Asia Times: America casts long shadow over summit


	July 12, 2001	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

America casts long shadow over summit
By Sultan Shahin

NEW DELHI - Despite the best efforts by the United States to stay invisible, its behind-the-scenes presence in this weekend's India-Pakistan summit in Agra is manifest.

To start with, although officially it has no role to play, Washington is widely believed to have pressured Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee into inviting President Pervez Musharraf for talks, with the Pakistani leader even stating as much.

Pakistani officials have, however, "clarified" his comment as being untrue, and their Indian counterparts have angrily dismissed the allegation out of hand. Indeed, there might not have been direct US pressure on Vajpayee to invite Musharraf, but the possibility of greater US involvement in the region, in a situation where India and Pakistan are not able to solve their problems bilaterally, may have weighed heavily upon the Indian leadership.

Also worrisome for India must be the categorical Kashmiri view, as expressed recently by Ghulam Nabi Fai, the Washington representative of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), that "only the United States can midwife a Kashmir solution". The Hurriyat is an alliance of more than 26 political, social and religious organizations formed as a political front to further the cause of Kashmiri separatism.

India's concern is outlined by an American analyst and South Asia expert, Stephen Cohen, in a report for India's largest-circulated weekly newsmagazine, India Today. A former consultant in the administration of George Bush (Sr), Cohen is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington.

He says, "From Washington's perspective, the summit announcement came as a welcome surprise, but there are few expectations of a breakthrough. Should the dialogue falter, there will be a more activist American role in the region, a step that would be welcomed by Pakistan but not India. Ironically, this may be the most important incentive for a more forthcoming Indian policy."

Former Indian premier I K Gujral appears surprised at Cohen's remarks that Vajpayee's invitation "was realpolitik, not kindness", that his motive was "to pre-empt any American attempt to serve as a regional peacemaker, and there were reports that the Bush Administration intended to mount such an effort, albeit a modest one". Gujral writes in an article in the Hindu, "If true, this is a very significant revelation. In Cohen's view, 'resumption of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue that was abruptly broken off by Pakistan's bold but misguided military action in Kashmir two years ago' is a positive development, though it is an amusing irony that the same General Musharraf [who] was the leading advocate of the bloody 11-week military confrontation in the icy heights of Kashmir's Kargil region now sits in the seat of power and his perspective has changed dramatically."

Gujral continues, "Cohen is a highly merited academic. He has been writing about Indo-Pakistan relations for nearly three decades. He now says 'that the Indo-Pak summit [is] again on track'. Over the years he has believed that the United States has an important role in the Indo-Pakistan imbroglio even though 'the relationship between the United States and India and Pakistan is complex'. A comprehensive policy review is currently under way by the Bush administration."

"As is known, this leading power in the 'complex relationship' has been carefully watching India's nuclear development, though not so much that of Pakistan. The American policymakers spared no effort to make us sign the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] and conform to the NPT [Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the missile disciplines. In this context, Cohen had been suggesting that the 'route to India's denuclearization passed through Kashmir'. Notwithstanding Pokhran-II, this proposition continues to impress the US policymakers.

"Whatever be the fate of the Indo-Pakistan dialogue, Cohen asks the Bush administration to understand that 'a reinvigorated peace process will demand more rather than less high level attention from Capitol Hill and the White House [who] should see in it an opportunity to deepen its engagement in South Asia first by strengthening its ties with India and Pakistan respectively and then by ensuring that these talks are followed by substantive progress on linked problems of Afghanistan, Kashmir and the threat of regional nuclear war'."

Obviously, Indian paranoia about third-party mediation in the resolution of the Kashmir conflict has not lessened despite the newfound warmth in Indo-US ties.

Which country is under greater US pressure to behave at the summit on Sunday is a subject of great speculation in the subcontinent. India believes the US pressure is greater on Pakistan. Manoj Joshi, an analyst with The Times of India, for instance, comments, "US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's remarks on India and Pakistan may underscore the growing distance between Pakistan and the US. But they are also being seen as a somewhat blunt hint to Pakistan to behave. Armitage not only declared that the US would not treat India and Pakistan equally in the matter of lifting sanctions, but maintained that the past US proximity to Pakistan was built on relatively false premises." He said that while the US had "a lot going" with multi-religious and democratic India, with Pakistan "we lack that commonality".

Indulging in what he calls informed speculation, Joshi forwards the following circumstantial evidence for the US involvement. Following the announcement of the summit, top Indian and Pakistani officials visited Washington and met senior US counterparts. In mid-June, Pakistan Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar met US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Armitage and assured them of Pakistan's desire to talk peace with India and crack down on terrorism. Later, Vajpayee's principal secretary was in Washington where he met with State Department officials, as well as Vice President Richard Cheney, National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice and CIA director George Tenet.

Commenting on the China, North Korea and Afghanistan factors in US-Pakistan relations, Joshi concludes, "With its continuing estrangement with the US, Pakistan now faces an uphill struggle to gain international support for its position. The depth of the US anger over Pakistan's links with the Taliban as well as with North Korea has been clearly expressed to Sattar. Unstated are US concerns over the Chinese role in building a port at Gwadar, proximate to the strategic Persian Gulf. Though Pakistan gains an enormous deal from its close relationship with China, it cannot but be worried about the unrelenting attitude of the world's only remaining superpower."

Indeed, in a recent interview published in the The Hindu newspaper, Armitage said, "For years we had an unbalanced policy in South Asia and people would look at it superficially and say we had a great relationship with Pakistan, but it was in a way a false relationship because in the first instance it was built against the India-Soviet Union axis and then latterly it was against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. So we didn't have a policy for Pakistan; we had a policy with Pakistan directed against something else; what we are desirous of is for our Pakistani friends to try and develop a relationship about Pakistan ..."

