Asia Times: India/Pakistan


	May 1, 2002	atimes.com

India/Pakistan

Tigers show they mean business
By Sudha Ramachandran

'Towards the imagined haven of Eelam'

Selective roots to Tamil nationalism

Why the Tigers call the shots

BANGALORE - The on-going peace process in Sri Lanka is the fifth attempt at negotiating a resolution to the near two-decade-long conflict in the country. Its outcome will be closely watched not just by Sri Lanka's people who have suffered directly because of the war but also by a number of countries and a variety of interests.

Right from its inception, the conflict in Sri Lanka was not one confined to domestic actors alone. In addition to the Sri Lankan state, the Sinhalese parties and the Tamil parties and militant groups, a number of external actors have been involved and influenced the conflict, often strengthening the adversaries with diverse support.

Reflecting the internationalization of the conflict today is the fact that the Norwegians are brokering the current peace process. A number of countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom and India have expressed support for it, and the venue of the talks is Thailand in June.

From the 1980s onward, the Sri Lankan government and the Tigers have looked overseas for diplomatic and material support. The government started scoring on the international diplomatic front only in the mid-1990s when President Chandrika Kumaratunga made a genuine effort at negotiating a devolution package with the Tamils.

International support for the Liberation Tigers of Tamileelam (LTTE) suffered a huge set back in 1991 following the assassination of then Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, reportedly by the Tigers. LTTE suicide missions strengthened the organization's image as a deadly killer force and in the process earned it the label of a terrorist organization. Banned in several countries as well as domestically, including India, the US, UK and Canada, the LTTE's stock internationally plummeted further when it figured in Washington's list of foreign terrorist organizations last year.

The ban on the LTTE and its terrorist label has meant much more than just a change in the organization's status. It has also affected the LTTE's elaborate overseas network and its strategy.

Throughout the 1980s, India provided the Tigers and the other Tamil rebels support and sanctuary. Separated from India by the narrow Palk Straits, the militants operating on the Jaffna peninsula could hop across to the southern Indian state of Tamil Nadu, where thanks to ethnic links with the locals and a friendly government in Madras, the LTTE was able to build an awesome network. Injured Tigers came to Tamil Nadu for treatment and the locals were more than willing to sell the LTTE diesel, medicine and clothing.

More controversial was the Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing's (RAW) supply of arms and training to the LTTE and the other Tamil militant groups from 1984-87.

It is generally believed in Sri Lanka that India favored the LTTE. However, senior RAW officials who were involved in the Sri Lanka operation told this correspondent that the LTTE was never India's favorite as it was seen to be not amenable to Indian influence and unwilling to give up the Tamil Eelam demand. Since the creation of a separate Tamil Eelam was not in India's interest, the LTTE received less weapons compared to other groups like TELO, for instance.

The LTTE was therefore suspicious of New Delhi's intentions from the start. Its good equations were with the chief minister of Tamil Nadu, which it fully exploited.

The LTTE's uneasy relationship with India soured further when the Tigers rejected the 1987 India-Sri Lanka peace accord and fought the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The final break came with the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Gandhi. India dismantled the elaborate network and support for the Tigers evaporated. The LTTE leader, Velupillai Prabakaran, is a wanted man in India today and there are demands for his extradition from Sri Lanka.

With Indian support drying up, the LTTE should have collapsed. It did not because it had built up a sophisticated network across continents, a veritable multinational corporation.

Describing the LTTE's international links, Anthony Davis wrote in Asiaweek, "A complex, shadowy network developed over more than a decade, it mirrors the sophistication of the quasi-governmental structure built by the Tigers in Sri Lanka itself. Drawing on the loyalties and resources of members of a global Tamil Diaspora, the network - call it LTTE International Inc - links commercial companies and small businesses, informal banking channels, a fleet of ships, political offices, aid and human rights organizations, arms dealers and foreign mercenaries."

The LTTE International has a "quasi diplomatic organization, with around 38 offices globally. Aside from centers in leading Western states with large Tamil communities, the Tigers are represented in countries as far-flung as Norway and Botswana. The LTTE also works through sympathetic umbrella groups such as the Australasian Federation of Tamil Associations and the Federation of Associations of Canadian Tamils.

"The war for international hearts and minds is conducted at a level of sophistication far more advanced than anything Colombo has reached. Diplomatic missions and news organizations receive daily faxes detailing - albeit selectively - battlefield reports transmitted by satellite phone links. The LTTE puts out slick videos projecting in gut-churning detail the results of government air strikes [while editing out LTTE military units the planes are trying to target]. And it uses the Internet both as a propaganda tool and a means to appeal for funds."

But it is the LTTE's links with international arms merchants, its transcontinental business ventures that finance its protracted armed struggle, and its shipping network that is perhaps the most important part of its activities overseas. LTTE International Inc functions like an iceberg - only a part of its work is visible even to governments on whose soil it operates.

While the ban on the LTTE in several countries in the West brought its activities under scrutiny of intelligence agencies, pressure on the organization increased following September 11. With the United Nations Security Council passing a resolution making it mandatory for member countries to deny financial and logistical support to terrorists and their network, pressure on groups like the LTTE mounted. Figuring on the US list of foreign terrorist organizations and with the US leading an international war against terrorism, the LTTE's label as a terrorist organization spelt big trouble for the Tigers.

It is widely believed that the international mood against terrorism is mainly responsible for the LTTE's current willingness to come to the negotiating table. Washington's involvement in the current peace process and its clear signals of support to the government's effort has put further pressure on the Tigers. During her visit to Sri Lanka in March, US Assistant Secretary of State Christina Rocca made clear US support for Sri Lanka's territorial integrity - a big blow to the LTTE's aspirations for a separate state.

While refusing to state just what the US would do if the Tigers pulled out of the peace process, Rocca said that Washington was monitoring developments closely. Without committing to providing military assistance to the Sri Lankan government in the event of the Tigers walking out of the peace process, she pointedly referred to the "long history of close military cooperation" between the US and Sri Lanka.

When representatives of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE sit down to talk in Thailand, many other international actors besides the US, India and Norway will be monitoring its progress. Arms dealers and drug-runners who have made millions of dollars out of the war would like to see the conflict continue. Whether it is their interests or those of Sri Lanka's peace-hungry people that will eventually win remains to be seen.

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