What measures of nuclearrestraint, apart from largely symbolic and quickly reversibleones such as de-alerting of weapons, do they advocate regionallyand globally?

Even on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Indian andPakistani policy-makers have no categorical answers. Some saythey won't sign it in its present form, or unless they getsomething in return. Some say they will sign the treaty as itstands, by September next, if a ''positive'' atmosphere iscreated. But no one quite knows what this means.

More crucially, the Indian establishment is divided on whetherto conduct more tests. According to 'Nucleonics Week', India'sclaimed thermonuclear (H-Bomb) test of May 11 is considered a dudby U.S weapons designers. It did not produce the designed yield.Some Indian nuclear scientists are pressing for at least one moretest.

However, this is sure to be seen as an extremely irresponsibleand defiant act and may attract heavy penalties. It is not clearif the government is ready to face the consequences, rather thando with a fairly rudimentary (but highly destructive) nuclearcapability.

If the Indian and Pakistani governments thought thatnuclearisation would increase their security and add to theirdiplomatic leverage, at least to their prestige, they have beenproved wrong. They have both ended up antagonising theirneighbours and friends, losing face in regional and internationalfora, and attracting flak and admonition from the Non-Alignedstates and U.N bodies, as well as the Great Powers. Economicsanctions have adversely affected both and have hit Pakistanparticularly hard.

Both New Delhi and Islamabad have conducted a bilateraldialogue with Washington on the nuclear issue for six months.They have both been told they should expect economic sanctions tobe lifted only if they sign the CTBT, and agree to restraintmeasures such as non-deployment of weapons in the short run, anda unilateral halt to fissile material production.

Besides, they must cooperate with the U.S and other nuclearweapons-states (NWSs) in limiting global nuclear negotiations toa fissile material cutoff treaty, a minor nuclear restraintmeasure being discussed in Geneva.

Three months ago, India and Pakistan were drafted in to breakthe Non-Aligned Group-21 unity on the FMCT, linking the talks'commencement with the NWSs agreeing to discuss complete nucleardisarmament. This signifies a total reversal of India'straditional role as an advocate of disarmament and peace -- a 50-year-long tradition going back to Mahatma Gandhi. For Pakistan,it has meant a greatly reduced ability to overcome the stigmaattached to it on account of its support to the Taliban inAfghanistan and Islamic extremists in Kashmir.

Pakistan is using an astute negotiating tactic, of trying toconvert its weakness and its present, grim, economic crisis intoa strength: by telling the U.S that pushing it too hard towardsfreezing and reducing its nuclear capability and tighteningsanctions will lead to its collapse -- a highly undesirablesituation. But there are limits beyond which this cannot work.

India and Pakistan now confront each other -- without clearstrategic doctrines, confidence-building measures or transparencyabout each other's nuclear capabilities, intentions or plans.They hold an enormous potential for destruction -- whether bydesign or through accidental, unauthorised or unintended use ofnuclear weapons. Kashmir is only one possible flashpoint wherethis could happen.

The two states face a choice: eliminate that potential, or''manage'' their rivalry. Serious-minded military experts suchas Admiral L. Ramdas, former chief of the Indian Navy, believethat such ''management'' is gravely fraught. ''We have too manytensions, suspicions, and too long a history of strategicmiscalculation for us to be assured that a nuclear confrontationwon't happen,'' he says. ''The only sensible alternative is todefuse the nuclear rivalry and return to the disarmamentagenda."

India and Pakistan -- both with unstable, tottering regimes -- face in 1999 a series of critical choices: should they proceed towards full-scale weaponisation, further cuttingdown on their measly social sector programmes? Where does theirreal security lie? in the false prestige of nuclear weapons or infeeding and educating their people?

How they make these choices will depend as much on domesticpolitical factors as on the international situation. In India, ifa non-BJP party/coalition takes power, as is possible, then aslowing down of nuclear preparations would be likely. This couldopen up new opportunities to negotiate nuclear restraint anddisarmament. Pakistan could then be persuaded to respondfavourably.

Equally important would be the shape of the nuclear debatewithin NATO and in the U.S government. Already, Germany, nowunder Social Democrat-Green rule, has proposed a change of NATOnuclear doctrine in favour of no-first-use. Washington isresisting this. But the U.S elite consensus on nuclear deterrencehas been shattered.

If this leads to a re-opening of the nuclear debate, and if acivil society movement for disarmament develops, then there couldbe a wholly new nuclear ball game at the global level. India andPakistan could then contribute to the nuclear disarmamentmomentum in a positive way.

(Inter Press Service)

asian sex gazette