Asia Times: 'Towards the imagined haven of Eelam'


	April 12, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

'Towards the imagined haven of Eelam'
By Sudha Ramachandran

BANGALORE - The Sri Lankan government and representatives of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are expected to begin talks in May in Thailand toward a political settlement of the ongoing conflict in the island. While the armed struggle has raged for close on 19 years, its beginnings go back much further to the political and economic marginalizing of Tamils by a Sinhalese-dominated political establishment.

Sri Lanka is a multiethnic and multireligious society. Broadly speaking, the conflict is ethnic: between Sinhalese and Tamils, the island's two major ethnic groups. While Sinhalese constitute 78 percent of the population, Tamils, who are a significant minority island-wise, are in majority in the north and east of the island. Both communities are divided along religion, caste, regional and political lines.

The LTTE has been fighting for the creation of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in the northern and eastern provinces of the island. This is unacceptable to the government. Nineteen years of fighting has resulted in the loss of more than 60,000 lives. The economy is in bad shape and it is unlikely that either side can win through military means.

The key question, therefore, becomes whether the conflict can be resolved at the negotiating table. It can if the two sides are willing to compromise and scale down their demands. Contrary to what hardliners on both sides of the ethnic divide might say, the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict is not visceral or atavistic, as is the one in the Balkans, for instance.

Sections in Sri Lanka describe the conflict as historic. They point to the frequent clashes between Tamil and Sinhalese kings. However, these were really instances of political rivalry between dynasties. The conflict as it exists today dates from independence from Britain in 1948.

While certain processes during colonial rule contributed to the present situation, post-independence developments set in motion the entrenchment of Sinhalese interests in the state and in the economy at the expense of Tamils. At independence, it did seem that the Sri Lankan state would reflect the multiethnic nature of its society. However, such accommodation was short-lived.

The first blow was dealt to Indian Tamils (distinct from Tamils who reside in the north and east, Indian Tamils are descendants of indentured labor brought from India to work on the island's tea estates) when legislation denying them citizenship and voting rights was enacted in 1948-49. Their representation in parliament fell and Sinhalese representation gained directly. Other moves to weaken Tamil representation included the government-sponsored settling of Sinhalese in Tamil areas, resulting in the redrawing of electoral constituencies and gerrymandering. As Tamil representation in the legislature fell, the capacity of Tamil political parties to influence legislation affecting Tamil interests was obviously reduced.

While the marginalizing of the minorities was set in motion in 1948-49, the Sinhalization of the state gathered momentum in the 1950s when Sri Lanka witnessed the competitive chauvinism of the two main Sinhalese-dominated parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Having their strongholds among the Sinhalese, these parties tried to outbid each other as champions of Sinhala-Buddhism to woo the voters.

In December 1955, S W R D Bandaranaike, leader of the opposition SLFP, promised that if elected he would declare Sinhala as the only official language within 24 hours of assuming office. In the prevailing revivalist atmosphere, the populist "Sinhala Only" slogan was a vote-catcher. Bandaranaike was swept to power. The results indicated that a landslide win was possible by appealing exclusively to the Sinhalese voter. All Sinhalese-dominated parties, including the left, quickly jumped on to the bandwagon.

Sinhala as the only official language meant that government servants were required to know Sinhala or learn it within a stipulated time. The policy was a severe blow to Tamils, for whom the civil service was a main source of employment. In 1956, Tamils held 30 percent of the jobs in the administrative services. By 1975, that had fallen to 5 percent.

The entrenchment of Sinhalese interests in the political system and in the bureaucracy was taken a step further when in 1972 a new constitution sanctioned Sinhala as the official language and accorded Buddhism the "foremost place". Besides ignoring Tamil demands for a federal system, the unitary structure of the state was retained.

Alongside the political marginalization of the Tamils was the economic neglect of Tamil areas. Political power in Sinhalese hands was used to further Sinhalese economic interests and in the state-run economic system that existed until 1977, Tamil economic interests were ignored. Industrial development of the north and east was neglected; even projects that might have been more profitable in the Tamil areas were set up in the Sinhalese areas in the south. Since recruitment in the public sector and credit worthiness depended on political influence, Tamils did not get jobs or loans. While economic liberalization did improve things to some extent for Tamils, this was really only the case with Tamils residing in Colombo.

The economic problems confronting the Tamils might have been less severe had there been greater decentralization of decision making in Sri Lanka. Unfortunately, this was not so. While the possibility of Tamil political parties forming a government at the center was remote, the unitary constitution and centralization of power together with the rejection of Tamil demands for autonomy by successive regimes meant that Tamils had no say or influence at any level over issues that affected them.

However, it was the repeated use of the coercive apparatus of the state against the Tamils that deepened their alienation most dramatically. The involvement of the state in mass violence against Tamils, the promulgation of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act and the use of an undisciplined and overwhelmingly Sinhalese army to quell Tamil civilian disturbances strengthened Tamil perceptions of the state as oppressive. It strengthened their feeling of "collective suffering" and as S J Tambiah, a reputed scholar on the conflict wrote, this pushed Tamils "towards the imagined haven of Eelam and towards a blanket ethnic solidarity".

Significantly, the state as it evolved in Sri Lanka, alienated not only the Tamils but also the rural, lower middle-class youth among the Sinhalese as well. Despite the Sinhalization of the state and economy, the system did not accommodate this section of Sinhalese. The political power structure, though dominated by Sinhalese, remained the preserve of the middle-aged, the propertied and the professional elite. The economic crisis among the rural lower middle class was severe.

As in the case of the Tamils, this section among the Sinhalese became alienated from the state, mainstream politics and the traditional political parties. They believed change would be possible only through the barrel of the gun. In 1971, a radical group of Sinhalese youth, the Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP - People's Liberation Front) led an armed insurrection against the state. The insurrection was brutally crushed.

The crisis among the Tamils was far more acute. In addition to the kind of discontent the Sinhalese youth felt with the government, the Tamils also faced ethnic discrimination. Moreover, all sections of Tamil society felt alienated, giving the Tamils' protest wider backing from society.

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