Asia Times: Pakistan: Let the people (really) decide


	April 10, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

COMMENT
Pakistan: Let the people (really) decide
By Ahmad Faruqui

Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf has shown his true colors by calling for a national referendum in May. If he wins, he will stay on as president until October 12, 2007, fully eight years after he came to power in a coup d'etat that deposed the democratically elected government of prime minister Nawaz Shariff.

Musharraf has discovered that Pakistan's deep-rooted problems of sectarianism, corruption and narco-terrorism cannot be easily remedied by October, the time given to him by the Supreme Court for holding national elections. On this issue there is no argument. Where Musharraf's referendum ploy invites argument is the assertion by the president that only he is capable of tackling these structural problems and of instituting much-needed economic reforms.

In a wide-ranging and rambling speech on Friday, he recounted the many achievements of his administration, and then went on to lay out his political vision for the future of Pakistan. Saying that he was "not power-hungry" and that he wanted to bring "real" democracy to the people of Pakistan, Musharraf told the nation that the referendum was needed to ensure the continuity the seven-point reform agenda he had instituted soon after taking over as Pakistan's chief executive two and a half years ago.

In words reminiscent of Field Marshal Ayub Khan, Pakistan's first military ruler, he reminded them that the British model of democracy was ill-suited to Pakistan's environment. In the early 1960s, Ayub concluded that the Westminster model "did not suit the genius" of the people of Pakistan.

Musharraf is determined to create a system that will ensure that democracy is not "derailed" in the future. By implying that civilians had derailed democracy, he overlooks the obvious fact that it was the military - and not the civilian governments - that had derailed democracy. The very abundance of coups in Pakistan has given rise to a whole cottage industry of academics that specialize in recidivist militarism.

Another military ruler, General Zia ul-Haq, who seized power in 1977, never tired of saying that Pakistan's future lay in democracy. Several years into his rule, he decided to hold a referendum to legitimize his position. The electorate was asked to say whether Zia's reforms were in conformity with the injunctions of Islam, and "yes" answers were interpreted as an endorsement of Zia's rule, so he would continue as president.

Lost on Zia was the irony that he was posing this Orwellian question quite appropriately in the year 1984. As expected, voter turnout was abysmal, not even reaching 10 percent, according to most independent observers. Rumors persisted that government workers and employees of semi-autonomous corporations were asked to send in their responses through their departmental heads, to ensure that enough "yes" votes came in.

Well aware of the criticism that yet another referendum would invite from the world community, Musharraf has gone to great pains to talk about Pakistan's unique circumstances and poor track record with parliamentary democracy. He has tried to fend off his critics by saying that they do not understand Pakistan's unique socioeconomic and political realities, forgetting that South Asians living in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka have practiced democracy under very similar conditions.

The secretary general of the Commonwealth of Nations has condemned Musharraf's decision to hold the referendum, as has the 15-party Alliance for Restoration of Democracy in Pakistan. Even the three leading religious parties - whose leaders often disagree so vehemently from each other that they won't pray together - have joined forces. Editorial writers of all persuasions have eloquently penned their opposition in the nation's leading dailies. A former chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, Justice Sajjad Ali Shah, has stated categorically that while questions of national importance can always be put forth to the electorate, a presidential election cannot be held by referendum in view of the Supreme Court judgment directing the holding of national elections this October.

An embarrassed White House, which has been singing praises to the general since he offered unstinted cooperation in the war against terrorism, has said that the legitimacy of the referendum is a matter on which the courts in Pakistan will need to rule upon.

Undeterred, because he is "a soldier who knows how to take risks", the general has launched a 20-city whistle-stop tour. In his stump speech he is distancing himself from the two former premiers by saying that he is not going to deceive the people of Pakistan, and that he is not a hypocrite. "Trust me because I am an honest soldier" has been a signature line of Musharraf's from the outset.

In his speech after the coup, he reminded the nation that "your armed forces have never let you down", conveniently forgetting the dark episode of 1971 that led to mayhem in the former East Pakistan, and ultimately to its secession as Bangladesh after India administered a resounding defeat to the Eastern Garrison of the Pakistani army. In subsequent meetings, he has been known to say that he did not engineer the coup that brought him to power.

