Asia Times: Selective roots to Tamil nationalism


	April 18, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Selective roots to Tamil nationalism
By Sudha Ramachandran

'Towards the imagined haven of Eelam'

BANGALORE - For several decades, the Sri Lankan Tamils articulated their grievances through moderate and constitutional methods of protest. When these failed to bear fruit, they were forced to adopt armed struggle and to opt for extreme solutions, including the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam.

The changing self-perception of the Tamils over the years has influenced their demands. From seeing themselves as part of the larger Tamil population of the subcontinent, they switched in the 19th century to viewing themselves as a community distinct from the Tamils across the Palk Strait in India. That changed to a self-perception that they were part of Sri Lanka's plural society and one of its two main ethnic groups. Anti-Tamil policies post-independence led to the Tamils perceiving themselves as a nation, distinct from that of the Sinhalese. State-sponsored settlement of Sinhalese in Tamil areas raised the issue of the Tamil homeland while anti-Tamil violence underscored the significance of this homeland as a refuge.

The Tamil self-perception that they constituted a nation and lived in a distinct territory comprising contiguous districts soon crystallized into demands for self-determination, autonomy and subsequently for a separate Tamil state.

Tamil nationalism has evolved through a moderate and militant phase. The moderate phase was predominant until the 1970s. In the early post-independence years, Tamil politicians believed that Tamil interests were best served through cooperation with the party in power. It was only in the mid-1950s, when parity of status between the Sinhalese and Tamil languages was abandoned in favor of "Sinhala Only" that Tamils came to realize that cooperation was not rewarding.

The idea of a federal system, which did not attract much support until 1956, now captured Tamil imagination. The Federal Party, whose main plank was a federal set-up, received a strong endorsement from the Tamils in the 1956 elections. The enactment of the Official Language Act, the state's brutal response to peaceful protests by Tamils, and the outbreak of anti-Tamil violence on the island spurred the escalation of demands.

While Tamil political parties worked within parliament to influence policies, they simultaneously used extra-parliamentary methods, including non-violent protests and civil disobedience movements, to pressure the government.

There were calls for secession, too, during this moderate phase. Tamil politicians warned that if the Sinhalese continued to be unaccommodating, the Tamils would choose to have a division of the country. But secession had little support. A Tamil politician, who contested the 1960 elections on a secessionist plank, was defeated. Even though the Federal Party repeatedly complained of the government breaking pacts and promises it made with the Tamils, in its 1970 election manifesto, the party appealed to the electorate to refrain from supporting any political movement that advocated the division of the country as this would benefit neither the country nor the Tamils.

The Tamil movement witnessed a sudden stridency in demands and methods in the 1970s. A number of developments triggered this change. One was the adoption of a constitution that discriminated against the minorities. Two days after its promulgation, three Tamil parties came together to form the Tamil United Front (TUF). The formation of TUF electrified the movement.

The 1971 insurrection by Sinhalese radical youth inspired Tamil youth to take up arms against the state. The creation of Bangladesh convinced the Tamils that India, as in Bangladesh's case, would come forward to back their struggle for a separate state too.

But it was the introduction of a new university admissions policy that most significantly fanned the flames of youth protests. It required Tamil students to secure higher grades than their Sinhalese counterparts to gain the same seat in a university. The policy led to a sharp fall in Tamil admissions to professional education.

The impact this policy had on the Tamil psyche can be understood only in the context of what education means to Tamils. With opportunities for employment in agriculture and industry almost negligible in the north and with "Sinhala Only" closing options in the civil services, a university education in medicine, engineering or law was the Jaffna youth's economic lifeline. Squeezed out of that option, an enraged youth population came out in protest.

The death of nine Tamils at the 1974 World Tamil Conference due to police firing or electrocution was blamed on the state. From alienation, the mood was now defiant. Jaffna erupted.

A number of militant youth groups emerged, some with close ties to the TUF. The moderate-militant nexus was evident, as the Tamil politicians never condemned the militants' methods. In 1975, the mayor of Jaffna, a member of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), was shot dead. The number of violent incidents steadily mounted. The targets were initially Tamil politicians who "collaborated" with the Sinhalese.

The year 1976 saw the moderate TUF shift to a demand for separation, under pressure from militant youth. On May 5, 1976, an underground group, the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) changed its name to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). A week later, the TUF included the word "liberation" in its name and came to be called the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF). The TULF resolved that a sovereign state of Tamil Eelam based on the right of self-determination had become inevitable.

In the 1977 elections, the TULF asked for a mandate for Tamil Eelam. It received a clear one from the Northern province. The result in the Eastern province was ambiguous as no TULF candidate won in Muslim majority areas.

The TULF was now in a dilemma. Its youth wing was pressuring it to deliver on Tamil Eelam. TULF leaders described the army as an "occupation force" and reiterated their commitment to Tamil Eelam. They never condemned assassinations or acts of sabotage by Tamil youth. In the process, they accorded legitimacy to the militants and their methods. However, as the main party in opposition in parliament, they were constrained to act according to the constitution. Therefore, in practice, they clung to parliamentary methods.

In July 1983, anti-Tamil violence broke out in Colombo. Tamil homes and businesses were systematically targeted by mobs led by persons with links to the ruling UNP. Thousands of Tamils fled to the Northest and Eastern provinces, strengthening the concept of the "Tamil homeland" as a refuge. Many times more that number crossed over to India. The 1983 violence led to thousands of Tamil youth joining the militant groups. With arms and training from India, their firepower increased.

While the TULF's own shortcomings contributed in some measure to the rise of militancy, the role of the Sri Lankan government in this transition was substantial. It undermined proposals negotiated with the TULF. Seeking to settle scores with Tamil politicians, it undermined their credibility in the eyes of the Tamil people. It negotiated with little intention of implementing what came out of the negotiations. It destroyed in the process the dialogue option.

Then, the constitution was amended, making it mandatory for members of parliament to forswear separatism. The Tamil MPs, under pressure from the militants, could not disavow Tamil Eelam. Consequently, the TULF MPs did not take the oath and lost their seats in parliament. Thus, the parliamentary path for dialogue with the state was lost to the Tamils. The gun became the only means of dialogue with the state.

As a reaction to state oppression, Tamil nationalism as an ideology of resistance was initially progressive. However, early in its evolution it exhibited reactionary tendencies and over time came to imitate the state in several ways.

Like the Sri Lankan state that excluded minorities, Tamil nationalism failed to forge an identity that included the Indian Tamils and Tamil Muslims. It was often undemocratic and intolerant of dissent - those Tamils who differed with the Freedom Party's thinking were labeled traitors and attacked. If Tamils did not comply with the party's calls for agitation, they were beaten up.

Besides, Tamil nationalism had a middle-class character. It did not articulate the concerns of the poor or the truly disadvantaged. It did not challenge the caste hierarchy. Neither was it completely pacific in content, even during the "moderate" phase. The symbols and language used were distinctly violent.

This was the ideological milieu in which the militant organizations emerged. The difference between the Tamil nationalism of the moderate phase and that which came to dominate Tamil society in the 1980s and 1990s was that the latter used violence not just symbolically, but practically as well.

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