The reaction from Capitol Hill has been equally discordant for Islamabad. Senator Paul Wellstone, Democrat from Minnesota, said during the confirmation hearing of Wendy Chamberlin, the Ambassador-designate to Pakistan, "A long-time friend, Pakistan may now be in need of some tough love. The next ambassador to Pakistan will have to convey a strong message about America's commitment not only to nuclear nonproliferation but also to democratic values, human rights and opposition to Taliban-inspired militancy. The decision of Musharraf to anoint himself president is surely a troubling development." Chamberlin said she would take the senator's remarks as instructions to the next envoy to Islamabad.

A major reason why the United States is so keenly interested in promoting India-Pakistan dialogue is that the two countries are now declared nuclear-weapon powers and the US, of course, wants to reserve the "right" to use nuclear weapons to itself. In fact, a recent publication of the Stimson Center, "The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia", argues that India and Pakistan face far greater difficulties in establishing nuclear safety and stability than other nuclear-weapon states. In his contributory piece, Michael Krepon wrote, "If India and Pakistan are to demonstrate a superior wisdom that resists ever-increasing nuclear capabilities, they must first demonstrate a superior wisdom to reduce nuclear risks."

Sridhar Krishnaswami, the Washington correspondent of the widely read Indian magazine Frontline, comments, "If Kashmir is going to be the core issue as far as Musharraf is concerned and if Pakistan hopes somehow to rope in the US into the scheme of things, it is not going to work. At the same time, although the word 'mediation' is anathema to India, the US may be interested in impressing upon the two sides to take note of any ideas and suggestions it may have. In any event, the way in which the Bush administration goes about this business is bound to be marked by extreme caution."

Krishnaswami adds that in his confirmation hearing, American ambassador-designate to India Robert Blackwill said, "We are not going to mediate in this dispute. But if we can be helpful and both sides want us to be helpful, then I think we should be. In the end, they are going to have to find a way to resolve this issue, hopefully peacefully, between them."

If there is one thing that is working in India's "favor", says Krishnaswami, it is the Bush administration's assessment of terrorism, especially the cross-border variety. Of late, the United States has been extremely concerned about the terrorist menace on Pakistan's borders, which has implications not only for the region but also the entire world. Islamabad's relationship with the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan has not gone down well with the US politically. US lawmakers have wasted no time in slamming Pakistan for not doing enough to rein in the Islamic fundamentalist leaders, who are harboring Osama bin Laden, wanted in the US for international terrorism.

And over the past two years Indian officials have done well to impress upon the US administration the meaning of India's stance that there can be no talks unless there is a let up in terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir. Gujral appears to agree. Two of the three anxieties that trouble Washington policymakers, he points out, are nuclear proliferation and Afghanistan. India and the US are even otherwise engaged in discussing various aspects of New Delhi's nuclear weapons program. But the Taliban adventures in Afghanistan and adjoining countries of Central Asia cause deep concern to the near and distant neighbors.

Gujral points out some other factors that should worry Musharraf: "The formation of the Shanghai Five [now six] was jointly initiated by China and Russia to manifest this uneasiness. Despite China's leading role in the forum, Pakistani pleadings for membership have not been heeded. Four member states - Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan [apart from Russia and China] believe that Pakistan is the bedrock of the Jehadi intrusions into their countries. The Pakistani policymakers, it seems, have not yet taken note of the Moscow meeting of the Shanghai forum that has brought to the fore the growing camaraderie in Sino-Russian relations. Together they feel that the Taliban-abetted disturbances in the Central Asian states tend to flow in their directions too. The forum may not have said so, but surely they know that the fountainhead of the trouble is not confined to Afghanistan."

What does the US expect from the summit? Assuming neither side commits a misstep, these are the possibilities, according to Stephen Cohen:

a) Musharraf and Vajpayee will not change fundamental positions on Kashmir but they will agree to further talks. Since Indians believe Pakistan's weakness brought Musharraf to the summit and Pakistanis believe that pressure on India made Vajpayee invite their president, there is no basis for a long-term negotiation that is not shadowed by the threat of force.

b) The two will take steps to ease the plight of the Kashmiris, including another ceasefire, more movement of Kashmiris across the border, reduced flow of weapons and extremists from Pakistan and the softening of the heavyhanded approach of Indian forces in Kashmir.

c) The problem lies in verifying that such steps have been taken. An independent, non-governmental citizen's commission, possibly including foreigners, should be set up to assure both sides that agreements reached are being implemented.

d) There is likely to be agreement on several confidence-building measures in the area of nuclear policy. Whether these are faithfully implemented is another matter. The US has some ideas on how they might be verified and US officials will be standing by with suggestions.

e) Musharraf and Vajpayee will resurrect or expand several earlier agreements. The Siachen Agreement, sabotaged by then Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi in 1989, could be revived and will be a template for the reduction in forces along the Line of Control. There are other unimplemented agreements concerning trade, the exchange of scholars and free movement between the two countries, some of which might be revived. However, special interest groups are likely to prevent their implementation.

Despite all of this speculation in the media, Washington continues to maintain a studied silence, probably giving South Asia its last chance to sort out its problems by itself. While Pakistan may not be as averse to Uncle Sam's entry into the arena as India is, it is no longer as enamored of the prospect either.

Therein lies the possibility that it may cooperate with India in finding a lasting solution to the Kashmir dispute and other problems bedeviling the region and impeding its progress in an age when most regions in the world are concentrating on finding new avenues of increasing their prosperity through mutual cooperation.

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