October 13, 1999	atimes.com

India/Pakistan Hunt for Osama bin Laden intensifies STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update October 12, 1999 Summary: The Taliban government of Afghanistan has reportedly caved in to months of intense pressure from Pakistan and the United States over its support of terrorism. At the same time, the Pakistani government has embarked on a high-profile campaign against Sunni terrorist violence. Both events strongly suggest that a major political effort is underway in the region, one that could clear the way for the capture of the world's most wanted fugitive: Osama bin Laden. Analysis: The London-based Daily Telegraph reported on October 9 that Taliban leader Mullah Omar said this week that the Taliban government is ''ready to cooperate fully with the international community to combat terrorism by vested interests in the name of Islam''. This is an abrupt policy reversal. Until now, figures such as Omar have spoken only in the most general terms about terrorism. And never before has the fundamentalist - and de facto - ruling government of Afghanistan made such a definitive commitment to cooperate with the West in countering terrorism. But the Taliban's new stance is only part of a much broader anti-terrorist campaign emerging in the region. In neighboring Pakistan, the government of Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has blamed terrorists trained in Afghanistan for a wave of sectarian violence. Sunni militants have enjoyed sanctuary in Afghanistan under the Taliban since 1996 and the government has held them responsible for killing about 40 Shiite Muslims across Pakistan over the last two months. As a result, Sharif's government is also striking a new, hard line against Taliban-supported Sunni militants. On October 7, Radio Pakistan announced that Sharif sent the director-general of the Inter-Services Intelligence Service, Gen Khawaja Ziauddin, to Kandahar in southwest Afghanistan to demand the closure of terrorist training camps. Sharif has also begun a high-profile campaign abroad, aimed at pressuring the Taliban to close down the camps. The prime minister and Ziauddin traveled to Dubai on October 11 for talks with UAE leaders on the violence in Pakistan and its relationship to the Afghan camps. Sharif's course of action makes sense: the UAE is one of only three nations, along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, to recognize the Taliban as Afghanistan's official government. By the time of Sharif's trip to the Persian Gulf, however, the Taliban had already announced their intent to counter terrorists. Both events strongly suggest that the actual discussion in Dubai is not centered as much on the Taliban as it is on a particular terrorist, Osama bin Laden. The United States has been increasing pressure on the region to cooperate in the hunt for the man Washington blames for the bombings of its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998. Last month, President Clinton wrote Iranian President Mohammed Khatami to ask for his support in fighting terrorism. Washington has also dangled the prospect of official diplomatic recognition in front of the Taliban in exchange for certain concessions - including the extradition of bin Laden. No regional player, however, has been more vulnerable to US pressure than the Pakistani prime minister, Sharif. The Clinton administration expressed its support publicly - and quite possibly forcefully and privately - for the beleaguered prime minister last month, as rumors of a coup surfaced in Islamabad. [ http://www.stratfor.com/asia/specialreports/special81.htm ] It seems that Sharif is responding to US demands for the arrest of bin Laden. His campaign against terrorism is costing him political support at home, particularly among the Sunni population, which has been a vital constituency. Just last year, Sharif promoted a return to the old Sharia Law. By going after the camps so publicly, Sharif clearly risks an even more violent Sunni backlash. But Sharif and to a similar extent the Taliban can only help create the conditions for bin Laden's capture and extradition; neither can politically afford to be seen taking part in either. Sharif is in far too tenuous a political position at home. The Taliban and most Afghanis regard bin Laden as far more than a terrorist, to them, he is a national hero. With his Saudi wealth, bin Laden helped finance the guerrilla war against the Soviet Union, from 1979 to 1989. Though international recognition is the Taliban's number one priority, snatching bin Laden and turning him over to the United States would be political suicide. There is one other regional player, though, that is feeling the mix of incentive and pressure from the United States and is at liberty to aid in the hunt for bin Laden: Iran. On October 5, US State Department spokesman James Rubin hinted that cooperation against terrorists could lead to an easing of US sanctions against Iran. Iran conceivably has its own score to settle with bin Laden, too. He has supported the Taliban in the civil war against the Iranian-backed factions of the Northern Alliance. And Iran's Shiite population would mourn little for the loss of a Sunni hero. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the Iranian-backed Northern Alliance may be preparing its own campaign on the ground against bin Laden. On September 22, rockets struck a Pakistani village and the Pakistani press reported that the prime suspect was the Taliban. The Taliban rocket attack suggests that the Northern Alliance - with both Iran's and Pakistan's knowledge - has set up inside Pakistan. Significantly, the area is in close proximity, within 25 miles, of bin Laden's suspected hideout. Throughout the region, bin Laden has become much more of a liability than an asset. In many ways he is worth more captured than free. His arrest would appease the United States and forward the interests of the Taliban, Pakistan and most importantly Iran. Within Iran, the lifting of sanctions would strengthen the hand of the moderates in their struggle with conservatives. In the region, Tehran would curry great favor with Saudi Arabia, whose government has constantly been threatened by the bin Laden network. The American-led strategy is not without risk. Sharif is pressing his popular support to the very limit and will have to rely heavily on the military for backing. But a clear pattern is emerging among a disparate cast of actors - the United States, Pakistan, the Taliban, the UAE and Iran - that could lead to the apprehension of the world's most wanted terrorist leader. (c) 1999, Stratfor, Inc. _________________________________ For republication policy contact: STRATFOR, Inc. 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ Email: info@stratfor.com

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