Asia Times: Cowardly generals triggered East Pakistan debacle


	January 06, 2001	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Cowardly generals triggered East Pakistan debacle
By Nadeem Malik in Islamabad

Background note
When British India was partitioned in 1947 the independent nations of India and Pakistan were created.

Almost from the advent of independent frictions developed between East and West Pakistan, which were separated by more than 1,800 kilometers of Indian territory. East Pakistanis in Bengali felt exploited by the West Pakistan-dominated central government. Linguistic, cultural, and ethnic differences also contributed to the estrangement of East from West Pakistan.

Bengalis strongly resisted attempts to impose Urdu as the sole official language of Pakistan. Responding to these grievances, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman - known as Mujib - in 1949 formed the Awami League, a party designed mainly to promote Bengali interests. Mujib became president of the Awami League and emerged as leader of the Bengali autonomy movement. In 1966, he was arrested for his political activities.

After the Awami League won all the East Pakistan seats of the Pakistan national assembly in 1970-71 elections, West Pakistan opened talks with the East on constitutional questions about the division of power between the central government and the provinces, as well as the formation of a national government headed by the Awami League. The talks proved unsuccessful, and on March 1, 1971, Pakistani President Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the pending national assembly session, precipitating massive civil disobedience in East Pakistan.

Mujib was arrested again. His party was banned, and most of his aides fled to India, where they organized a provisional government. On March 26, 1971, following a bloody crackdown by the Pakistan army, Bengali nationalists declared the independent People's Republic of Bangladesh. As fighting grew between the army and the Bengali mukti bahini (freedom fighters), an estimated 10 million Bengalis, mainly Hindus, sought refuge in the Indian states of Assam and West Bengal.

Indian sympathies lay with East Pakistan and in November India intervened on the side of the Bangladeshis. On December 16, 1971, West Pakistani forces surrendered and Bangladesh was born.

Damning report
Lusty, incompetent and cowardly senior West Pakistani army officers led to the East Pakistan debacle in 1971, where a brief show of resistance would have spared them the humiliation of having to surrender.

This is the key finding of the Justice Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report (HRCR) on surrender of (Dhaka), declassified after 30 years.

The report said West Pakistani generals suffered "unprecedented humiliation in the history of Muslim soldiers," and ordered court martial of the entire top brass, including General Yahya Khan, then President of Pakistan. This never happened.

According to the report, between 73,000 and 93,000 West Pakistani soldiers and officers were stationed at the Eastern Command at the time of surrender on December 16, 1971.

They could have held out for a few weeks longer, especially as the United Nations Security Council was discussing a resolution on the issue at the time. Peaceful resolution of the conflict would have saved the army from ignominy and public humiliation.

The commission found that that the military leadership was engaged in immoral activities, in minting money, acquiring property and grabbing land.

The report listed a number of instances where senior officers were engaged in womanizing, drinking and other immoral activities at the crucial time that Indians in league with the mukti bahini were entering Dhaka. The Commission concluded that the moral degeneration resulted in indecision, cowardice and professional incompetence.

"There should be no compromise on moral values, the syllabuses for military academies and other services should include courses designed to inculcate in the young minds respect for religious, democratic and political institutions. Drinking should be prohibited in army messes and serious notice should be taken of notorious sexual behavior and other corrupt practices, and all military offices should submit a declaration of their assets," the Commission recommended.

It also suggested the establishment of an Inspector-General, such as the one in America, to carry out surprise inspections and to check on units to see whether they are fit for war.

The Commission added: "We have not been able to escape the conclusion that General Yahya allowed the country to blunder into a war from which no good result could be expected and to continue in the course of his obstinate conduct merely because he would not, at any cost, agree to a political solution of the country's troubles and finally to permit, even instigate, a surrender."

General Yahya and his generals were found to be corrupt to the core and to be shamelessly addicted to wine, women and amassing of personal wealth.

The HRCR investigations questioned the role of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, founder and Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party, who "displayed a lack of political insight by failing to make a proper assessment of the intensity of the reaction likely to be created in East Pakistan to the postponement of the date of the national assembly".

"We have not been able to understand on what democratic and parliamentary principle could Mr Bhutto demand that the Awami League should enter into a compromise or make concessions before the meeting of the national assembly."

The report made strong observations about the military's interference in finding political solutions, foreshadowing, perhaps, the present military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan.

"There can also be no doubt that the military action could not bring about any solution of the problem. Political problems do not admit to anything but political solutions, and it should have been apparent to General Yahya Khan and his advisers that a military solution could not be enforced against one's own people. The general, we regret to say, was insensible to the need of any solution. Politically, East Pakistan was, of course, almost lost the day military action was launched."

The report also made strong observations about the then National Security Council (NSC), similar to the present NSC, which is today viewed as a permanent forum to ensure a continued military role in the future political set up of the country.

"Having examined the working of the National Security Council, we are of the opinion that there is no need for superimposing such an organization over the directorate of the Intelligence Bureau and the directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence. The NSC should be abolished," recommended the report.

Regarding alleged atrocities in East Pakistan, the Commission said excesses were committed on the people of East Pakistan, although the degree and estimates put forward by Dhaka authorities were "highly colored and exaggerated".

The commission held 57 sittings and spoke to 213 people, including serving and retired personnel of the armed forces, political leaders, civil servants, journalists and members of the public. The commission submitted its main report to the President of Pakistan on 12 July 1972. On the return of East Pakistani prisoners taken during the of war, the commission recorded the additional evidence of 72 people. Its supplementary report was submitted to the Prime Minister on 25 November 1974.

Parts of the report relating to foreign policy issues have not been declassified due to international sensitivities.

(Special to Asia Times Online)