Asia Times: Pakistan rethink over support of militants


	December 20, 2001	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Pakistan rethink over support of militants
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - Last week's attack on the Indian parliament building in New Delhi - widely blamed on terrorists trained in Pakistan - is the latest turn of events to add to Islamabad's troubles.

Pakistan now has an essentially unfriendly neighbor across the 1,300 kilometers of the border its shares with Afghanistan, and most of the military and strategic objectives that caused the United States to woo Islamabad in the war against terrorism have been achieved.

Immediately after the attack in New Delhi, in which five terrorists and eight Indian security force members died, the Indian government blamed Kashmiri militants. Subsequently, it has pointed the finger at the Pakistani-based Lashkar-i-Taiba (Army of the Pure) as responsible for the attack, with Indian Home Minister L K Advani on Tuesday repeating the accusation in parliament.

India has now given Pakistan a deadline of a few days to close down the offices of the Lashkar-i-Taiba as well as the Jaish-i-Mohammed, another militant group, and warned of "dire consequences" if it does not. Delhi says that these two groups are based in Pakistan and receive training and support from the country's intelligence service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Islamabad denies this, saying that India has provided no evidence to support its allegations, and says that it "will not be intimidated".

India has seized the opportunity launch a diplomatic initiative to push its contention that the separatist struggle being waged in Kashmir is actually terrorism. The Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba are Islamic groups fighting to separate the mostly Muslim region of Kashmir from India.

Following India's warning, the Pakistani military leadership under President General Pervez Musharraf called urgent meetings at which it was concluded that Pakistan would not bow down to the Indian demands as such a move would demoralize the military struggle in Kashmir, which has engaged several thousand Indian forces in the Kashmiri Valley. Musharraf has also warned that any "adventurism" on the part of india in response to the attacks would be firmly resisted.

However, sources say that Pakistan's strategic planners are concerned over how the United States will react to this hard line as Washington has already branded the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the group from which it separated, the Harkatul Mujahideen, as terrorist organizations, and many US publications, thanks to Indian lobbyists in America, are promoting the idea that these organizations have strong links with Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terror network.

So, once again, just as it was urged by the United States to turn its back on the Taliban in Afghanistan, which it had nurtured over the years, Pakistan is caught between the devil and the deep blue sea over how it handles the militant groups in the country.

While the war in Afghanistan was still raging, the United States was prepared to let Pakistan, its frontline ally, handle the militant organizations as it saw fit. The situation might be different now with Pakistan's usefulness exhausted.

The US has succeeded in having an acceptable interim leadership installed in Kabul, it has fostered strong relations in the Pashtun belt in the east of Afghanistan and its forces have established a strong presence in the Central Asian republics. Within Afghanistan, they have secured key airports, so they no longer need Pakistani airbases, a key reason for courting Musharraf in the first place.

Indeed, the US is likely now to turn on Pakistan, forcing it to take action against senior Taliban leaders - possibly including bin Laden - who are thought to be sheltering in the semi-autonomous Pakistani tribal areas. And there will be pressure to take action against pro-Taliban leaders in the tribal belt to nip any possible revival of the Taliban movement in the bud.

All of this could force Islamabad to rethink its Kashmir policy. The Kashmiri struggle was connected to the Afghan war against the Soviets of 1979-89 in that the struggle for an independent state was converted into a jihad so that foreign mujahideen fighters would join locals in trying to force India to give Kashmiris the right to self-determination.

This policy could now backfire on Pakistan. The Kashmiri uprising in Indian Kashmir began in 1989. The ISI, then under the command of General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, started making a case for a Kashmiri jihad in the mid-1980s. Rehman was subsequently elevated to the position of chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. He died in an air crash that also killed military dictator General Zia ul-Haq, on August 17, 1988.

Kashmiris have been fighting for self-determination ever since the partition of British India in 1947, when, despite the fact of a majority Muslim population, the region was incorporated into India with the permission of the maharajah of the state. The rulers of princely states had been given the choice to freely accede to either India or Pakistan, or to remain independent.

After skirmishes in previous years, heavy fighting broke out again in 1965 between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. A ceasefire was established in September 1965. Indian prime minister Lal Bhadur Shastri and Pakistani president M Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent agreement on January 1, 1966. They resolved to try to end the dispute by peaceful means. However, it was at this time that the Kashmiri leadership decided that they would fight for their own fate, with one possible option being an independent state ruled by Kashmiris, whether they be Sikhs, Hindus or Muslims.

Rehman subsequently prepared the grounds to convert this struggle into a jihad. The leadership of the Jamu Kashmir Libration Front were declared traitors in Pakistan, and the ISI promoted the Jamaat-i-Islami, which had a strong network in Indian Kashmir, to be the main force for the Kashmir jihad.

Thus, the plan was that as soon as the Afghan jihad had successfully seen off the Soviets, mujahideen would pour into Kashmir, and as with Afghanistan, Islamic countries would lend their support. Rehman did not survive to see his plans come to fruition though. He was succeeded as head of the ISI by Hamid Gul, who adopted the same policy approach.

During the Afghan resistance struggle, three Pakistani-based militant organizations fought alongside Afghan groups - the Al-Badr, the Harkatul Mujahideen and the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad. Al Badr was an off-shoot of the Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan, the premier fundamentalist party in the country and the real force behind the Afghan resistance movement. The Harkatul Mujahideen was affiliated with Islamic seminaries of the Deobandi school of thought, and the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad was connected with the wahabi school of thought.

All three of these organizations were given a role to promote a militant struggle in Kashmir, with the Al-Badr playing a pivotal role. Initially, the Jamaat-i-Islami helped fire the spirit of the Kashmir jihad among youths, who were then sent to Afghanistan for training and fighting experience.

The Al-Badr organized their training at Khost. Later, the youths were organized under the banner of the Hizbul Mujahideen, which was a purely Kashmiri-based militant organization ideologically affiliated with the Jamaat-i-Islami, and which wanted Kashmir's accession into Pakistan. This proved to be a successful formula and laid the foundations for the struggle that continues today.

However, the Harkatul Mujahideen failed to attract mass support in Kashmir Islamic seminaries and thus was unable to organize an effective indigenous movement. The Harkat, therefore, continued to train Pakistani youths to send to Kashmir, and its chief is a Pakistani. Because of its Pakistani flavor and its vocal opposition to the US presence in Pakistan, the US listed it as a terrorist organization.

Before this declaration, it had renamed itself the Harkatul Ansar. As a result, the US banned the "Harktul Ansar". So, soon after the US announcement, it reverted to the Harkatul Mujahideen and continued its operations. A breakaway faction of the Harkat is the Jaish-i-Mohammed, which is also included on the US terror list.

Splits also occurred in the Markaz-i-Dawat-u-Irshad, leading to the establishment of the Lashkar-i-Taiba. The purpose was to get financial aid from Saudi Arabia because the Lashkar came from the wahabi school of thought. But since there are almost no wahabi influences in Kashmir, they have failed to organize an indigenous movement and are seen as foreign infiltrators.

Now, the Jaish-i-Mohammed and the Lashkar-i-Taiba have been thrust into the limelight. Clearly, they are not indiginous movements, and their senior leaders are all Pakistani. In the past, when these objections were raised, the Pakistani government took a strong stand that a jihad is a part of Islam, and any Muslim wanting to join in one could not be stopped by Pakistan.

Given recent events, though, Pakistan will find it difficult to stick with this policy.

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