Like a schoolboy who has been thrown by his classmates into the pool, he had to learn to swim in a hurry. Just as he begins his electoral swing, he has found it expedient to say that he is above seeking votes in an election and has no ambition to enter into politics.

One of the more ominous features of Musharraf's vision for Pakistan is the creation of a higher authority known as the National Security Council. Patterned after the Turkish organization of the same name, this would have executive powers in order to ensure the continuity of his seven-point agenda. Musharraf, whose childhood was spent in Turkey, is an ardent admirer of the Turkish general Mustafa Kamal Pasha, no great icon of democracy. Musharraf provided few details about the National Security Council in his address to the nation, except to state in true regal fashion that "people will be informed when we decide about it ... first we will make up our own mind and then your views will be invited ..."

Seeking to differentiate himself from the run-of-the-mill politician, Musharraf has reminded the people of Pakistan that he was a soldier who believed in the unity of command. "I believe that there should be one authority to run things rightly." Recognizing that in the parliamentary setup that is spelled out in Pakistan's constitution the premier is the chief executive, Musharraf said that he as the president would retain the power to ensure that the prime minister "dares not undo what I have said ... he dare not reverse the reforms agenda ... I cannot allow him to manipulate institutions". In other words, Musharraf would reign as a post-modern sovereign, one who had the support of the electorate through a referendum.

There are several things that are discordant in this vision, but the most important one is that a general in uniform is expected to lead armies, not nations. Even during the five centuries of the Roman republic, its consuls were elected on an annual basis. During times of military emergency, dictators were elected by the Roman senate for a six-month term. Augustus Caesar put an end to this practice when he had himself declared imperium proconsulare maius (control over the provinces and the army) and tribunicia potestas (personal inviolability and the right to veto the actions of other lawmakers) for life, thereby acquiring complete control of the state, which contributed to the end of the Roman republic.

Musharraf, a keen student of military history with a forward-looking vision for Pakistan, knows that it is not in the national interest to have two parallel regimes in existence, a military one and a civilian one. In the 21st century, Pakistan stands to gain little from becoming "an army with a state", like 19th-century Prussia. He knows only too well that Pakistan needs a strong military and that the fine soldiers of the Pakistani army need the time and attention that only a full-time chief can provide.

It would be best if he stepped down from his military position and contested the elections as any other candidate in a democratic country. The examples of former generals Dwight Eisenhower and Charles de Gaulle come to mind. As with other "war heroes", there is a strong probability that Musharraf would win. The events of September 11 have given him unparalleled visibility both at home and abroad.

To his credit, the general comes across as a man of integrity and exudes a natural flair at press conferences. He has shown flexibility and dexterity in his dealings with foreign heads of state. But he should realize that it would demean his character and his effectiveness, if not his place in history, if he continues to rule Pakistan through the back door for another five years.

The second-best option would be to hold a different type of referendum. This would not ask the question whether the people want Musharraf to continue as president for another five years. It should instead ask: Do the people empower Musharraf to modify the constitution outside of the due process enshrined in the constitution? If the answer is yes, Musharraf should then proceed to amend the constitution, allowing for a presidential referendum to be held.

Finally, there is the least desirable of the acceptable options. If he and his formation commanders are convinced of the absolute necessity of creating a National Security Council, they should limit its functions to those of an oversight body. It should discretely monitor abuses by the executive and bring them to the attention of the courts if conditions warrant. If the normal checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government have indeed broken down, the council should be empowered to dissolve the legislature and arrange for elections within 90 days. During such time, the head of the Supreme Court should be asked to lead the country. The very existence of such a bitter pill would keep rogue governments in line, preventing the need to swallow it.

It is a uniquely Pakistani tragedy that for half its history it has been ruled by the army. Each military ruler has had his stay legitimized by the Supreme Court during his tenure. The apex court has cited Hans Kelsen's "Doctrine of Necessity" every time, to state that necessity often makes legal what is otherwise illegal. Not surprisingly, once the military ruler has been deposed, as all of them ultimately are, the same institution has used choice diction to brand the former ruler as a "usurper" or as an individual "who treated the nation like his chattel".

((c)2002 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact ads@atimes.com for information on our sales and syndication policies.)